

**The Propaganda Model, Class Struggle and New Media Technology:
An analysis of the Propaganda Model in an age of social uprising, and social media**

Michael Corcoran
Capstone Project in International Relations
Prof. Ursula Tafe
University of Massachusetts, Boston

Acknowledgments

Numerous individuals at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, have been instrumental in assisting me in my analysis of the media, and its impact on international issues. Of those who helped me in my efforts to produce this research, the most important has been Prof. Ursula Tafe, who has guided me through this process from the start, and has been invaluable with her numerous edits and suggestions, and very generous with her time. I would also like to thank Prof. Robert Weiner, the director of the graduate program, for his constant support and encouragement. Prof. Leila Farsakh taught me in several classes which directly examined the relationship between the media, the State and society at large. Lastly, I would like to thank the late Prof. Jalal Alamgir, whose class I was fortunate enough to attend prior to his unfortunate death last year. He was an excellent researcher and educator and will be missed. The fruits of his work will continue to be demonstrated in the work of his students, who gained so much from his teaching, support and expertise.

Abstract:

In 1988 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky presented for the first time the Propaganda Model. The model aims to provide an “analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of U.S. media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships from which they operate.” It hypothesizes that U.S corporate media will generally produce news content that will serve to benefit elite interests. News serves these interests, not through direct censorship, but through five filters (ownership, advertising, flak, sourcing and national ideology) that exist within the institutional structure of private national media organizations. It attempts to empirically demonstrate, by measuring volume, sourcing and tone of news output, how the political economy of the mass media generally serves the interests of the centers of power that own and control the media, and those with similar interests. In terms of international affairs, the propaganda model predicts that media coverage will favor the US and its allies, hiding or downplaying their crimes and emphasizing their plights, while doing exactly the opposite for enemy states or regimes. The model, which has been well tested, has been a valuable contribution to media studies and has helped scholars better understand the propaganda function of the media. As media technology changes, however, it is important for those who study the media to adjust as well. In recent years there has been an explosion of new media technology, namely the widespread use of “social media” – such as Twitter and YouTube – which have been used by millions of regular people, who might typically not have access to mass communication, to create and share content, and even organize politically. These new media technologies offer the prospect of an increased democratization of the media and, by creating the ability for people from all over the world to spread news without the filters that exist within a capitalist, private media corporation, In 2011, these technologies were instrumental in messaging and political organizing for the Egyptian Revolution and the Occupy movement in the United States. This paper will test the propaganda model on these case studies to assess any potential impact new social media has had in altering news output, and in particular the propaganda function, of the media in the United States.

Table of Contents

- 1. Introduction**
- 2. Methodology**
- 3. Literature Review**
- 4. Assessing the Impact of Social Media**
- 5. Testing Coverage of Egypt**
- 6. Testing Coverage of Occupy**
- 7. Considering Other Variables**
- 8. Conclusions and Considerations for Future Study**

I. Intro

In 1988 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky introduced the Propaganda Model (PM). The model aims to provide an “analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of U.S. media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships from which they operate.”¹ It hypothesizes that US corporate-owned media will generally produce news content that will serve to benefit elite interests. News agencies serve these interests, not through direct censorship, but through five filters (ownership, advertising, flak, sourcing and ideology) that

exist within the institutional structure of private media organizations.ⁱⁱ The model attempts to empirically demonstrate, by measuring volume, sourcing and tone of news output, how the political economy of the mass media generally serves the interests of the centers of power that own and control the media, and those with similar elite interests; in terms of international affairs, the propaganda model predicts that media coverage will favor the US and its allies, hiding or downplaying their crimes and emphasizing their plights, while doing exactly the opposite for enemy states or regimes. The role of the US and its allies will be assumed to be well-intended and benevolent, while enemy states and entities will be seen as aggressive, undemocratic, and unlawful. The model attempts to show that the owners of mass communication use media, not on behalf of the general population, but to advance their own interests. This leaves the issues of importance to an increasingly disengaged and politically invisible working class population with little serious examination in the most important national media outlets. The model, which has been well tested, has been a valuable contribution to media studies and has helped scholars better understand the propaganda function of the media.

Indeed, since 1988, corporate consolidation of the media has only increased, and dramatically so, strengthening the ownership filter outlined in the PM. In 1983 Ben Bagdikian wrote The Media Monopoly, highlighting how the vast majority all of mass communication outlets were then-owned by about 50 large corporations (Bagdikian).ⁱⁱⁱ By 1990, only seven years later, that number had dwindled to 23 corporations.^{iv} Now, the bulk of US media outlets – from newspapers to magazines, to book publishers to television stations – are owned primarily by merely five corporations: Viacom, AOL/Time Warner, News Corporation, Comcast and Disney.^v The concentrated ownership of mass communication and the existence of journalism as a

commodity, as opposed to a public service, have marginalized the voices of the masses who do not share the same interests of the concentrated power that owns the media: the working class, minorities, radicals and so on.

Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky introduced the Propaganda Model in Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, which borrows its title from journalist Walter Lippmann (and an expert on the use of propaganda) who said that power brokers, using mass communications, engage in the “manufacture of consent,” a process which “was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy,” but had instead gotten stronger.^{vi}

In 1921, when Lippmann wrote his famous work, Public Opinion, propaganda had already become a “regular organ of popular government.”^{vii} Manufacturing Consent recognizes this long history of systematic propaganda and develops the propaganda model to empirically test for this function, which they find is executed in numerous and often subtle ways: accepting certain doctrinal positions as uncontroversial facts; limiting the range of permissible debate (but still engaging in healthy debate within the acceptable framework, further creating the illusion of a vibrant, engaging press open to numerous viewpoints); holding different standards of law, morals and behavior for leaders and states based on their geopolitical relationship with the United States ; and dismissing or ignoring threats to elite interests, such as class-based struggle or third-world nationalism. In a “world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest” maintaining a narrative favorable to concentrated power “requires systematic propaganda.” News media, according to the model, produces content that “serves the ends of a dominant elite.”^{viii}

It is important to note how propaganda in a democracy is quite different than the direct control of media that authoritarian and totalitarian states often have. Propaganda in the US is “normally not accomplished through crude intervention ... but by the selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editor’s the internalization of priorities and definitions on newsworthiness that conform to the institution’s policy.”^{ix}

As mass media changes, however, the methods to study the media must also be revisited to adjust to existing realities. New Media Technology (NMT) that has developed in just the last few years, in particular, have greatly impacted the way information is consumed and disseminated, such as “social media” outlets, and pan-Arab broadcast networks that stream online 24 hours a day in both Arab and English. The major advances in media technology have significantly altered the media landscape across the world. The speed in which NMT enables news to be spread across the world, as well as the increasing level of access to these technologies, has created a world of global communication where people across nations have become increasingly, and irreversibly, interconnected. This was especially evident during the social uprisings of 2011. In the Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street protests, activists were able to spread messages, organize politically, produce images, stream meetings, and counter alleged misinformation, all using social media. Some of the largest news items in 2011 – aspects of the protests in the Middle East, or the pepper-spraying incidents involving “Occupy” protesters in California – can be traced back, not to a major newspaper or channel, but to a solitary internet post or video.^x

