

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

A Thesis Presented

by

KYLE R. VALE

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies,
University of Massachusetts Boston,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTERS OF SCIENCE

June 2012

International Relations Program

UMI Number: 1512073

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI 1512073

Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

© 2012 by Kyle R. Vale
All rights reserved

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

A Thesis Presented

by

KYLE R. VALE

Approved as to style and content by:

Robert Weiner, Professor
Chairperson of Committee

J. Samuel Barkin, Associate Professor
Member

Michael Keating, Lecturer
Member

Robert Weiner, Program Director
International Relations Program

Eben Weitzman, Chairperson
Conflict Resolution, Human Security, Global Gov

ABSTRACT

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

June 2012

Kyle R. Vale, B.A., Syracuse University
M.S., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Professor Robert Weiner

This paper attempts to answer the question, is the International System the main driving force behind how states act in the international arena? This is examined through a Neoclassical Realist lens and the main subject of this study is the United States and the International System that evolved out of the Cold War into the post-Cold War system to now. With this newly emerged international system, should the U.S. be simply viewed as a world hegemon or an empire? This paper also examines how the most powerful actor in the system (at least for a significant portion of the contemporary era), the United States, and a mid-power position actor, Turkey; adjust foreign policy decisions for military and economic security situations that arise with changing dynamics at the macro international system level for the last 20 years.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
PART I.	
Introduction.....	1
Terms	4
International Relations Theory	6
The International System.....	8
The Cold War system.....	13
Post-Cold War system.....	16
Empire or Hegemon? And the Use of Power	21
The International System Today.....	36
PART II. CASE STUDY	
Rise of a Middle Power in the Post-Cold War Era	47
Turkey: History	47
Turkey as a Growing Middle Power	51
Political Relations: (EU)rope	54
Turkish Relations with Russia.....	57
Turkey and Iraq	63
Turkey and the United States	67
Conclusion.....	71
PART III. CONCLUSION	
A Changing International System.....	75
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	87

PART I.

Introduction

After the fall of the Soviet Union, between 1989 and 1991, the United States was left in a position of unipolarity, in which the sole remaining superpower in a system it was quite clear that there was no other entity, at the time, to compete with the U.S. in both hard and soft power terms. Due to this unique position the United States found itself in; many people with clout in Washington, particularly the neo-conservatives, started to call for the use of this power to create the “new world order” in America’s image in order to bring about global peace. Many people argued that one such way to do this was through American primacy and to go about it unilaterally because what state could stand up to the US’s might? (Thayer, 2007).

But with the 2001 war in Afghanistan, 2003 war in Iraq, the continuous rise of the BRICs (among others), and the consequences of the 2007-08 financial crisis, the combination of all of these factors, among others that are not explored in this paper, have left lessons to be learned. While the United States maintains far and away the best military in the world and can work unilaterally in military terms, simultaneous conflicts that are prolonged and protracted in which Washington must build states is a cost that might not be bearable, even for a “hyperpower,” a term once coined by French politician Hubert Vedrine. This venture of unilateralism has born costs that were unforeseen and

have contributed to the decimation of the U.S. economy, especially now in the midst of the worst economic recession since the Great Depression, and has also damaged the image of Washington in the international system in which it is not respected or trusted as it once was.

While the United States must maintain the ability to use unilateral force when absolutely necessary, such as when national security interests are directly threatened, Washington should reexamine its grand strategy. Grand strategy consists of militaristic, diplomatic and economic strategy – including the trade-offs across those domains – as well as foreign policy outlook. Once these avenues are fully explored, then a decision should be made towards working unilaterally or multilaterally not only the benefit for the United States, but also for the world as a whole (Feaver, 2009). The U.S. needs a fundamental change not only in its foreign policy decisions, but also how Americans view the world. The United States must change with the times, this “unipolar moment” is nearly at its end and therefore there is a need for a better understanding of America’s capabilities, in which these identifications need to be more in line with the realities of the international system of today.

This shift needs to be two-fold; first the new emerging poles of power, the BRICs (even potentially Turkey, South Korea, Indonesia and South Africa), need to be more closely examined with an understanding that Europe might become a secondary power center now, due to internal problems such as a stagnating population and economic and political woes. Combined with the fact that Washington and the Pentagon have started to

focus more attention on the Middle East and the Pacific, as stated within Obama's National Security Strategy (The White House: Washington, 2010) and more recently in March of 2012 (Garamone, 2012). Second, there needs to be an increased focus towards multilateralism in which the U.S. still holds the largest sway in the international arena, but can no longer take on the burden of the world itself, but needs to more equally distribute tasks and burdens (with key allies and or partners) in order to maintain this position as the most powerful actor in the international system for as long as possible. This needs to be done not only because it is more beneficial for the United States, but also, because of the combination of affects that were mentioned above, the U.S. no longer holds sway in the international arena as it once did. While yes it is still the situation that if the U.S. supports or opposes initiatives in international affairs, it is likely to succeed or fail, but for the first time since the end of the Second World War, if the United States is 'bandwagoned' against, it might not hold enough power to be able to turn the tide.

This paper will attempt to answer the question; is the international system one of the main driving forces behind how states act in the international arena? In conjunction do states calculate and adjust foreign policy decisions for military and economic security as their power within the system changes? This paper will make a Neoclassical Realist analysis of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era and will focus mainly on the international system; where the United States was positioned during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era. It will examine how the international system, and increasingly how globalization, play a pivotal role in decision making in both academia

and policy making. This lens of analysis is valuable here because neoclassical realism places heavy emphasis on the importance of the international system and why states behave in this particular arena.

How globalization and the international system are key to decision making in the international arena will also be supplemented by a case study of Turkey. It will examine Turkey's position within this same system, albeit from a different power position and geographic region, will show that actors in the system must act in accordance to their relative position (compared to others in the international arena) and geographic disposition. This paper will also attempt to show how the idea of American exceptionalism, in the post-Cold War era, has moved Washington away from more multilateralist notions to unilateralist ones. Finally this paper will observe where the United States is today in relation to the world with the rise of new and old poles of power, (BRICs and others) and what should be done in order to maintain this current position for as long as possible.

Terms

Before this paper progresses, there are several terms that must be defined in order to avoid confusion on the part of the reader and it is understood what context certain terms are being used in. This must be done because many of these words in International Relations are either ambiguous or could be multifaceted according to the context.

Unilateralism can be understood in both normative and substantive elements. This generally “refers to a tendency to opt out of multilateral frameworks (whether existing or proposed) or to act alone in addressing a particular global or regional challenge rather than choosing to participate in collective action” (Khong, 2003). The number of states involved in policy formation is an important determinate of unilateral action while the second element pertains to the kind of relations found between states, either failing to include in, or removing it from, international cooperative efforts, unilateralism focuses on the motivations for choosing either option (Khong, 2003).

While compared to unilateralism, multilateralism is, “a highly demanding institutional practice, one which requires states to comply with its rules not simply out of expediency or coercion, but because they perceive the multilateral norms as valuable principles worth retaining and promoting in the international system for the global commons” (Keating T. F., 2002). This denotes commitment to multilateralism that involves more than a procedural strategy for conducting one’s foreign policy. It suggests an idiosyncratic approach and a mindful commitment to the process and substance of the relations – more specifically - a conscious interest in the applicable content of the international order that is supported by multilateral activity (Keating T. F., 2002).

There is also a need to address the difficulty in defining the word ‘region’; which is a socially constructed phenomenon that embraces many forms and ideas and is not set in stone, but is rather fluid. Because there is no officially accepted definition of region within many scholarly circles – for the purpose of this paper - a region will be defined as

a group of countries located in the same geographically specific area but also implies more than proximity. In order to belong to a region one must also share, but is not limited to; cultural, economic, linguistic or political ties. “There are no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ regions, but these are constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed – intentionally or non-intentionally...regions are overlapping and come in the plural” (Schulz, 2001).

Much like trying to define the word “region,” globalization is a term that has several different definitions and can mean several different things in various contexts. Globalization is an amorphous and an amalgam term where a variety of schools of thought are poured into it, each in turn will have a definition that suites their particular interest, study or jargon. The idea of globalization is constantly in flux over time, so what was understood as globalization today is different from 10 years ago, not to mention 50 years ago. But for the purpose of this paper globalization will be understood as growth on a worldwide scale. This is a global movement to increase the flow of goods, services, people, real capital, and money across national borders in order to create a more integrated and interdependent world economy. In which it is the effort to standardize consumer habits, values, and ways of thinking that contributes to the development of global markets, greater efficiencies and profits (Keating M. , 2011).

International Relations Theory

For this study Neoclassical realism will be used as one of the lens of critical analysis for understanding American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

Neoclassical Realism is an offshoot of both classical realism and neorealism that combines the two theories to explain and analyze foreign politics. This theory posits that the international system determines how states act and behave toward one another because the international system is anarchic and states vie for status quo power or maximum power if they are a subscriber of Mearshimer's offensive realism (Jackson R. a., 2010). This theory also argues that domestic political structures such as; democracy, oligarchy, dictatorships etc... and cults of personality (particularly influential people within the domestic political realm) have sway over how the state will act in the international system and that these political leaders should avoid morality and ethics in order to protect themselves, their state, and their people (Jackson R. a., 2010).

Neoclassical realism argues that states are the main actors in the international system but international organizations, such as the United Nations or multinational corporations, can no longer be discounted as having influence on actors within the system.

This theory of international relations was chosen because of its wide encompassing spectrum of foreign policy decisions; which is how foreign policy is truly created, not by a single decision maker but rather it is subjected to a wide spectrum of influences. Neoclassical realism is also an exemplary choice here because it places heavy emphasis on power, states, and an anarchic international system and is highly applicable to the way that most scholars and decision makers of foreign policy view how the world "really is," especially in the post-Cold War United States.

Economic-Liberalism (economic interdependency) is another theoretical tool that will be used in this paper. It represents the other side of institutional or Utopian Liberalism. This theory has accepted that states are an important factor in the system, but also argues that international institutions are also important and have sway in international politics. Economic-liberalists believe that, “Power is no longer measured solely in terms of military strength,” but also encompass political and economic interdependency (Genest, 2004). Economic-liberalists have a more optimistic view of human nature than realists because they believe that humans can work, learn, and develop norms and justice in the international arena. They also believe that increase trade between two or more states, ultimately decreases war incentives. Thus there is an increased importance for non-state actors in the international system for economic-liberalists because of the focus that is placed on international economic integration and the role of nongovernmental organizations and multi-national corporations (Genest, 2004). This theory will be used during the case study of Turkey to help understand Turkey’s actions and the position it is coming from.

The International System

The international system has had a profound effect on the United States since its inception. In every era Washington has responded accordingly to its dogma at the time, its position in the international arena, and to what was perceived as other states goals and intentions. How the United States acted in the post-Cold War era has proven that this

period is no exception. In fact the international system might have had the most profound effect on decision making within Washington than any other factor. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the “unipolar moment” came about and America stood alone at the top of the international order. With natural and predictable consequences: the U.S. became more willing than ever to use force (Kagan, 2003).

The major idea behind what drives the international system is that of states, power, and anarchy. Various academic theories look at the international system in different lights and claim certain aspects of it are more influential than others. Some claim that; states act in accordance to their theoretical creed, others contend that diverse influential domestic factors determine how players in the international system act, and others would argue that the structure itself is the main determinate for how an actor makes decisions in the international arena. For example offensive realists, notably John Mearsheimer, claim that major powers (states being his main focus in the international system due to their ability to project power) act in the international arena to obtain as much power as possible, at the expense of other states, in order to become secure in an anarchic world (Mearsheimer, 2001). Neo-liberals on the other hand would look at the international system and see many different actors; states, NGOs, economies etc. that have a profound effect on the actors within the system and how they operate. This tenet in conjunction with the idea of power, is essential to why there are so many factors that must be taken into consideration in understanding choices actors make and why (Sorensen, 2010).

There are many different forms of the international system; the most common through a greater part of history, would be the multipolar system. This is where there are numerous great powers that influence international politics and all are vying for dominance. An example of this would be the international system preceding the First World War. This system is arguably the most volatile or most prone to aggressive natures within the international arena. Then there is a bipolar system, much like the one that took over at the end of World War II, where the international system was locked in a battle of titans of sorts, between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is where there are only two major powers opposing one another for dominance in the system, creating a bipolar international order in which both sides create calculated moves to counter one another for world dominance to sway the direction the world operates. This dynamic actually creates a fairly stable international system, especially compared to that of a multipolar system, for neither side usually has enough power to feel comfortable going head to head with one another (Jackson R. a., 2010). Instead the two powers use proxies against one another to test each side's power and resolve. Then there is a unipolar system, this is when there is one superpower and no other major powers in the international system. This one superpower is able to do as they please, where they please, when they please, and is arguably the most stable of any of the international systems. One example of this is the ancient Roman Empire at the apex of their power, the British Empire at the zenith of their supremacy, or the United States after the fall of the Soviet Union until arguably the beginning of the 2003 War in Iraq. These are the

three big international systems that are discussed in much of the world of International Relations academia.

In the last decade or so there has been a new structure coming into the fray and this is a uni/multipolar international system. This type of system has a single world superpower, this entity is still the most dominate actor in the system; but there are several major powers in the system which constrains the superpower so that it cannot act as if it were within a unipolar international system. One author that discussed this new phenomenon in detail is the late Samuel Huntington, who notably worked for Harvard and Columbia University and wrote for prominent think tanks such as Foreign Affairs. In his article, *The Lonely Superpower*, Huntington discussed this uni/multipolar international system as one where the single superpower is needed for any initiative to be settled in the international arena, but there is also a need of the major powers to finalize any proceedings (Huntington, 1999).

The current international system is extraordinarily close to this scenario; there is a single superpower, the United States, and several major powers (at least economically). “The settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of other states” (Huntington, 1999). Another author that argues this point is Heather Conley in her review article, *The End of the West: The once and Future Europe*, she argues that there is a shift back towards the East, most notably India and China, as the main dominate actors in the international system – as they

once were before the late eighteenth century – from today’s dominate actor(s), the United States and the West. Conley describes the same uni/multipolar system and designates this transition as the inauguration of the cycle down from the West back to the East (Conley, 2011).

As the post-Cold War era began, there was no other major player in the system able to counter balance the power disparity between the United States and the rest of the world, creating seismic shifts throughout the international arena. This in turn highly affected not only how Washington acted, but also changed its perception of the world and its duty within it. This drastic alteration in the international system, from a bipolar to a unipolar system, shifted the mentality within Washington from a more multilateralist mindset to dealing with international issues, to more unilateral. This is due to a whole new host of issues that America never had to deal with in the past; chief among these issues is the idea of American exceptionalism. Neoclassical realism can explain this evolution in mentality due to the changing dynamic in the international system and Washington’s new found position now at the apex of this order. The ways in which the United States acted in the past according to the international arena will be discussed in further detail in the proceeding sections.

The Cold War system

American foreign policy during the Cold War Era circled around one major concept, containment. No matter the arena or region the United States found itself in there was one major overarching goal, to contain the Soviet Union, its allies, and the spread of communism around the world. A cornerstone of the containment policy was the idea of self-determination. This helps to understand the formation of U.S. policy towards many parts of the world. This concept must be kept in context of American interests during the post WWII era and the emergence of the Cold War and containment policies. One such example would be the Truman Doctrine and how this policy expressed, “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” (Harry S. Truman Library & Museum). This in turn significantly helped the nations of the “Northern Tier,” which extended from Turkey to Pakistan, in order to create anti-communist factions and institutions. However many states or people aspiring to receive Western aid were seen as too unstable to be used in a manner that could promote Western objectives.

One group of people that were seen as too unstable, in the eyes of the West, were the Palestinians. Washington viewed these people as uncivilized and not organized enough for the idea of self-determination to apply to them. This in tandem with the fact that Israel, viewed as a Western stronghold in the Middle East that was neither Arab nor communist, had the West’s backing and made Palestinian aspirations largely unheard.

Therefore Palestinian aspirations that undermined Israel, and thus containment policies, were seen as non-factors in the self-determination policy.

Egypt was seen as another state that could possibly promote American principles and contain communism with the ideals of self-determination; that is until the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser. At first this strong willed man, later known as the father of Pan-Arabism, was thought of by the West as someone who could be an instrument of power and modernity and reflect the “good” intentions of the West, namely America (Khalidi, 2005). But soon many American Presidents found out, Nasser was not someone who could be controlled. Even though Nasser tried not to take sides during the Cold War, he created one problem after the next for foreign policy officials in Washington. This was especially true after the Aswan Dam incident, where after American funding was dropped; Nasser sought Soviet help to complete the project and incurred Cold War anxieties in the hearts and minds of U.S. officials.

Even though Pan-Arabism was not in essence anti-Western, it was perceived that way because it was not anti-communist either. This idea is also fundamental to understanding the way that Washington viewed the world and politics during this bipolar system, if you were not against the Communists, you were with them. President Dwight Eisenhower, like many other American politicians of the time, came to think of Nasser and his nationalist aspirations in Cold War contexts, “Nasser, who was creating ‘an Arab ‘bloc’ extending from Pakistan to Dakar, with weak and unstable governments and institutions, and resulting vulnerability to Soviet penetration” (Little, 2008). Because of

Nasser's unwillingness to take a side, the West equated it to being communist due to the fact that Nasser and Pan-Arabism would readily play the East against the West whenever possible. Egypt's cotton for arms and Syria's wheat for arms deal with the Soviet Union only strengthened Western perceptions of Pan-Arabism as being pro-Communist and deepened distrust and hostilities between the two sides. If Nasser had come to power during a period other than the Cold War era, he might have been successful in turning his dream into a reality, but as history has shown, American fear of communism hindered development in many places around the world and crippled aspirations of countless others.