Further, in the case of the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera English (AJE) – which has different political and cultural sensibilities than US media – was on-hand to provide coverage of the revolution from a different perspective than dominant US media outlets.^{xi} Al Jazeera’s coverage

won awards and was lauded for being far superior to US broadcast coverage of events in the region.^{xii}

While the PM has been widely tested and shown to be a solid framework for analyzing news output, changes to the media and the world more broadly do necessitate examining how the model works when it includes new media technology of the current day. This paper seeks to examine the propaganda model in light of new media technologies, such as social media outlets and Al Jazeera English, and assess if the existence of these new entities has impacted US news coverage and/or the propaganda function it serves according to the Propaganda Model. To examine this, this paper will test the PM using these case studies to assess any potential impact new social media has had in altering news output in the United States. The paper will test the hypothesis that in the cases of the Egyptian Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street movement, the organized use of social media (and in the case of Egypt, the widely seen coverage from al Jazeera) served to counter the propaganda function of the US news media. Since new media technologies enables masses of regular, working class people to spread news and impact the dominant narrative – often before major corporate news outlets go to press – the US media would be less able to credibly downplay the plight of the Egyptian protesters, or the undemocratic tendencies of Mubarak, as the propaganda model would predict. Likewise, if Occupy was able to impact the national discourse through the use of NMT, the US media would less credibly be able to downplay their message of economic injustice and income inequality that would threaten elite interests, including the owners of media corporations, such as Viacom and News Corporation. Here, instances where the predictions of the PM are found to be less reliable can be instructive. If we find a strong correlation between the use of social media and the lessening of the propaganda function, it could well be useful to consider ways to alter the

propaganda model to account for these developments. It may also be worth examining methods in which, through the organized use of new media, the elite bias within the corporate media that the propaganda model asserts, can be countered to some extent.

II. Notes on Methodology

A. Allies and Enemies and the Use of Paired Examples

There are numerous ways to test the propaganda model. One of the most valuable methods is the use of “paired example.” This process entails finding situations that are as close to the other as possible – preferably one by a U.S. enemy and the other by an ally – and comparing the differences in coverage depending on who the subject of the news media is. Manufacturing Consent uses many such examples.^{xiii} On foreign policy issues, the propaganda model demonstrates differences in the way the media treats US allies, compared with nations hostile to the United States, even when they commit similar, or sometimes identical crimes (election fraud, war crimes etc ...) The prediction is that the US will ignore or downplay atrocities committed by client states and allied leaders, while they give rigorous attention – in news columns and editorials – condemning similar injustices committed by enemy states. Likewise, victims of atrocities committed by US allies are “non-worthy” of coverage, whereas victims of leaders who oppose the US-dominated world order are “worthy of coverage.”^{xiv} For instance, when there was an illegal coup committed in Honduras in 2009, the ousted leader was an enemy of the US (a self-described Bolivarian socialist), while those who executed the coup were more favorable to US economic policies. Despite the fact that the UN, the EU, most human rights organizations, and the Organization for American States (OAS) all decried the coup as illegal, the US media largely ignored the jarring undemocratic takeover. Yet, during the same summer, when

allegation (never entirely substantiated) were made against Mahmoud Ahmanidejad for election fraud, the US devoted massive coverage to the issue, sympathizing heavily with anti-regime protesters and sharply condemning Iran for its failure in democracy. The data that can be gleaned from the study of paired examples can help demonstrate double standards in coverage between US allies and enemies.

In the 10 days following the Honduran coup, the *Times* devoted 13 news articles to the events unfolding there – only two of which appeared on Page 1 – totaling less than 14,000 words. They ran two op-eds, one news analysis piece, no editorials and no letters to the editor. In the 10 days following the Iranian elections, by contrast, the *Times* ran 37 news articles on the issue – more than 38,000 words in total – including 15 front-page articles. The paper also published 12 op-eds, six news analysis pieces, two editorials and more than 2,600 words in letters to the editor.^{xv}

B. Measuring the Impact of New Media

In section 5 the impact of social media on a given event (not the news media coverage per se) is analyzed. Once it can be determined that new media technology did indeed play a role in an event, it is then useful to use paired examples to test its impact on news media coverage. Measuring the impact of new media on the propaganda model, however, requires different types of paired examples, because the variable in question is not merely whether the subject in question is allied with the United States, or shares the same elite interests as the corporations that own the media, but also whether or not new media technology may have played a role in the coverage. To test the hypothesis that, due to the role of new media, US media output will be less likely to meet the predictions of the propaganda model, we must compare coverage of an event or a leader, such as Mubarak, before the rampant use of social media, with coverage of Mubarak during the revolution, when social media had impacted the global narrative. This way the impact

of the variable (the influence of new media technology on US media coverage) can be assessed. Likewise, we can compare the coverage of issues like income inequality and economic protests prior to use of social media, to coverage during the Occupy movement, when social media was rampant.

Another paired example that could be useful is to compare US coverage of protests movements against US allies in nations that had widespread use of new media technologies (such as Egypt), compared with coverage of protests against US allies (Saudi Arabia) where social media was not a major factor. If there is a strong correlation between the existence of social media on the one hand, and US media coverage scrutinizing a US ally on the other – the opposite of what the propaganda model would predict – it is quite possible that we could be witnessing the impact that new media has on the US media coverage. This would be a correlative link, as other variables could potentially account for the changes in media output, but with enough testing the correlative link could be persuasive and important and worthy of further examination.

Finding appropriate “apples to apples” comparisons is not easy and sometimes impossible. As is the case when measuring data in the social sciences, where all variables cannot be controlled, no example is identical. For instance, comparing coverage of Mubarak during the revolution in 2011 when he was about to be ousted from office, to coverage of the 2005 Egyptian elections (as this paper does), when controversy and protests erupted over the validity of the election results, as well as the jailing of an opposition candidate, is instructive as it enables us to see how coverage of a specific leader might have been changed.^{xvi} But the size of the protests in 2005, and thus the geopolitical significance of the event, clearly pales in comparison to the Arab Spring. However, the lack of perfect pairings can be countered by making further tests. For

instance, comparing the Egyptian protests to the 2002 coup of Hugo Chavez enables us to compare coverage of events that had more in common, even if it involved a different leader. The 2002 coup in Venezuela, like the 2011 Arab Spring resulted in a world leader, in charge of a nation of geopolitical significance being ousted. It also compares events where the protests in the streets were massive. While no paired example is perfect, if the PM is shown to meet its predictions over the course of numerous tests, it can show patterns of media bias that counter the impact uncontrolled variables may have on any single event.