This is just one small example of how the United States handled the Cold War era, if you were not with Washington, you were viewed as against the United States. The idea behind containment was as black and white as that, but of course the implementation of that on the ground was not as clear cut. The Cold War bipolar system forced the United States to respond in certain ways all around the world so that it could counter the USSR and its allies in order to keep a certain status quo. This scenario applied to the neoclassical realist paradigm makes sense. With the bipolar international system that emerged, it was only natural that the United States and the USSR would go head to head for world dominance, especially considering that these two powers came from different ideological backgrounds (Capitalist Democracy versus Communism). Neoclassical realism quite succinctly explains why both of these powers acted the way they did, the institutions that they used during this time in order to legitimize themselves in the international community, and the usage of their power. With the dismemberment of the

Soviet Union, the United States found itself in an extraordinary situation that no other contemporary state has ever been placed in. With the beginning of the post-Cold War era, Washington slowly but surely began to take advantage of this unprecedented situation and disparity of power between the U.S. and the rest of the world.

Post-Cold War system

The post-Cold War era provides a logical place to begin any contemporary analysis on the shift in the international system from a bipolar to a unipolar world and ultimately a multilateral/unilateral dichotomy, as the fall of the Soviet Union was instrumental in causing these shifts (Manca, 2005). The post-Cold War era should be broken down into two distinct periods from 1991-today. Within this time era, there are two phases that need to be addressed, the pre and the post-9/11 periods, in which there were drastic changes in perceptions of American security. This paper will start chronographically, with the fall of the Soviet Union, which is when the United States began to reign supreme in the international arena.

During this time all areas; economic, political, militaristic, cultural, soft power, etc. America had no challenger that could compare to any degree of this dominance. This is when the dialogue of what is the best way to promote U.S. power around the world, empire building and primacy or a more multilateral benevolent hegemon route, truly began. During this time Washington began to truly develop and conceptualize the idea of American exceptionalism, which will be identified later in this paper. Since the end of

the Cold War American security policy had undergone a slow yet “relentless” move towards unilateralism. This shift in multilateral to unilateral tendencies, and rhetoric, has historical context for the U.S. in combination with various structural factors such as; America’s hegemonic position as the sole power in the international system, perceived international security challenges, domestic institutional structure, changing conceptualization of multilateralism, and exceptionalism all contributed to this shift. The main focus is on post-Cold War era, or the contemporary, but since many of the factors are not exclusive to the current historical period, it will sometimes become necessary to refer to earlier historical periods in order to fully explain and determine the effect that was produced.

The new hegemonic position that Washington found itself in undoubtedly changed many notions of the political elite and how they believed was the best way to use American power throughout the world. Without the constant threat of nuclear annihilation and containing communism from spreading to every corner of the world, many believed that a gentler and warmer form of relations would develop in the international arena, allowing multilateralism to become the favored means of international relations (Manca, 2005). However in Washington’s political atmosphere questions began to surface considering the costs and benefits of using the multilateralist approach. “Questions such as why a newly established hegemonic state – unrivaled in economic, cultural, political and technological powers – would subject itself to multilateral constraints if it did not have to, remained prevalent throughout this period”

(Manca, 2005). This new hegemonic position – reduced the multilateralist-unilateralist dichotomy to a single causal explanation according to Manca. It must also be noted that this new found hegemonic position is not the only reason for the shift in Washington’s rhetoric and actions. But what has become clear is that the unipolar position, or the belief that the United States was the single pole of world power, is one of the, if not the, most important factors behind the contemporary move toward unilateralism in U.S. security policy. This new structure in the international system, the United States being the single most powerful actor, juxtaposed with the idea of American exceptionalism within the political elite inner circles, created a cyclical environment that fed itself and America’s desire to reshape the world.

Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. steadily moved towards unilateralism. During this time the United States saw it as not only their duty to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states in faraway places, but also did it unabashedly because what force could bandwagon against the world’s first “hyperpower?” The multilateralist President George Bush Sr. began this trend in 1991 and the world saw the inauguration of this evolution with the first invasion of Iraq in which Bush Sr. used the United Nations, a multilateralist organization, to legitimize his actions (Kitfield, 1998). Bush Sr. began operations in Somalia from 1992-94, which the UN was again used for peace keeping purposes, but was a conflict that President Bill Clinton inherited and had to end. Clinton could be described as an ambiguous multilateralist. Clinton used NATO to bomb parts of Bosnia during the civil war in Yugoslavia, along with several other small campaigns that

Clinton used both multilateral and unilateral actions. Finally, President George Bush Jr. came into the limelight of U.S. presidency and from onset was a realist. But after 9/11, not only did Bush junior's rhetoric change, but everything else transformed within the American political system. He soon moved away from a realist and more or less a multilateralist position, to a unilateral idealist that was determined to spread democracy and capitalism to "rogue states," that he and other neo-conservatives deemed unacceptable for the international arena. "America's grand strategy in the aftermath of 9/11 shifted from that of a hegemonic hyperpower minded to manipulate the rules, to that of an imperial power that regarded the rules and institutions of the UN order as outdated and irrelevant" (Mulaj, 2010).

In the period following 9/11 American politics became galvanized and the ideology of neo-conservatism, which relies heavily on imperial logic, took a strong hold at the forefront of how the United States acted in response to perceived security threats. Rooted in liberal exceptionalism – the belief that America is qualitatively different from other developed nations as a result of its unique origins and historical evolution – a vision of America as a redeeming force in international politics, this dogma (the 2002 National Security Strategy and neo-conservative rhetoric) endorsed the projection of U.S. power as the primary instrument of change (Mulaj, 2010). Neo-conservatives argued that America must move beyond example and actively use its power to spread its universal values; in which this notion became abundantly clear in Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy and with the culmination of the 2003 War in Iraq. In the months leading up the war the

international community condemned the “unilateral” actions of the U.S. and President George Bush Jr., but this did nothing to stymie the actions of the United States and its perceived obligations to create a “new world order.”

All of this leads up to the beginning of the end, of sorts, for America. Arguably it could either be seen as opening with 9/11 or with the 2003 War in Iraq. But either way several changes occurred in the international system. Some of these changes were due to the Wars, while others were outside that realm, but all contributing to the decline of the US’s relative power and its ability to project this power (Duffield, 2009). These changes include but are not limited to; the rise of other major powers (if not militaristically, economically) in the international arena – notably the BRICs, the EU and others, the decline of Washington’s ability to use soft power and clout within international affairs, the 2007/08 financial crisis, and the polarization of American politics that led to a fragmentation and radicalization (of some) of the parties that once came to bipartisan compromises more frequently than before 9/11. “The first gulf war was paid for by a coalition of the willing. The cost of the second one will be borne by the American taxpayer alone. Iraq has shown the costs, monetary and otherwise, that are added to the exercise of power when friends don’t trust your intentions” (Ignatieff, 2003).

Ever increasing interconnectivity, unilateral work, and ignoring UN Security council resolutions only helps to undermine the multilateral system and affects all that Washington tries to do in the international system. While the U.S. will remain the world’s foremost military power for the foreseeable future, this power will be reduced

and tough strategic choices will need to be made. “Classic case of overstretch: The country’s international and domestic commitments and ambitions far exceed its capabilities and reach. This will have important implications for at least three key regions: Europe, Asia and the Middle East” (Szabo, 2011).

Empire or Hegemon? And the Use of Power

There are many different strains of thought on how the United States should move forward in the international arena during the contemporary era. Some believe that the U.S. should project its power in faraway places and use military might and economic force to hold onto this current power position and move more towards imperial logic. Others believe that a more benign use of power is the best path and that this will ensure the current system for the longest time and will create security for all, while many others argue everything in between these two strains of thought. Many have used the term empire to describe the United States and what it has done in the contemporary era. But how does one define an empire? Should the U.S. be viewed as being an empire in a unipolar or multipolar international system or should the United States simply be viewed as a hegemon in this system? Many people, be it politicians, academics, journalist, etc. have argued one way or the other if United States is an empire. While not many people within the United States want to discuss or even admit that they reside within what could be considered an empire, it has boiled down to a few key arguments that America is viewed as an empire by many; and at the very least the foremost hegemon in the international system.

According to Stephen Howe, author of *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*, an empire should be defined as, “a large, composite, multi-ethnic or multinational political unit, usually created by conquest and divided between a dominate center and subordinate, sometimes far distant peripheries” (Howe, 2002). This means that there are certain criteria that all empires must embrace in order to qualify as one. Such criterion that determines an empire would be domination on a global scale, undefined borders of influence, a sense of mission, multi-ethnic political units and the idea of a core versus the periphery. While the United States has met all of these general requirements for becoming an empire, it did so in such a unique way, that it deviated from this path and should not be compared to empires of the past. A hegemon on the other hand is,

“A concept referring to a state’s power relative to that of the other states. A state may be considered a hegemon if it is so powerful economically and militarily that it is a dominant influence on the domestic and foreign policies of other states. Depending on its level of power, a state may be a regional hegemon...or a global hegemon (e.g. many agree, the United States in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries” (Jackson R. a., 2010).

Through exploring the most recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one will be able to determine why the United States is not empire, but rather a global hegemon. One of the key features of becoming an empire for any actor in the international system is to have dominance on a global scale. This dominance encompasses economic, political, militaristic, and cultural might that is both far reaching and highly influential on all, and forces all actors in the system to at minimum consider the empires perspective before implementing their own policies (Howe, 2002). Historically speaking the ancient Roman

Empire and the British Empire are excellent examples and at the apex of their power, no actor would be able to do anything in the international system without first considering how their respective empires would respond. While the U.S. has arguably aspired to become an empire (at least according to Howe's definition), it did not achieve this status until 1900 when territorial expansion of the U.S. was more or less complete, and arguably after the Second World War or even until after the Cold War with it being the most powerful actor in the system (Thayer, 2007). More traditional empires of the past, such as Great Britain, controlled the globe through territories or colonies by direct and indirect means in order to acquire land for dominance, exploitation of "other" peoples, and goods in order to sustain the machine that is an empire.

But unlike traditional empires of the past, the United States almost always used indirect means of control through democracy and capitalist promotion, not land acquisition. The reason why America was vaulted to this exceptional position after the Second World War was because Europe, and all of her great powers, save one, had been decimated. The U.S. on the other hand had an economy and military that was one of the strongest in the world, if not the strongest, was untouched by the war, and politically and cultural American ideologies were spreading like wild fire and were embraced in many corners of the world.

In the post-World War II era the international system changed from a multipolar system, with several major powers in the mix, to a bipolar system between two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. During this time both actors were in

constant competition for control, which is essential to all aspiring dominate powers; for economic markets, militaristic supremacy, and the spread of ideologies. America saw an unprecedented gap in the amount of power that it possessed compared to that of other powers of the past and even arguably compared that of its competitor, the USSR, but this particular type of global dominance was unique. At this time it was unique in the fact that Washington did not covet land or additional territories in the traditional sense of empire, but rather just friendly regimes to the American government that would be willing to work in tandem to stop the Communists. “It is interested in promoting the political and economic well-being of its allies” (Thayer, 2007).

When the Cold War ended, these advantages that America held over other actors not only became more apparent but also widened (at first) as the structure of the international system changed from a bipolar to a unipolar model with the United States standing at the top. “American domination encompasses the entire globe; it is in many ways unprecedented in human history” (Khalidi, 2005). This level of disparity in power between the number one actor in the international system and the rest of the world has never been seen before in a modern context. The international system is very important for understanding why The United States acted the way it did and how it operated and implemented foreign policy. Within the confines of the unipolar international system that emerged with the fall of the Soviet Union, there were several actors, or more accurately groups of actors, that possessed the potential to stand up to the United States. But for the most part these actors chose not to because even if resources were pooled, there was still

no guarantee of success against such a power. Because of this inability, or the choice not to intervene in American foreign relations, it left the United States in a unique situation at the onset of the 21st century.

The case in point of American global dominance through promotion of democratic and capitalistic ideologies and not coveting land (in the traditional sense) can be seen in both cases of the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both instances show that the U.S. has a global reach to extend power to far flung countries that are both remote and rugged. Most other powers would have a hard time emulating such a show of force, especially for an extended period of time in simultaneous theaters. The first war to be fought after 9/11 would be in Afghanistan where Washington responded that same year to rid the country of Al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters. Before the war started Americans garnished support from other world powers and led a coalition of forces into the state to rid the country of enemies, identified by Washington, but to also create a democratic and capitalistic state that would be U.S. friendly. This is a typical tool used by America as a form of indirect control to create friendly regimes that use similar governmental and economic systems, which the United States is the undisputed leader of the world in. By creating this dynamic the countries have no choice but to be influenced by both Washington and Wall Street. In this system, if the U.S. is able to gather support for a particular move and it is not opposed by the international community, this in turn allows Washington's influence to grow unfazed, more so in a hegemonic sense than that of an empire. Increasingly speaking in economic terms since the onset of these two wars,

the U.S. has found itself rivaled by a unified Europe; a growing Asia, notably China and India (individually, unlike Europe), among others that have also benefited from globalization. This in turn diminishes the U.S.'s potential to be an empire, but rather just a hegemon.

This is also seen in the 2003 War in Iraq. Very much like the war in Afghanistan, this was a war to topple over a regime that was perceived as a threat to American security and to install a friendly democratic government and capitalistic economic system that would be in cahoots with Washington and Wall Street in the future. Even when the international community does not support Washington, America possess enough hard power to do as it pleases, which is a rather exceptional feature in the 21st century. The war aims of the American government included making the U.S. and its 'allies' more secure from any form of attack, to hinder the production of WMD's, securing oil, and to foster the Arab-Israeli peace process (Karon, 2003). All of these goals were in line with American national security, which in its self is not exceptional, but rather the aims and the tactics used to achieve these goals were. True security and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. Such liberal goals need to be defended by military muscle and when the raw resources, oil, acquired through military campaigns in Iraq are not used to directly finance the core, this gives credence to the idea of a world hegemon more so than that of an empire. "Kitchener, Churchill and Curzon...notable imperialists in the fullest sense of the word, could not be said to have put the interest of subject peoples above those of Great Britain" (Khalidi, 2005).

Another criterion for an empire is that of undefined boundaries, in a sense this means that there is no place in the world that the Empire is not, it is all encompassing. For traditional empires this meant that lands have been acquired all around the globe, or the known world. For the empire that Great Britain built it was said that the “sun never set on it” and implied that the British had extended themselves throughout the world and would have control in almost all facets of life. In the United Kingdom’s case the use of hard power and empire promotion were the two main driving factors for why the British Empire was so vast and all encompassing. The need to feed the financial capital of the world at the time drove the British to scour the globe for raw materials and other forms of capital to keep the machine moving forward (Howe, 2002). This was all done to either supplement the military apparatus or the financial institutions of the empire and for no other reason. Europeans in general believed that by making subjects out of conquered peoples that they were bringing them into a better world and that they would lead better lives now that they had been introduced to the ways of the West (Mamdani, 2004). Washington’s promotion of open markets and globalization goes against this tenet of empire building and supports hegemony. “The hegemon is oriented toward preserving order and openness in global exchange because it will dominate trade anyway by virtue of its economic paramouncy” (Steinmetz, 2005).

What the United States has done has met this criterion of undefined borders, but has done it in a different sense. While the U.S. has bases, military personnel, embassies, international corporations etc. placed all over the world, it is the cultural dynamic that has

spread most affluently to all corners of the globe (Howe, 2002). American culture is very dynamic and seductive to most. Liberal values of peace, democracy, human rights, economic free markets, and investment are very appealing to people all around the world in any religion, nation, or ethnicity. Bradley Thayer argues that America is unique because it does not covet land and resources like a traditional empire, but rather desires to promote ideologies. “The prodigious appetite of the US for ideological expansion has never been satisfied” (Thayer, 2007). The use of culture to create undefined borders can be seen by the fact that there is a McDonalds in nearly every country of the world, that people from all around the world want to listen to American style of music, wear blue jeans, go to a prestigious American university, open a business in America, watch movies from Hollywood, and the list could go on. The use of culture in this sense to create undefined boundaries is quite exceptional compared to traditional models of empires. As Joseph Nye quite aptly points out, “It is a mistake to confuse primacy with empire,” and this cultural dynamic is not a means of formal control, which is what an empire needs (Jr., *Is America an Empire?*, 2004).