Lastly, case studies can also be used that do not involve paired examples. For instance, the ability of social media to directly impact coverage (ie, the stories are about social media, or what was produced on social media), can also help demonstrate the impact of social media on media output.

C. Choosing Sources

When applying the propaganda model it is important to understand the type of media institutions the model is referencing. The most useful sources generally are “agenda setting” publications that cover national issues, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post. Another important criterion is that the media entity be privately owned, and not state-run or government funded. This is not to say these public media entities are immune to propaganda, or do not face some of the same filters, but they do deal with all of the filters (say, advertising). Likewise, the business press is excluded from tests. This is not essential, but the preference since the audience of papers like the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times are often, themselves, elites. There are some, including the architects of the PM, that find that these outlets – which often inform the financial decisions of investors – are more likely to broach topics that could challenge dominant US ideology, since it is in the interests of consumers of these products

to have no important information omitted or distorted to better improve their investment decisions.^{xvii}

D. Examining Broad Trends

Another method used in this paper to test the impact of NMT is to find changes in tone and volume of coverage that correlate with the use of social media. For instance, this paper examines how often a perjorative term, such as dictator, may be applied to a leader in the years and decades prior to the invention and mass usage of social media, and seeing if the use of the term increased or decreased once social media, and its ability to enable citizens and activists to shape the global narrative of a story, became prevalent.

III. Literature Review

A. Before the Model

The view that the media, even when privately owned, could be an effective propaganda tool for elite sectors of society, and the government, has been put forth before. The neo-Marxist theorist Louis Althusser, for instance, wrote that the media – along with many other institutions – served as Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) or ideological tools that benefit the elite classes. These ISAS include the media, the church, the family and other pervasive institutions of society. Althusser writes: “To my knowledge, *no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses,*” Althusser wrote (emphasis in original).^{xviii} In many ways, Althusser’s research can be seen as a precursor to the PM. While, Althusser’s view was abstract and philosophical, however, Herman and Chomsky in 1988 attempted to provide a quantifiable model that can be measured and tested with some degree of objectivity – an important development. Herman and Chomsky also

focused their research entirely on the media, while Althusser's work on ISA included the media as one of many private institutions that served the ideological ends of the State.

B. Reaction by Scholars

The propaganda model was initially rejected by the academic community and generally criticized, if mentioned at all, by mainstream scholars. In fact, Chomsky and Herman's second-order prediction was that their scholarship would be largely marginalized by the media it critiques and the academic community.^{xix}

In time, however, the model gained more prominence and more students and scholars applied it in their media studies. Joan Pedro notes that the Propaganda Model went through a second phase of critical reception in the early 2000s and beyond, which has "been marked by greater engagement and significant debate."^{xx} Scholars such as Andrew Mullen and Jeffery Klaehn observed in 2010 that the model "continues to provide an invaluable tool for understanding the media within contemporary capitalist societies," and suggested that it "is even more relevant today than when it was advanced."^{xxi}

While the propaganda model has been tested many times over the years, there remain constant efforts to adapt it to current conditions. The creators of the model have written about the subject on numerous occasions. In 1996, Herman wrote, "The dramatic changes in the economy, communications industries, and politics over the past decade have tended to enhance the applicability of the propaganda model. The first two filters -- ownership and advertising -- have become ever more important. The decline of public broadcasting, the increase in corporate power and global reach, and the mergers and centralization of the media, have made bottom line considerations more controlling. The competition for serving advertisers has become more intense. Newsrooms have been more thoroughly incorporated into transnational corporate

empires, with shrunken resources and even less management enthusiasm for investigative journalism that would challenge the structure of power. In short, the professional autonomy of journalists has been reduced.^{xxii}

Herman also addresses the Internet, then in its infancy.

“Some argue that the Internet and the new communication technologies are breaking the corporate stranglehold on journalism and opening an unprecedented era of interactive democratic media. There is no evidence to support this view as regards journalism and mass communication. In fact, one could argue that the new technologies are exacerbating the problem. They permit media firms to shrink staff while achieving greater outputs and they make possible global distribution systems, thus reducing the number of media entities. Although the new technologies have great potential for democratic communication, left to the market there is little reason to expect the Internet to serve democratic ends.^{xxiii}

Other writings on the propaganda model include media critic Philip Schlesinger, who found merits in the filters but found the PM to be "a highly deterministic vision of how the media operate coupled with a straightforward functionalist conception of ideology."^{xxiv}

C. Potential Changes

There have been fairly recent studies of the model which suggest tweaking it to reflect new phenomena or to fill potential holes in the model as it is constructed. Anthony Dimaggio, for instance, wrote a book discussing media and foreign policy and suggested the “emphasis on objectivity” in the media should also serve as a filter for the propaganda model.^{xxv} Chomsky and Herman further wrote about the model, and how it had stood up to scrutiny in 2003, then acknowledging more explicitly the growing role of the Internet, but still saying its existence did little to democratize the media, or lessen the propaganda function of the media. Herman wrote:

The propaganda model remains a very workable framework for analyzing and understanding the mainstream media--perhaps even more so than in 1988. As noted earlier in reference to Central America, the media's performance often surpassed expectations of media subservience to government propaganda. It did so, also, in their

reporting on the Persian Gulf and Yugoslav wars of 1990 and 1999 respectively (Mowlana et al. 1992; Kellner 1992; Herman 1999: 161- 6; Chomsky 1999). And we are still waiting for our critics to provide a better model.^{xxvi}

At a conference commemorating the 20th anniversary of the model's introduction, the authors addressed how the role of blogging and other such items could lessen the propaganda function of the media.

“It is possible that this [the lessening of the propaganda function due to new media technology such as blogs] might happen, but it hasn't yet and there are several factors protecting the hegemony of the traditional media ... much of the new media on the Internet is oriented toward facilitating social connections, with politics secondary at best, and the best of the new alternative media have limited resources and outreach and specialize in critical analysis rather than news-making.”^{xxvii}

But, in fact, in the coming years – between 2008 when this quote was made and 2011, when the Arab Spring first occurred – many of these social networks were used for political ends and became used as tools of these uprisings. And the rise of microblogging sites like Twitter, (which largely diminished the importance of blogging) which allow small messages or postings (“tweets”) to enter into a massive stream of discourse read across the globe. This is in contrast to blogs where whatever is written or posted, is published on a lone blog, generally, and will only be read by those who visit the site. The opportunity for a message to be spread and circulated widely is much greater with microblogging than with traditional blogging. In fact, Chomsky himself even noted that while he has not studied the impact of these new technologies, nor does he use them, they seem to have some democratizing impact. “I'm probably the wrong person to ask. I'm kind of out of the Stone Age, I don't use any of these things and don't know a lot about them, but they are doubtless effective. For example, Occupy Wall Street could not have developed like it did without social media,” he said in an interview with *New Scientist*.^{xxviii}

To date there has been only a few published analysis of the impact of social media on the propaganda model.