This can also be exemplified through the cases of both Iraq and Afghanistan. While both cases it is more of the hard power and traditional forms of undefined borders that are easily observed, there are still undertones of liberal values in these situations. In both cases American military presence is reminiscent of traditional empires holding territories. While this is partly true because the American military is there to help with stability, these lands were not meant to be in direct American control for prolonged

periods of time. On the contrary Washington has from the onset made significant steps to relinquish control of these two countries and to make them successful states that are both democratic and capitalistic. While this will still be an informal means of control because the U.S. is the global leader of both democratic and capitalist states (beginning to wane as far as economics goes, especially since the 2007/08 financial crisis), promotion of liberal democracies and open capitalist societies in these two countries, instead of creating colonies to extract raw materials from is where uniqueness comes into play. “The US seeks ideological conversion, an objective that requires submission to American values, not acquisition of territory. Without colonies and spheres of influence, America therefore lacks the typical geography of empire” (O’Reilly, 2008).

Another very important factor for constructing an empire is the multi-ethnic political units that are incorporated into the core. This is when an empire expands beyond its core; so in the case of the Roman Empire it would be Roman peoples integrating Germanic tribes and their values, or with the British Empire it would be assimilating Indian culture into their own. This is essential to becoming an empire, to rule over other peoples that are not from part of the core and the interactions that ensue after. It is argued that there are, “three analytically distinct...forces: the particularistic demands of private interest groups in the dominate countries; the perspective of the dominant states with respect to general concerns of national interest; and the strength and stability of political organization on the periphery,” that determine how empires interact with the periphery (O’Reilly, 2008). In most situations when traditional empires

incorporate the other, the empires gave them little to no rights and were either ruled by individuals from the core or ruled by peoples that were from the periphery but were in league with the core. In these situations the peoples would have to pay tribute in order to be protected by the empire. In turn these people would most likely be slaves to the core and had little room to advance themselves within the social system of the empire. More contemporary forms of empire such as the Ottoman Empire actually incorporated much of the periphery into the core and turned certain customs, beliefs, and cultures into their own. This was done to not only better themselves but to alleviate some of the tension between the core and periphery dynamic and give the periphery a feeling of empowerment.

The United States of America is rather unique in this regard because the core is already has a multi-ethnic population in which a main value is that all peoples and creeds are readily incorporated into the core to make an amalgamation of beliefs and cultures that is new and unique and ever evolving. Due to the three forces mentioned previously that determine core/periphery relations; for the U.S. it is usually in the sense of liberation to give economic and political freedom, instead of attempting to enslave like traditional empires. “American people are not seized with the desire to run colonies or a global empire” (O'Reilly, 2008). But this could be argued as merely a form of neo-colonialism; a different and more nuanced form of control in today’s post-Colonial world. But with these instilled values in American culture and the expansion of the U.S., the incorporation of a wide variety of people is actually very easy to complete and is something that is

promoted on both sides. The U.S. has had bases of operation in Japan, South Korea, Germany, Iran, Egypt, and Mexico, to just name a few, in which all of these different peoples were incorporated into the core to create a new core over time, not forcibly, but because some of these people wanted to come to the United States on their own accord.

Once again Iraqi and Afghani peoples are a prime example of multi-ethnic incorporation because the United States will allow them to do as they please in the periphery as long as their domestic policies are in line with what Washington wants. What the American government wants, does not make it exceptional because these desires are in line with national security, is the promotion and maintenance of democracy and capitalism in the area, American friendly regimes, and the ability to maintain military bases in the region in order to project power. While this promotes the empire argument, it also gives equal credence to the hegemon argument.

Another facet that makes America distinctive is the structure of the international system while the United States is experiencing this unprecedented amount of power. Power in terms of soft cultural power, economic, and militaristic power are undeniably influence the globe on such a scale that has not been seen before. But with the advancement of technology, telecommunications, and globalization in general, the world as a whole is much more aware and informed of itself which makes this international system unique compared to those of the ancient Roman Empire or the British Colonial Empire. The terms in which America tries to protect and expand the current economic structure of capitalism is quite unique in the sense that no other country has been able to

forge so much influence over the global economy where as 6 percent of the world population holds 30 percent of the world's wealth (Thayer, 2007). While this statistic is now five to six years old, it is still staggering. Another unique trait of America is how it goes about using its power. It does not go around conquering all peoples and forcing them to succumb into an empire, but rather uses its power more or less for what America believes is right for the world, and how it can make the planet ever more safe and secure. The last dissimilar trait of America to empires of the past is its sense of mission to promote liberal democracy, human rights, and freedom all around the world. All other empires before used tools of control to stifle these traits, whereas the United States is actually trying to endorse them for the entire world, once again giving credence to the hegemon argument, not that of empire.

There have been countless empires in history and there will most likely be countless more in the future. What has been built around the United States of America is that of uniqueness and should not be compared to empires of the past. While the United States does fall in line with the general term empire in certain aspects, the means in which these criteria were acquired diverges from the stereotype and is much more closely aligned to a global hegemon and thus should not be considered an empire.

Christopher Layne and Bradley Thayer discuss this topic quite in depth in their book *American Empire: A Debate*, in which they do not disagree that America is in a unique situation being the most powerful actor in the international system, but rather whether or not America has indeed become an empire or a hegemon in addition to what

path Washington should take in the world today when using this power. Thayer argues that America is currently doing the correct thing and should project power in order to create a more secure today and tomorrow, for it is inevitable that the U.S. will succumb to another power. Layne argues the opposite and believes that this current foreign policy pursuit is detrimental to American security. Layne states that by becoming more restrained and not projecting as much power that this will be useful in the long run because it hurts the economy less, enhances the American image abroad, and reinforces domestic liberal ideologies instead of undermining them, thus allowing the U.S. to stay in its current position for an extended period of time.

“The spirit that animates the American Empire, is the right one for the US today. I strongly believe it is. Christopher Layne, equally strongly, believes it is not” (Thayer, 2007). Thayer quite adamantly believes that America has aspired to become an empire since its inception and became one around 1900. “The United States has expanded greatly since its founding in 1776 ...territorial expansion stopped at around 1900” (Thayer, 2007). Thayer argues that America should dominate the world because it is, “a force of good and far better than any other realistic alternative” (Thayer, 2007). By dominating the world the U.S. makes it more stable and produces economic prosperity for all. Due to the stability and economic prosperity provided by an American empire, many countries would be willing to piggy back off of American imperialist might, hard economic and militaristic power, to enhance themselves even further by not spending

large sums of their GDP on militaries, such as what Japan and most of Europe have done since the end of World War II.

Thayer believes that in order to spread American ideologies, liberal principles and democracy, America must use its primacy in the world to do so, which also happens to be the best way to make America more secure from threats, be it nations or terrorists. In order to achieve these ends, according to Thayer, is through traditional forms of hard power; militaristic and economic, and soft power; cultural inclinations. Through the use of a strong economy the U.S. would be able to use this might to pose sanctions or help other economies while also bolstering conventional military forces and WMD stockpiles. By using the tools of military power the U.S. would be able to forcefully stabilize regions or states, force others to democratize, and to enhance American security throughout the world. Through the use of soft power Washington can put hard power by the wayside in certain situations and convince “others” that it is in their interests to be like “us” because of our attractive life styles. With hard and soft power dominance Thayer argues that America could truly do a lot in the international system. By using these tools Washington should keep a close eye on certain aspiring or troublesome rising actors such as China, the EU, Iran, North Korea and others (Thayer, 2007).

On the other hand, Christopher Layne argues that an American Empire not only hurts the world as a whole but also endangers American security. “A too-powerful America risks a global geopolitical backlash against its preeminent position in international politics” (Thayer, 2007). Layne argues that there is only so far that hard

power and soft power can take the U.S. alone and that instead of projecting U.S. primacy, “primacy is a strategy that causes insecurity because it will lead to geopolitical backlash against the US” (Thayer, 2007), Washington should instead show some self-restraint. The adverse effects of maintaining a position of empire in economic, political, and militaristic terms would be astronomical compared to self-restraint, which would in turn greatly bolster American security. Layne argues that the economic weight of maintaining an empire is too great and would spur the advancement of China and India, which in the end undermines American security. “US was doomed to repeat a familiar pattern of imperial decline because of excessive costs of military commitments abroad was eroding the economic foundations of American power” (Thayer, 2007). Layne also believes that the idea of an American empire undermines domestic political ideologies. “Americans have seen the very apotheosis of Empire: a government that has built its Iraq policy on a foundation of lies...made an unprecedentedly sweeping assertion of presidential war powers, and has rolled back civil liberties” (Thayer, 2007).

In the post-9/11 period the use of primacy for American security was the tool of choice. But at the end of President Bush Jr.’s term there was a beginning of a roll back away from these tendencies and has become even more evident with President Barak Obama. It has become clear that with an evolving international system from unipolar to that of uni/multipolar or multipolar system that the use of primacy is not the path that is most beneficial for the United States and that there must be a reexamination of security needs, goals, and capabilities in order to not only stay the premier power, but to survive.

The International System Today

Where the United States stands today in the international arena is a very interesting topic. Today the U.S. is seen as the undisputed world hegemon especially in militaristic terms and soft power terms, and is still a very strong economic power. Since the end of the Cold War there had been a lot of unilateralist rhetoric with each succeeding U.S. president culminating with the Bush Jr. presidency. However, Bush was not alone in his idealism; Clinton paved the way before him. Realists would warn against unilateralism due to the balancing phenomenon, or “bandwaggoning.” This is where states begin to band together in order to counter-balance the power disparity, of a hegemon in the system from their own. After eight years of the Bush administration in which Washington increasingly isolated itself within the international community, two subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and anti-terrorist operations combining for a total of “\$1.283 trillion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs and veterans’ health care” (Belasco, 2011), increased globalization that has created more interdependence than ever before, the fast paced and steady rise of emerging states (such as Brazil, South Korea, Turkey, China and others), and the expanding importance of non-state actors in the international arena has created an increasingly complex international environment that Washington can still direct, but not without some major constraints that has not been faced in the contemporary era. By Bush’s second term there had been a shift towards pragmatism from idealism in international affairs. “The Bush doctrine has collapsed, and the administration has

consequently embraced realism, American foreign policy's perennial hangover cure” (Rose, 2005).

This return to realism is the wakeup call that Washington needed in order to more aptly understand the nuances of today's international system. That is not to say that realism is the only theoretical tool of analysis that the U.S. should use, but it should be used in conjunction with others in order to be more restrained and have a better understanding of the uni/multipolar, or worst case scenario, the multipolar system that has emerged. Fukuyama would argue that America does not need one extreme or the other to take control of the foreign policy directive, but rather a mix of idealism and realism to go back to a more “realistic Wilsonianism” that took place during the Second World War and in the preceding years (Fukuyama, 2006). Ian Jackson argues that the half-century long dominance in international politics is now coming to an end because of the policies that were pursued under the Bush administration. With the invasion of Iraq in 2003 not only did the U.S. increase the amount of instability in the region, but also created an atmosphere that amplified terrorism. Jackson then goes into why the Iraq war had been so costly for a variety of reasons, supported by Mr. Ricks, a senior military correspondent with the Washington Post (Jackson I. , 2007). While this might be an overstretch, it certainly seems like the beginning of a new age. Some of the templates that were designed in the post-World War II era still hold true today and resonate very strongly with what has been happening America in the post-Cold War era;

“Roosevelt understood that Americans can best secure their own defense and pursue their own interests when they unite with the other states and, where

necessary, sacrifice unilateral freedom of action for a common good. The signal failure of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has not been a lack of will to lead and to intervene; it has been a failure to imagine the possibility of a United States once again cooperating with others to create rules for the international community. Pax Americana must be multilateral, as Franklin Roosevelt realized, or it will not survive. Without clear principles for intervention, without friends, without dreams to serve, the soldiers sweating in their body armor in Iraq are defending nothing more than power. And power without legitimacy, without support, with the world's respect and attachment, cannot endure" (Ignatieff, 2003).

The U.S. spends more than the next 8 countries combined on the defense budget, and the economy is as large as the next three combined (Jr. J. N., *The Paradox of American Power*, 2002). Nye claims that the U.S. is still by and far the most powerful actor in the international system, with the emergence of several other significant powers, the US's ability to obtain outcomes on, "trade antitrust, or financial regulation issues' without the EU, Japan and others is nearly impossible" (Jr. J. N., *U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq*, 2003). In this regard, globalization is very important, it has not only strengthened many economies around the world but has also given NGOs more power than they have had in the past, and state actors can no longer discount them as players within the international system. Globalization has also increased the power of terrorist networks (Jr. J. N., *The Paradox of American Power*, 2002), through technological transfer and the restructuring of global norms of production and trade, globalization has allowed a transformation of hierarchical organizations to become more dispersed, smaller, streamlined and ultimately less decentralized. In the end this has made these networks much harder to track and catch, thus changing not only the type of world that we live in, but also the way people view and think about the world, in conjunction with

how wars and battles are fought. “Globalization has not only expanded illegal markets and boosted the size and resources of criminal networks, it has also imposed more burdens on governments: tighter public budgets, decentralization, privatization, deregulation, and a more open environment for international trade and investment all make the task of fighting global criminals more difficult” (Naim, 2003).

The dynamics of power and weakness forces nations and people to act differently in the international system according to their status. Today American’s must accept limitations and start to curb certain aspects of foreign policy and move more towards multilateralism in order to preserve the status quo for as long as possible. “In an anarchic world, small powers always fear they will be victims. Great powers, on the other hand, often fear rules that may constrain them more than they fear the anarchy in which their power brings security and prosperity” (Kagan, 2003). This is exactly what the Europeans have done in the wake of World War II, they began to appeal to multilateralism and international law in which it has had a practical payoff and little cost for them. This is part of the reason why America needs to start working more multilaterally, less cost that is borne on the United States alone will allow for a greater number of situations that Washington can be a part of, instead of being constrained by overstretch or fiscal and monetary incapability.

The international system not only affects the top tier actors, but everyone within the system itself. This theme can be seen throughout all actors within the international system. According to where they are placed within the overall international system along

with their geographic position informs many of these actors decisions moving forward. So a middle power, like Turkey, also has to work within the system according to its general position that it belongs to. Meaning that there are certain allowances and constraints placed upon all actors within the system according to their position. These actions will also be weighed against the acceptable amount of risk that the decision makers are willing to take when operating within the international arena. So a top tier actor will have more affordances given to it, while a low echelon player would be ever more constrained than an actor that is more powerful than it and thus creates a system that is more risky for actors with less power. But none the less, the international system as a whole is a huge determining factor for the way actors operate at the international level.

Nye argues that there must be an examination of three dimensions of today's international system; military, economics, and transnational relations in order to have a better understanding of capabilities. Militaristically the United States is the undisputed power house, and will be for the foreseeable future. Economically the U.S. needs to work in conjunction with the other major economic powers such as China, Japan, and the EU. In the transnational relations scenario, there is a rise of non-governmental organizations such as banks and terrorists networks, that need to be dealt with in an entirely different manner than from in the past (Jr. J. N., *The Paradox of American Power*, 2002). Nye call's for two policy prescriptions: define the U.S. national interest to produce global public goods; which should include the interests of other nations in these

calculations. And secondly, “start with multilateralism and only move to unilateralism if that fails. With multilateralism we embed our power in a framework that legitimizes it; we can also learn by listening” (Jr. J. N., *The Paradox of American Power*, 2002).

In order for the United States to maintain its competitive advantage in the international system several things must change. The fact still is that the international system is anarchic and the armed forces must remain the cornerstone of American security, but this must be complemented by soft power and individuals that are able to advance U.S. interests without having to coerce people. The 2010 National Security Strategy reveals that this is still a reality, but the U.S. cannot take on the international system by itself, and if this was attempted, a classic case of ‘imperial overstretch’ would be seen (The White House: Washington, 2010). Washington must start working more closely with traditional key allies, hold true to old alliances that have served well and modernize them to meet the challenges of today. “Security will come not from our ability to instill fear in other peoples, but through our capacity to speak to their hopes” (The White House: Washington, 2010).

More actors today exert power and influence than in the past. Due to increased rates of both regionalization and globalization the world is transforming in ways that it has not in the past and Washington must evolve with the times in order to stay at the helm of the international system. Europe is now more united, free, and at peace than it has ever been before. The European Union has deepened its integration, even though it is currently in a decline economically (Britain splitting from the Euro zone in the recent

past, Greece being in a full blown depression are just some examples) and militaristically Europe does not have the capacity for prolonged engagements, even within its immediate neighborhoods nor the stomach for military adventures, as could be seen with the campaign in Libya this past summer. Japan and South Korea in Asian are needed in order to counterbalance the rise of China, even though China is pivotal to the economic well-being of the U.S. right now. A renewal of relations with Turkey, should also be examined more closely, seeing how it is the second largest member of NATO, has been a long standing ally of the United States historically, is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, 2010 Turkey saw GDP growth at 8.9% (Nitschke, Oct. 27 2011), and is geo-strategically placed at the crossroads between the east and the west. These are among just a few of the important ties that the U.S. must renew or maintain for strategic alliance purposes. Other important powers that should be examined are emerging countries and key regional powers such as Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan (another traditional ally that has recently had rising of tensions with Washington). Along with Russia, which has reemerged in the international arena with a growing voice, China and India – the world's two most populous nations – are becoming more engaged globally and need to also be reexamined in today's context.