IV. The Growing Use of Social Media and its Impacts

It was actually before the Arab Spring began (most date the spark of the Arab Spring as the self immolation of Tunisian vendor Mahomed Bouzani) the role of social media in social movements and geopolitics had become an increasingly important area of study and debate amongst academics and the media.^{xxix} Contested Iranian elections in 2009, which led to demonstrations often called “the Green Revolution,” were largely cited as having been organized, in large part, by social media outlets like the microblogging platform Twitter. *The Washington Post* also used the term “Twitter Revolution” to describe the uprisings (which failed to unseat the incumbent Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad); so too did popular US blogger Andrew Sullivan and the venerable *Atlantic Monthly*, which actually described the ordeal as “Iran’s Twitter Revolution.”^{xxx}

These claims, though a bit oversimplified, did demonstrate that the use of Twitter and other new media in social movements in Iran in 2009 were of serious intrigue in mainstream Western journals before the Arab Spring began. *Foreign Affairs*, largely viewed as the preeminent establishment foreign policy journal in the United States, ran a long essay written prior to the Arab Spring examining “the political power of social media,” and asked questions which further proved how the changing media landscape was very much a matter of geopolitical strategic interests.^{xxxi} “Since the rise of the Internet in the early 1990s, the world's networked population has grown from the low millions to the low billions,” wrote Clay Shirky in *Foreign Affairs*. “Over the same period, social media have become a fact of life for civil society

worldwide, involving many actors – regular citizens, activists, nongovernmental organizations, telecommunications firms, software providers, governments. This raises an obvious question for the U.S. government: How does the ubiquity of social media affect U.S. interests, and how should U.S. policy respond to it?”^{xxxii}


The connection between social movements and social media platforms – such as Facebook and especially Twitter – would soon become common-place in late 2010 and into 2011 when the Arab Spring blossomed into a global movement with massive implications for people and nations across the globe. The first such utterances were made when uprisings in Tunisia occurred following the aforementioned self-immolation of a poor street vendor who had grown frustrated by a lack of opportunity and disrespect from the Tunisian government. On queue, Sullivan titled a blog post in January of 2011 with the question, “Could Tunisia Be The Next Twitter Revolution?”^{xxxiii}

In a report by the Project for Information Technology and Political Islam, titled, “Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?” a group of academics cited their quantitative findings to conclude that “social media played a crucial role in the political uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.”^{xxxiv} The authors, importantly, also claimed that (emphasis added) “a spike in online revolutionary conversations often *preceded* major events on the ground,” which seeks to assess whether an increase in the use of social media helped to spark protests, or were the byproduct of protests that were sparked in other ways.^{xxxv} The author’s conclusion, thus, is that new media often led to action on the part of the movement for social justice in the Arab world. The report cited the use of key words on Twitter, the volume of related updates on Twitter (corresponding with key events, and the volume of

“viral videos” on the internet, which would often, the report said, “became an increasingly important tool for spreading news and information about Egypt’s uprisings.”^{xxxvi}

In particular, Egypt had an enormous amount of activity on the internet – especially Twitter – when its revolt helped lead to the fall Mubarak. The study observed, “Over the course of a week before Mubarak’s resignation, the total rate of tweets from Egypt and around the world about political change in that country ballooned from 2,300 a day to 230,000 a day. Interestingly, the relative contribution of people not living in the region diminished significantly over this period. On the day Mubarak left office, February 11, there were more than 225,000 Tweets outside the country that spread the news of his departure.” The report further concluded. “In the two weeks after Mubarak’s resignation, there was an average of 3,400 tweets a day about the political crisis in Egypt by people living in neighboring countries.” Another report done by the social media intelligence firm, Sysomos, measured an increase of tweets about Egypt to correspond with the peak of the revolution. Tweets about the uprisings went from about 120,000 in the week of January 16-23, 2011 to 1.3 Million the following week, when Mubarak was forced out of office (see chart 1, data from Sysomos):^{xxxvii}

Crisis in Egypt, Tunisia & Yemen



Rise of crisis related tweets




Chart 1: Tweets and Egyptian Revolution 1

V. Case Study: The Egyptian Arab Spring


In the case of Egypt, as noted above, the propaganda model would predict that coverage US media coverage would be favorable to Hosni Mubarak, who was a crucial US ally until his resignation in early 2011. Egypt receives \$2 billion in annual aid, the second highest recipient of

US aid, trailing only Israel. It dutifully upholds the US-Israeli-supported siege of Gaza and is the only state in the Middle East to recognize Israel.

Yet, even just anecdotal observations make it obvious that the narrative in the US media was critical of Mubarak, who was regularly critiqued for his undemocratic ways in the media. His efforts at cracking down on protesters were available worldwide well before US media went to press each day. Al Jazeera had live footage of the Arab Spring, and incidents such as Mubarak's decision to shut down the Internet simply were too widely known to be downplayed. Here, we see a scenario where the existence of new media brought attention to political realities well before the US corporate media could be the primary deliver of the news. The prediction here, which will be tested below, is that the coverage of the Egyptian Arab Spring will not be conducive to the prediction of the propaganda model, and that coverage of Mubarak would be more critical than the PM would predict, while coverage of the protesters would be more favorable than the PM would predict. If this prediction holds, the question then becomes why was the media coverage different? Was it the use of new media, or might other variables – a weakened Mubarak that is no longer a useful US ally, or the size and strength of class struggle and if so, we must ask why this is so.

In examining the media coverage, there is indeed a notable increase in negative coverage of Mubarak. For instance, we see a notable increase in the percentage of articles and stories that refer to Mubarak as a dictator across virtually all mediums. In chart 2, for instance, we see that in television and radio broadcasts from ABC News, CBS News, Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC, the term dictator was only applied to Mubarak in .01 percent of all stories about the man, during his 30 year tenure as the Head of State in Egypt, prior to the Arab Spring. During the Arab Spring, 25 percent of all stories about Mubarak references this term to describe the leader. ^{xxxviii}

Chart 2: Mubarak on TV and Radio



This trend holds true in newspaper coverage as well. In the Washington Post only .03 percent of newspaper articles mentioning Mubarak used the term dictator, a number that spiked up to (chart3) 19 percent during the Arab Spring (chart 4).^{xxxix} Likewise, the New York Times saw a similar increase, going from (chart 5) XX percent, to (chart 6) 18.2 percent

Chart 3: Mubarak, the Post, Before Arab Spring




Chart 4: the Post, Mubarak during Arab Spring




Chart 5: the Times before the Arab Spring





Chart 6: the Times during the Arab Spring



How much of this change can be attributed to social media? We can't say with certainty, and only can point out a notable correlative change in the tone of coverage. It is worth noting that there were several mentions of the impact of social media in the news coverage of these events. In the 159 articles mentioning Mubarak in the Times' during the Arab Spring, 33 mentioned Al Jazeera, 63 mentioned Facebook, 43 mentioned Twitter and 7 mentioned YouTube. This, of course, is not the only barometer of the impact of NMT. The tone in coverage could be attributed to the massive supply of news and commentary that poured out of these and other venues every day during the Arab Spring, which helped shape the global narrative – and direct references to these mediums are not needed for them to have an impact.