One way for the United States to renew these relations is through the use of preexisting multilateral institutions. If the U.S. were to endorse the UN again, this would re-legitimize it in a way that could be beneficial to the entire planet. There is also a way out of interventionist policy and unilateralism, and that is to allow others to have some of

a say when America uses force, while this is not a favorable option, it should at least be on the table. A return to the United Nations, multilateral institutions, and an international doctrine that promotes and protects not only American interests but that of the international system is what is needed by the United States to be taken seriously once again as a world leader. The United States should only commit to use of force with the approval of the Security Council, except where its national security is directly threatened (Ignatieff, 2003).

Foundation of U.S. power in terms of security will continue to be relations with allies abroad. Alliances are force multipliers: through multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of our actions is always greater than if we acted alone (The White House: Washington, 2010). NATO and the UN are the two most important multilateral institutions that Washington is a part of at the moment. There is a need to strengthen multilateral institutions by modernizing them for today and tomorrow so they may operate in the 21st century; Washington should continue to push to modernize institutions to reflect the realities of today (G-8 to the G-20). Expanding the G-8 to the G-20 to more accurately reflect today's diffusion of power would significantly bring other players into the mix in which the U.S. could work in conjunction with on world problems that are too large for Washington to handle alone. "Many of today's challenges cannot be solved by one nation or even a group of nations. The test of our international order, therefore, will be its ability to facilitate the broad and effective global cooperation necessary to meet 21st century challenges" (The White House: Washington, 2010).

One of the key components, if not the most important, to meet national security concerns of today, the U.S. must have a strong base at home to count on. The welfare of the American people is where the USA draws its power from, especially because the economy is how the U.S. pays for the military industrial complex; diplomatic relations, developmental efforts domestically and abroad, and supplements cultural soft power. The economy is a must fix scenario, for it is one of the most important engines that drives American power. The U.S. lacks the domestic political wherewithal and militaristic resources to manage the situation within Iraq, and the region as a whole, to create the original desired outcomes. Thus why Obama reexamined American capabilities and goals in today's context, and started (and now completed) a withdrawal of combat troops in Iraq. This is a case for increased multilateralism and a taming of U.S. expectations (Simon, 2007). America has always had unique marriage between realism and idealism which has been a guide in the past, and will continue to do so in the present and the future. This is where a great deal of America's power is derived from, an understanding of how the world truly works, but also an understanding of the need to strive for a better tomorrow not only the U.S., but for the good of humanity. This cannot be done alone - nothing in today's world can be done alone anymore due to globalization and a lack of sufficient power (Restad, 2010).

“No large country can afford to be purely multilateralist, and sometimes the United States must take the lead by itself, as it did in Afghanistan” (Jr. J. N., U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, 2003). The U.S. should be inclined towards multilateralism

whenever possible in order to legitimize its power and to gain acceptance for new policies brought forth. “Preemption that is legitimized by multilateral sanction is far less costly and sets a far less dangerous precedent than the US asserting that it alone can act as judge, jury, and executioner. Granted, multilateralism can be used by smaller states to restrict America freedom of action, but this downside does not detract from its overall usefulness.” (Jr. J. N., U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, 2003)

Two decades ago, when President Bush Sr. marshaled a multilateral force to toss Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, it stood unchallenged in the region. Kings and presidents-for-life vied for American favor (The Economist, 2010). America’s influence has dwindled in nearly all spectrums with the financial crisis, the rise of emerging powers, the misuse of force, among many other factors. But it seems to be withering faster in the Middle East than anywhere else. Despite the commitment of successive American presidents, and despite near-consensus worldwide on the outlines of an agreement, Arab-Israeli peace has kept receding out of reach. The invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 vastly expanded America’s footprint in the region, “the smoke of those Pyrrhic triumphs cleared to reveal America in trouble” (Khalidi, 2005). The global “war on terror” declared by President George Bush Jr. displaced Al-Qaeda and prevented several serious attacks. But those successes drained America’s treasury, alienated its friends and emboldened its enemies. While Obama has yet to make any significant or critical strides in the Middle East, he has made headway and has at

least lessened the damage done by President Bush in nearly all areas (The Economist, 2010).

PART II. CASE STUDY

Rise of a Middle Power in the Post-Cold War Era

Turkey: History

One country that is immensely interesting not only due to its particular geopolitical dynamic, but also because of a wide host of reasons, is Turkey. Like any other actor in the international system, Turkey must adapt temporally and according to its overall geographic disposition. But in order to understand contemporary Turkey in terms of international relations with Europe, the United States, Russia, and Iraq, one must first try and understand some of the history of the country and its development. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk rose to power and led the country to become one of the first democracies in the Middle East. Due to Ataturk's desire, many laws and the underlying design of Turkey became extremely close, and uniquely tied, to Europe. As a result of the Ankara Agreement of 1963, Turkey has been invited to become a member of the European Union. Thus Turkey has started to take a number of necessary steps in joining the Union, which include drastic economic and social reforms and, within this process, has become rather closely tied to many of those European countries. Turkey has also been a long

standing ally of the United States and is a significant player within NATO, which adds further complexity to Turkey's relations with Russia, the Middle East, and the West.

But much more recently there has been a shift away from Turkey's traditional partners and a move towards the periphery, where a bond has been forming between Russia and Turkey, the preeminent actors in Eurasia today, are starting to become amicable towards one another. Turkey and Russia are now starting to work together to create stability in the Caucasus region, advancing their interests to achieve greater mutual goals. This shift in foreign policy is also evident in Turkey's renewal of relations within the Middle East and, more specifically, its neighbor to the south, Iraq. This shift in foreign policy can be partially explained by the shift in the international system from that of the bipolar world of the Cold War to the unipolar or multipolar world of the post-Cold War era.

In this new era, Turkey has begun a move of its foreign policy toward a more assertive and proactive manner that befits the regional power that it is, a trend which has become even more increasingly apparent since the 2007 world financial recession. Because of Turkey's unique disposition and ties to the West, Turkey has been working hard to be a strong and supportive ally, but at the same time to be an independent state that is not a pawn for the two major western powers. This assertiveness within Ankara's foreign politics is also evident by how relations with Moscow have been evolving in the post-Cold War era. Due to Turkey's close geographic placement with Russia, it is in constant competition for regional supremacy; however, these two actors are also trying to

find new ways to work together to achieve greater goals within the region and beyond. This same assertiveness is also evident in Ankara's renewal of interest in the Middle East and in promoting Turkey's power in the region.

Turkey's ability to successfully promote its foreign policy, the policy that befits its national interests in the near abroad, and its new found assertiveness in the international system stems from the hard and soft power that Ankara possesses. In terms of hard power, as of 2010, Turkey holds the 17th largest economy in the world—\$958.3 billion—and a population of nearly 79 million people, 33 million of who are fit for military service. Turkey also spends about 5% of its GDP on its military complex, which is high even for most Western and industrialized countries (Agency). At the same time, Turkey possess a tremendous amount of soft power due to its track record in mediation, its status as a successful Muslim Democracy that could be viewed as a model for aspiring Democracies, its growth in tourism, and in Ankara's closeness with the EU. All of these factors actively contribute to the soft power equation. As Ahmet Davutoglu, Professor of International Relations and Ambassador and former Chief Advisor to the Turkish PM, says, "Turkey's most important soft power is its democracy" (Davutoglu, 2008).

Turkey's Economic History

The transformation the Turkish economy went through a similar path compared to other emerging market economies in the post-World War II period. Turkey originally

went through a phase of import substitution industrialization (ISI) for an extended period of time. During this ISI phase Turkey mainly focused on more traditional forms of industry such as textiles and agriculture. But eventually Turkey adopted an outward oriented trade strategy in the 1980s and was able to increase its world export share from .36 to .60 percent in the 2000s, and after the 2001 financial crisis the average export growth outpaced 20 percent (Syagili, 2011). This adjustment from ISI to a more trade liberalized system allowed for a shift in resource allocation from traditional sectors, textiles and agriculture, to high end technological intensive sectors such as vehicles and consumer electronics. These sectors were the ones that continued to grow for Turkey even during the 2007/08 world financial crisis and became the engine that is now driving the economy. Furthermore during this ISI phase, human capital became more abundant, the level of illiteracy fell from 32.5% in 1980 to 12.7% in 2000 according to the Turkish State Planning Organization. And the UNDP Human Development Index increased from .628% in 1980 to .806% in 2007 (Syagili, 2011).