Another way to assess the strength of this correlation is to use a paired example. The 2005 Egyptian election is not a perfect pair (no such thing exists in the social sciences) but fits

on many levels. While Mubarak was accused of abuses of power throughout the Arab Spring, the same is true of the 2005, which were fraught with accusations of fraud; in fact, soon after the election ended, Mubarak's chief opponent was jailed.^{xl xli} But one major difference is that in 2005, social media was not a major force – Twitter and YouTube were not on the Web and Facebook was limited only to students.

The analysis shows a major difference in tone in the 2005 elections from that of the Arab Spring. While the coverage of the 2011 revolution routinely called Mubarak a “dictator,” in 2005, articles in the New York Times referenced how these elections were “a large gain for democracy and liberalism,”^{xlii} a “major development first and foremost for Egyptians and the emerging political class, which will draw many lessons from this day,”^{xliii} and a “first step in a process of managed political change and reform that Mubarak has launched.”^{xliv} In all the New York Times' coverage of the 2005 elections, Mubarak was never called a dictator.^{xlv}

Here, we can see that the predictions of the PM were largely accurate in 2005, where a key US ally was elected in what many called a sham election, but was largely praised in the Paper of Record. In 2011, this same leader was labeled a dictator in one in five articles from the very same paper. It is worth noting that this tone of coverage was not monolithic; the Post, for instance, did write a scathing editorial two months after the election, condemning it as illegitimate.^{xlvi} But the PM never asserts a total whitewash of dissenting views on the media, only the generally accepted parameters of debate. And here, the 2005 elections were largely accepted as positive, if imperfect, signs of democracy. Six years later, during the Arab Spring when millions took to social media to expose Mubarak as corrupt, the corporate media in the United States took a much more critical view, and indeed, may have looked embarrassingly out of touch if they insisted Mubarak was taking huge steps for democracy.

VI: Case Study: Occupy Wall Street

On September 17, 2011 a group of protesters started to “Occupy” Zuccotti Park in New York City, right at the heart of Wall Street. Naming itself “Occupy Wall Street,” the movement proposed a broad and general critique over the economic injustices of a system that allows the wealthiest one percent of the nation to continue to amass record profits and income, while much of the remaining 99 percent struggle to even survive. This appeal, which clearly pushes the idea of two classes with divergent interests, resonated far and wide and the Occupy movement, as it is now called, expanded into more than 900 cities and more than 82 countries.^{xlvii}

Interestingly, the Occupy movement has made the strategic decision to not make a list of specific demands, but instead to focus on growing the movement and in pushing for a better understanding of the class disparities and injustices that currently exist in the US financial system. In many ways the short-term goal of Occupy was not so much to change the economic policies of the US in the short-term but to have its message of class penetrate the national discourse. Therefore, its ability to penetrate the media narrative was of paramount importance to Occupy organizers. And the use of social media was a serious part of the Occupy strategy.


^{xlviii}Organizers broadcast meetings, operated chat rooms, made videos with songs and speeches, and made great use of Twitter and Facebook to spread their message.^{xlix} The New York Times made mention of this very fact, reporting that “Social media has played a vital role in the Occupy Wall Street movement since it began as a Twitter experiment in July ... And over the last two months, protesters used cell phones and social sites like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to spread their message around the world.”^l As an editorial in the New Statesman observed, “The kids don't have to wait any more for traditional news reporters to spin their message for them.”^{li}

Occupy is also an instructive case study in the sense that the movement directly targets elite concentrated wealth and power, or the “one percent,” of top-income earners in the United States. At times protesters specifically discussed corporate media as a target of its movement.^{lii} Therefore, it is clearly within the interests of elites to minimize the impact of Occupy Wall Street. To break through the filters of corporate media requires a movement to massive to ignore. In this case, however, Occupy’s message did manage to resonate and the movement grew rapidly. Anecdotally, there are many examples of this penetration of the national debate. The American Dialectic Association has named “Occupy” the “Word of the Year” for 2011, a feat made all the more impressive given that the term was not in the national consciousness until late September.^{liii} The GOP, in the heart of a heated presidential primary season, has been forced to consider the Occupy movement’s impact on the national debate as well. “I’m so scared of this anti-Wall Street effort. I’m frightened to death,” said Frank Luntz, a famous Republican strategist who focuses on political messaging. “They’re having an impact on what the American people think of capitalism.” Luntz went as far as to issue a memo that urged the GOP to refrain from using the word capitalism. “I’m trying to get that word removed and we’re replacing it with either ‘economic freedom’ or ‘free market ... [the public] think capitalism is immoral.”^{liv} And the word Occupy has now been used in countless ways: campaigns to “Occupy the Super Bowl,” the media, college campuses and Congress have been common-place since September.^{lv}

To test whether or not Occupy’s use of media technologies served to counter the propaganda function of the media requires going beyond anecdotal observations. An examination of the media coverage of the major issue of the Occupy campaign, income inequality, shows a correlation between the existence of Occupy Wall Street and a major increase in media references to issues like income inequality and class.

In measuring the content of the New York Times in the four months following the start of Occupy, we see (in chart 7) a major increase in articles referencing income inequality, when compared to the coverage of the same time period (September 17 - January 17) going back 10 years. There were 357 references to “income inequality” in the Times for the period when Occupy was active. Exactly 151 of those articles mention the Occupy movement directly, meaning not every reference was associated with an article about the movement, or events surrounding the movement. This suggests that the issue of income inequality was becoming a larger part of the national dialogue, beyond articles merely about the Occupy movement. The previous ten years, the range was 25-131, with an average of 63.9 references between September 17 and January 17 of the corresponding year.^{1vi}

Chart 7: New York Times and Inequality



¹ When measuring New York Times search results, only articles from the print publication were counted. This serves two primary functions: 1) to eliminate redundant articles, which appear the day before online (sometimes in abbreviated or slightly longer versions) and; 2) to avoid a bias towards recent years when there has been more information published online exclusively.

A similar trend exists in the Washington Post (chart 8). In the four months following the start of the Occupy movement, there were 117 references to income inequality in the Post, 54 of which mentioned Occupy. The previous 10 years had a range of 24-68, with an average of 39.6.^{2lvii}


Chart 8: Inequality/Washington Post



In a study of major broadcast news outlets the trend is just as strong. A search of radio and tv transcripts from MSNBC, ABC News, CBS News, NBC News, Fox News and CNN, there were 500 mentions of income inequality in the same four month period, 340 of which mention Occupy. In the previous 10 years the range was 17-98 and the average was of 47.7

² The standard noted in the above footnote applies to the Post, for identical reasons

(chart 9)



It is important to note that other variables could account for the rise in references to income inequality besides the social media-fueled Occupy movement. And moreover, one must also consider that the existence of the movement alone and not any connection to new media per se, as the reason for the change in media focus. Likewise, one could hypothesize that the flailing economy is the reason for the increase in references. But it is worth noting that there is correlation in the increase in references to inequality to correspond with the state of the economy year-by-year. The late 2000s economic recession hit its worst crisis in 2008, and unemployment reached the worst levels the following year. And yet, there is no noticeable change or increase for those years.

One can also argue that sustained class struggle itself is the reason for the increase in coverage, and this is indeed a compelling case (which will be discussed in more detail in section 8). The Occupy movement's growth made ignoring it or downplaying an untenable strategy for

corporate media. But this growth also corresponds with the spreading of its message through social media, meaning both class struggle and new media can be important variables in an increase in coverage of income inequality, which is, as noted above, to be ignored or downplayed by the media according to predictions of the PM.

VII: Class Struggle and other Variables

While this paper tests the impact that social media might have on the propaganda effect of media, it does not tackle the important topic of class struggle, which is evident in both case studies and which could serve as an important variable that could explain changes in media coverage. Since both the Egyptian Arab Spring, and the Occupy movement represent abnormally large movements largely predicated on class issues, this, as well as social media, serve to be important new variables. While this paper tests the latter, the former ought to be tested as well. Also of note is that the role of building class struggle with the aid of social media is also a new phenomenon that requires more research. As more case studies of note present themselves, we can better understand the role social media plays in both class struggle, shaping global media coverage.

Another variable to be considered is the changing status of world leaders. As noted above, the propaganda model asserts that media coverage of US allies will be generally favorable, and ignore crimes and atrocities, while coverage of US enemies will be quite the opposite. In the case of Egypt, Mubarak was a key ally. So, the negative coverage, as demonstrated above, seems to indicate a weakening of the propaganda function predicted by the PM. However, a plausible argument could be made that when Mubarak's domestic popularity made him something of a toothless leader (and virtually every government in the world, including the US, had called for his removal), he ceases to be a useful ally, and thus the

predictions of favorable coverage to allies is no longer valid. But this argument is circular. Mubarak's descent in popularity would likely have not been so rapid if it weren't for the communications used by activists on social media, and thus, one way or another, the use of social media to shape the media narrative served to change the media output. When put this way, the use of social media serves to either weaken the propaganda model, or change global circumstances so much that elite interests change. In either outlook, we see the prospects for massive change taking place at the hand of strategic use of social media.

VIII: Conclusions and potential avenue for further study

This paper asked the question: can new media technology serve to lessen the propaganda function of the corporate media, as predicted by the Propaganda Model? To try and answer this question, the paper analyzed two major events that occurred as social media was booming and events that used social media as a tool. What the paper has found is that there is a *strong correlation* between the use of social media and the lessening of the propaganda function. However, *no causal* link can be determined by this one study; to further understand how much of a role social media played in these instances, and might play in other events, it will be important for more research to be done that can test other potential variables (most notably, class struggle, or economic conditions) which could also account for the change in media output. Do class-based movements have a greater impact of pushing a narrative that is amplified by the media, compared with other types of movements (anti-war, gay rights etc ...)? This is a question that ought to be tested.

Also worth noting is that social media organizations are generally owned by large corporations – themselves members of “elite” sectors of society. Can these institutions be trusted

to enable tools to change society in a way that hurts elite interests? Might they be tempted to censor or minimize these impacts? Will states further intervene in the functioning of these mediums? Will they be used to enhance elite interests? Can public or non-profit institutions, democratically run by its users, replace these titans of the social media industry? All of the questions arise in the aftermath of the above research and any studies that can shed light on these questions could be invaluable in helping us understand the impacts of new media technology on media coverage and on the mobilization of activist movements. Will Youmans and Jillian York have attempted to answer some of these questions in a study done for the *Journal of Communications* published this year, in early 2012.^{lviii}

It is important to note that this research is not an attempt to discredit the propaganda model in the age of social media. It is simply testing to see, if under some circumstances, social media can counter the propaganda function of the media as it is predicted in the PM. Even within the Arab Spring storyline, many aspects of bias in favor of elite interests can be seen anecdotally, and have been tested in some cases. For instance, even if the US media turns on Mubarak, this does not mean it has condemned the United States for propping up the dictator to the tune of \$2 billion annually. Nor does it indicate that the media has placed a renewed emphasis in exposing the US relationships with undemocratic regimes with a record of human rights abuses.

In fact, Russ Baker, in a paper published for the Centre for Research and Globalization, observed that the US media effectively ignored a “Saudi Arab Spring,” which he called “a cautionary example of what happens when Western governments and their media are more favorable to some “revolutions” than others.”^{lix} Baker argues that when it fits US elites to bring attention to a revolution in the Arab World – Syria and Libya, for instance, both served to topple

of complicate life for US enemies – the US media will amplify tales of the abuses of these leaders and portray the revolutionary activists in a favorable light. They are, as Herman and Chomsky would say, “Worthy Victims.” But, in the cases of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Bahrain, where the United States has key geopolitical interests at stake that could be jeopardized if the in the current regimes fell, the media has been largely quiet.^{lx} Baker notes that The Associated Press and the New York Times failed to even refer to uprisings in Saudi Arabia as part of the “Arab Spring.” The Associated Press, Baker writes, described a crackdown of protesters in Qatif in November of 2011 as “a series of clashes between police and protesters in the country’s Shiite-dominated eastern region, starting in the spring.”^{lxi} The AP did not observe these “clashes” in the “spring” as part of the larger rebellions across the region, which the US and the US media selectively celebrates (Libya, Syria), while it supports crackdowns in places like Bahrain.^{lxii} Baker also observed that “according to a search of the [Lexis-Nexus] database (sic) the *Times* ran nothing at all on Qatif until Sunday November 27, when it featured a survey of turmoil throughout the region. A reference to Qatif was buried deep toward the end of the [piece](#), where it would go almost unnoticed ... Yet the *Times* should have realizing that it was looking at a pattern. After all, the paper did cover a previous incident in Qatif—back in *March*. It was a single article, with a Beirut dateline.”^{lxiii}^{lxiv}

So clearly, in terms of international relations, he trends of the propaganda model are not some distant theory of a bygone era. This, too, is true of the Occupy Movement. While Occupy was able, with the aid of social media, to put income inequality on the pages of major news centers, the movement itself still faced many negative articles from mainstream news outlets, which often decried the protesters as naïve and even or linked them with violence and crime.^{lxv} It took a massive global movement to increase media coverage of income inequality and crack

the veneer of elite propaganda; social media, as the data suggests, may correlate with lessening of the propaganda function, but it takes extreme and massive efforts to accomplish this.

But, clearly, as media is changing, it is important to examine how these new tools could serve to democratize the media, or how else these tools might change the functioning of the mass media. The social movements of 2010-2012 were important for numerous reasons. First, they demonstrate a capacity for democratic participation in public policy on a massive level. Secondly, the utilize new tools of communications that could – depending on many variables – transform the way information is understood across the globe. Together, these two trends could greatly change the world we live in. Therefore, those who study the media and its impact on policy and global affairs, must continue to better understand how social movements and social media work together.

VIV: Bibliography

Herman, Edward and Chomsky, Noam. “Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.” Pantheon Books (New York, NY) 1988; 2002.

Chomsky, Noam. “Media Control: the Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda” Seven Stories Press, 2002

Lippman, Walter. “Public Opinion” Free Press, 1997

Herman, Edward. “Propaganda Model: a Retrospective,” *Journalism Studies*, Volume 1, Number 1, 2000,

Herman, Edward. “The Propaganda Model Revisited,” *Monthly Review*. July 1996

Althusser, Louis. “Ideological State Apparatuses,” 1970 ,
<http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm>)

Youmans, Will and York Jillian. . “Activists Guide to Social Media,” *Journal of Communication Studies*

Howard Phillip, et al. “Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?” Project for Information Technology and Political Islam, Working Paper, January 2011. Available at: <http://www.pitpi.org/index.php/2011/09/11/opening-closed-regimes-what-was-the-role-of-social-media-during-the-arab-spring>

Keller, Jason. “Evaluating Iran’s Twitter Revolution,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 18, 2010.
<http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/evaluating-irans-twitter-revolution/58337/>

Jeffery Klaehn, "A Critical Review and Assessment of Herman and Chomsky’s ‘Propaganda Model’", *European Journal of Communication*, 17, pp.147–182, 2002.

Andrew Mullen and Jeffery Klaehn, 'The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model: A Critical Approach to Analyzing Mass Media Behavior,' *Sociology Compass*, 2010, Vol. 4(4), pp. 215-229.

Corcoran, Michael and Maher, Stephen. “The Times selective promotion of democracy,” *Extra*, August 2009.

Pedro, Joan. "The Propaganda Model and the Early 21st Century: Part 1" *The International Journal of Communication*. October 26, 2011. Available at: <http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/785/666>

Mullen, Andrew, Klaehn, Jeffery. "The Herman–Chomsky Propaganda Model: A Critical Approach to Analysing Mass Media Behaviour," *Sociology Compass*. Volume 4/4 2010. Available at: <http://www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Mullen-Klaehn-Sociology-Compass-essay.pdf>

"Iran's Twitter Revolution," *The Washington Times*, editorial, June 16, 2009; available at: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans-twitter-revolution/> ;

Sullivan, Andrew. "The Revolution Will Be Twittered," *The Daily Dish*, June 13, 2009. <http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2009/06/the-revolution-will-be-twittered/200478/>; accessed on November 28, 2011.

Shirky, Clay. "The Political Power of Social Media," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2011

ⁱ Herman, Edward and Chomsky, Noam. "Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media," Pantheon Books (New York, NY) 1988; 2002, pg xi

ⁱⁱ The fifth filter is said to be outdated with the end of the Cold War, though Herman has suggested possible replacements, including the ideological adherence to the free market and anti-terrorism as a state religion. This further demonstrates that the model can, and should be tweaked, to reflect changing realities. See: Herman, Edward, "The Propaganda Model Revisited," *The Monthly Review*, July 1996

ⁱⁱⁱ Bagdikian, Ben. The Media Monopoly, Beacon Press, 1988

^{iv} Herman, Edward and Chomsky, Noam. "Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media," Pantheon Books (New York, NY) 1988; 2002, pg xi

^v "Who Owns the Media? Media Ownership Chart," <http://www.freepress.net/ownership/chart>, accessed on May 13, 2012.

^{vi} Lippman, Walter. "Public Opinion" (1922); Available at: <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~Hyper2/CDFinal/Lippman/cover.html>

^{vii} Lippman, Walter. "Public Opinion" (1922); Available at: <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~Hyper2/CDFinal/Lippman/cover.html>

^{viii} Herman, Edward and Chomsky, Noam. "Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media," Pantheon Books (New York, NY) 1988; 2002, pg xi

^{ix} Ibid

^x For examples with Arab Spring, see: O'Donnell, Catherine, "Arab Spring: Revolution Goes Viral," Futurity.org (of University of Rochester and other colleges and universities) September 12, 2011, <http://www.futurity.org/top-stories/arab-spring-revolution-goes-viral/> , accessed on April 14, 2012. For

Occupy video of pepper spray see: Knickerbocker, Brad. "UC David pepper spray video goes viral," The Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 2011. <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/1120/UC-Davis-pepper-spray-incident-goes-viral> , accessed on March 29, 2012.

^{xi} "The Al Jazeera Moment," The Economist. February 11, 2011. Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/02/al_jazeera_moment

^{xii} Ibid

^{xiii} Herman, Edward and Chomsky, Noam. "Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media," Pantheon Books (New York, NY) 1988; 2002

^{xiv} Herman, Chomsky, "Manufacturing Consent." See chapter on Worthy and Unworthy Victims pg 37

^{xv} Maher, Stephen. "The Times selective promotion of democracy," Extra, August 2009.

^{xvi} "Backfunder: Egypt Election," Council on Foreign Relations, AUGISUT 31, 2005 accessed on May 15, 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypt-elections/p8744>

^{xvii} <http://www.chomsky.info/talks/20031021.htm>

^{xviii} Althusser, Louis. "Ideological State Apparatuses," 1970

<http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm>)

^{xix} For a detailed analysis of this prediction see: Mullen, Andrew. "20 Years on: The Second Order Prediction of the Propaganda Model," *Media Culture and Society*, July 2010, available at <http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/32/4/673.refs.html>

^{xx} Pedro, Joan. "The Propaganda Model and the Early 21st Century: Part 1" The International Journal of Communication. October 26, 2011. Available at: <http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/785/666>

^{xxi} Mullen, Andrew, Klaehn, Jeffery. "The Herman–Chomsky Propaganda Model: A Critical Approach to Analysing Mass Media Behaviour," *Sociology Compass*. Volume 4/4 2010. Available at: <http://www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Mullen-Klaehn-Sociology-Compass-essay.pdf>

^{xxii} Herman, Edward. "The Propaganda Model Revisited," *Monthly Review*. July 1996

^{xxiii} ibid

^{xxiv} Schlesinger, "From Production to Propaganda," *Media, Culture and Society*, 1989. As quoted in, Herman, "Prop Model Revisited," *Monthly Review*. July 1998

^{xxv} Dimaggio, Anthony. "When Media Goes to War: Hegemonic Discourse, Public Opinion, and the Limits of Dissent." (Monthly Review Press), New York, NY, 2010.

^{xxvi} Herman, Edward. "Propaganda Model: A Retrospective," *Against All Reason*. December 9, 2003.

^{xxvii} ibid

^{xxviii} Lawton, Graham. "Everything Was a Problem and We Did Not Understand a Thing," *New Scientist*. March 25, 2012.

^{xxix} For information on the self immolation that many feel started the Arab Spring see: Howard Phillip, et al. "Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?" Project for Information Technology and Political Islam, Working Paper, January 2011. Available at:

<http://www.pitpi.org/index.php/2011/09/11/opening-closed-regimes-what-was-the-role-of-social-media-during-the-arab-spring>

^{xxx} Keller, Jason. "Evaluating Iran's Twitter Revolution," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 18, 2010.

[http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/evaluating-irans-twitter-revolution/58337/;](http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/evaluating-irans-twitter-revolution/58337/)

"Iran's Twitter Revolution," *The Washington Times*, editorial, June 16, 2009; available at:

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans-twitter-revolution/> ; Sullivan, Andrew. "The Revolution Will Be Twittered," *The Daily Dish*, June 13, 2009. <http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2009/06/the-revolution-will-be-twittered/200478/>; accessed on November 28, 2011.

^{xxx} Shirky, Clay. "The Political Power of Social Media," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2011.

^{xxxii} *ibid*

^{xxxiii} Sullivan, Andrew. "Could Tunisia Be The Next Twitter Revolution?," *The Daily Dish*. January 13, 2011. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2011/01/could-tunisia-be-the-next-twitter-revolution/177302/> ; accessed on November 20, 2011.

^{xxxiv} Howard, et al, "Opening Closed Regimes," pg 23

^{xxxv} *Ibid*, pg 3

^{xxxvi} *Ibid* pg 22

^{xxxvii} Data available at: <http://mashable.com/2011/02/01/egypt-twitter-infographic/>

^{xxxviii} Search of Lexis-Nexus

^{xxxix} *Ibid*

^{xl} Human Rights Watch News Release: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/09/01/egypt-election-offers-public-debate-not-free-choice>

^{xli} White House statement on jailing of Ayman Nour: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051224-1.html>

^{xlii} Slackman, Michael. "Egypt's Presidential Election Ends," *the New York Times*, September 5, 2005. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/world/africa/04iht-egypt.html>

^{xliii} *New York Times*, "Q & A: Egypt's Presidential Elections," September 8, 2005. Quote is from an expert from the Council on Foreign Relations, Frank G. Wisner. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot1_090805.html?pagewanted=all

^{xliv} *Ibid*

^{xlv} Lexis-Nexus search

^{xlvi} *The Washington Post*, "Egypt's Ugly Elections," December 10, 2005. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/09/AR2005120901837.html>

^{xlvii} "Indignant Protests to go Global on Saturday," *Agence France Presse*, October 15, 2011.

^{xlviii} Orcutt, Mike. "How Occupy Wall Street Occupied Twitter, too," November, 11, 2009. Available at: <http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/editors/27324/> ; Accessed on April 1, 2012.

^{xlix} Preston, Jennifer. "Protesters Look for Ways to Feed the Web," February 25, 2012. *The New York Times*.

^l *ibid*

^{li} Penny, Laurie. "Occupy the Media," *The New Statesman.com* November 23, 2011. Available at: <http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/laurie-penny/2011/11/press-police-media-journalists> ; accessed on April 15, 2012.

^{lii} *Ibid*

^{liii} "Occupy is 2011 Word of the Year," January 6, 2012. *American Dialectical Association*. <http://www.americandialect.org/occupy-is-the-2011-word-of-the-year>

^{liv} Moody, Chris. "How Republicans are being taught to talk about Occupy Wall Street," December 1, 2011. *Yahoo News*; Available at: <http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/republicans-being-taught-talk-occupy-wall-street-133707949.html>; Accessed on April 17, 2012

^{lv} Zirin, David. "Occupy the Super Bowl: More than Just a Slogan," *The Nation*. January 31, 2012. Available at: <http://www.thenation.com/blog/165952/occupy-super-bowl-now-more-just-slogan> ; Accessed on March 4, 2012

^{lvi} Results from a search of the New York Times website for the term “income inequality” and “income inequality” with “Occupy

^{lvii} Search results from Lexis-Nexus

^{lviii} York Jillian, Youmans, Will. “Social Media and the Activist Toolkit: User Agreements, Corporate Interests and the Information Superstructure of Modern Social Movements,” *Journal of Communication*,

^{lix} Baker, Russ. “The Saudi Arab Spring that Nobody Noticed,” *The Centre for Research and Globalizations*, December 8, 2011. Available at:

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=28112>

^{lx} Baker, Russ. “The Saudi Arab Spring that Nobody Noticed,” *The Centre for Research and Globalizations*, December 8, 2011. Available at:

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=28112> ; For an analysis of Libya, vs Bahrain and Yemen, see: Corcoran, Michael and Maher, Stephen. “The Myth of Humanitarian War,” *The International Socialist Review*, March/April 2011. Available at: <http://www.isreview.org/issues/77/feat-libya&media.shtml>

^{lxi} The Associated Press, as quoted in Baker, Russ. “The Saudi Arab Spring that Nobody Noticed.”

^{lxii} “Saudi told of US Bahrain intervention: US Official,” *Agence France-Presse*, March 14, 2012.

^{lxiii} Baker, Russ. “The Saudi Arab Spring that Nobody Noticed,” *The Centre for Research and Globalizations*, December 8, 2011. Available at:

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=28112>

^{lxiv} Shadid, Anthony, “Post-Uprising, a New Battle,” *The New York Times*, November 26, 2011. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/world/middleeast/arab-world-struggles-to-shape-new-order.html?_r=1

^{lxv} For more on this see my, “Smear Campaigns Fuel Shutdowns of Occupations Across the Country,” *Truthout.org*, November 15, 2011. Available at: http://truthout.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=4895:smear-campaigns-fuel-shutdowns-of-occupations-across-country