Historically Turkey has had a hard time with inflation and early attempts to reduce it on a permanent basis started when the government declared its intention to liberalize the economy and to pursue an export-led growth policy to put the economy on a sustainable growth path in 1980. These initial goals, of lowering inflation, were soon reached and Turkey began generating higher GDP growth and created a relatively liberalized external trade regime and financial system. But in 1984 inflation began to rise again. Due to the failing fiscal policies and external deficit, the economy experienced a

major crisis in 1994. By 1998 the government was forced to start another disinflation program under the guidance of an IMF Staff Monitored Program (SMF). The program improved inflation rates and fiscal imbalances but could not contain the pressures on the interest rates. The Russian crisis in August 1998, general elections in Turkey, and two devastating earth quakes in 1999 led to a deterioration of the fiscal balance of the public sector (Slecuk). Then in 2001 Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis, where the IMF was once again allowed in to assist with adapting financial and fiscal reforms. Unlike most other economies, Turkey was able to bounce back both quickly and strongly in which it grew annually on average above the 6% mark until the 2007/08 world recession. The crisis in turn created an atmosphere of tighter fiscal policy that caused GDP to contract in 2009, but also reduced inflation to 6.3% (a 34-year low) and cut the public sector debt-to-GPD ratio below 50%. “Turkey's well-regulated financial markets and banking system weathered the global financial crisis and GDP rebounded strongly to [8.9%] in 2010, as exports returned to normal levels following the recession” (Central Intelligence Agency). The economy, however, continues to be burdened by a high current account deficit and remains dependent on often volatile, short-term investment to finance its trade deficit.

Turkey as a Growing Middle Power

Turkey has many economic, social, demographic, and political aspects that are encouraging and when coupled with current trends and future projections (even at their most modest) Turkey is poised to be one of the larger emerging economies by 2050. But

maintaining a competitive edge is not as easy as it seems. Turkey has relatively high labor costs and its main exports, such as cars and textiles (among other goods), are under pressure from Asian rivals, while hi-tech investment has not been flowing to Turkey as quickly as they had hoped so far. The labor force participation by women is a low 22% says Sinan Ülgen, head of Istanbul Economics a think tank in the cultural capital, and there are wide economic disparities between more affluent areas, such as around Istanbul, and the country's east and north-east, where per capita incomes are lower by a factor of 10 (The Guardian, 2011).

Youth unemployment is also high, at around 25% according to the OECD. A young population can spur growth when harnessed properly, if left unemployed for too long this will not only have detrimental economic consequences, but societal ones as well. Ülgen says that, "Turkey became a much more attractive destination for FDI, breaking a new record in 2007 before the global crisis with \$22bn of FDI [foreign direct investment] inflows.' Investment has waxed and waned since then but, as Ülgen continues, the country has a 'large and as yet unsaturated market,' which should make it attractive to investors" (The Guardian, 2011). Turkey has other assets too, the Hagia Sophia, once the largest church in the world and subsequently a mosque, is now a museum, a major part of Turkey's tourist industry. By 2023, the country hopes to have more than doubled arrivals of travelers to 63 million, thereby becoming one of the world's top five tourist destinations. It is all part of Turkey's plan to rise up the global

economic ladder, partly by taking advantage of its location as a natural bridge from east to west (The Guardian, 2011).

Sumru Altuğ a professor of economics at Koç University, observes that "Turkey's potential lies in its ability to exploit its proximity to markets in the region such as the Middle East, Central Asia, the Balkans, Russia as well as taking advantage of the energy market in the region" (The Guardian, 2011). With the country's European Union membership prospects diminishing, it seems, Turkey is looking toward its immediate neighbors for economic opportunities. The government of the Islamic-leaning Justice and Development party has just launched the country's first Islamic investment fund, making Turkey a belated entrant to the growing sharia finance sector. Ankara has established visa-free travel arrangements with Jordan, Lebanon, Libya and Syria, with similar bilateral deals under discussion with other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. However, nowadays, as Altuğ puts it: "One must create a favorable tax environment, undertake infrastructure investment, and be competitive against many players at once" in today's increasingly globalized world (The Guardian, 2011).

Turkey is in a very strong position in the world today, it has one of the most important and unique geographic political positions in the world putting it at the cross roads of Asia, Europe, the Caucasus, and Africa. It has a very young and large population that will be able to carry it for many years to come, barring any unforeseen disasters. Its military power is one of the strongest, if not the strongest in the Middle East, and the second largest in NATO (second only to the U.S.). If current trends

continue, being one of the fastest growing economies in the world, at around 8.9% in 2010 and 4.6% in 2011, Turkey's economic power, which is currently today's world's 16th largest economy, Goldman Sachs has forecasted that it should rise to 14th by 2050 (which might be modest considering all of the other aspects that Turkey holds), the Middle East's largest economy, is surely going to be a large factor in Turkey's ability to increase its power in the international arena as it shifts from a unipolar towards a uni/multipolar or multipolar system. Other significant factors for Turkey's bids to increase its share of the world power is its ability to transform this economic power into military power, its ever increasing soft power and its political relations with key actors in the international system.

Political Relations: (EU)rope

Turkey has had very close relations with Europe since its creation in 1923. This is due to Ataturk's design of the country and basing most of Turkey's laws off of European standards and the drive to be viewed as a progressive country with pro-Western or European ties and characteristics. Given Turkey's close ties to the West coupled with having a very strong sense of military, Turkey has helped with peace keeping missions ranging from Afghanistan to Kosovo and has sought closer involvement with the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which is a branch of the European Council that works as permanent standing political and security structures for members of the European Council (European Union). Because Turkey has been attempting to join the European Union, Turkey has become a longstanding member of almost every major

European organization and has very close ties to all of Europe (Turkey Conflict History, 2010). Due to Turkey's potential membership to the EU this turned relations with other parts of the world secondary because Ankara's efforts were pooled into European integration. That is until recently with several shifts in the international system.

A more recent trend for Ankara is a move away from the West. This directly has to do with Turkish disappointment in the EU and stalling of their membership status. "It is also clear that the disappointments encountered on the path to EU membership played a decisive role in the rethinking Turkey's foreign policy priorities... enthusiasm for EU membership has been significantly dampened both at the elite level and at the level of the public at large" (Onis, 2011). This places Turkey in a very peculiar position because of the EU; on one hand, Turkey would be better off in an economic sense because of the way that the EU functions as a single market, which could become a surge for the growing Turkish economy, but on the other hand Turkey is becoming increasingly ready to move on and find new avenues to explore to promote Turkish power.

Even though there would be huge economic benefits, Turkey is beginning to move away from the EU as the evidence shows in both the foreign political realm and the diversification of Turkey's economy. This move away from the EU as a global economic power house is part a causality of the 2007 financial crisis and the stagnation of the EU. "The global crisis has also strengthened efforts in the search for new markets at a time when the EU as Turkey's leading trade and investment partner was experiencing major difficulties" (Onis, 2011). The evidence is quite clear due to both the political elite and

general populace perception of the prospect of EU membership has dropped significantly and the recent global recession has caused a shift away from a predominate pro-European foreign policy. “EU’s share in Turkish foreign trade declined from 53.6% in 2003 to less than 42% in 2010, whereas Asia’s share skyrocketed from 18.8% to almost 30% in the same period” (Onis, 2011).

The movement away from the EU and the diversification of both Turkey’s foreign policy and economy is attributed to many different factors; such as the position of the political elite, domestic politics, the international system and so on. The change in the post-Cold War era, along with Turkey’s growing power has allowed Ankara to diversify itself in ways that it was unable to in the past. Now Ankara can attempt to achieve national goals that will promote Turkey as a both a global and regional player in ways that were not afforded to it in the past. While Ankara’s current trend of moving away from the EU has taken place, this is not to say that Turkey is no longer pro-European. Quite the contrary, Turkey is very much so a pro-European state that is still trying to become part of the Union. It is understandable why Turkey has started to move away from the EU more recently but,

“there is also a need to recognize that a major part of the attractiveness of Turkey to its various neighbors derives from its potential EU membership and its on-going Europeanization process. ..both the transformation of the Turkish economy and the consolidation of democratic credentials” (Onis, 2011).

Therefore while Ankara is attempting to promote its regional position and power, it must also maintain a pro-EU stance for many reasons, chief among them is because

membership in the EU is a surefire way of promoting regional power and becoming not only an extremely important regional player, but a powerful global actor as well.

Economic-liberalism fails to explain why Turkish-EU relations have stalled because even with economic integration, political, and social integration failed and thus soured relations over the years with Turkey's turn away from Europe. While economic-liberalism is unable to explain this, neoclassical realism is able to due to the changes in; domestic political environment of Turkey, the changing international system, and Turkey's relative power. A combination of domestic political support, at both the public and elite levels, significantly moved away from the Union, the 2003 War in Iraq has changed the landscape of the Middle East (making it more attractive in ways for Turkey because of their increased relative power in the region) and an increased assertiveness by Ankara in foreign politics have all contributed (along with many other reasons) to why Turkey has begun to move away from the EU as its major economic and political partner. With changes in all three of these significant areas neoclassical realism can explain why Ankara is behaving the way it is and the actions that are being taken.

Turkish Relations with Russia

Throughout history, Russia and Turkey have been rivals for regional supremacy in most of Eurasia, but recently both countries increasingly find it in their interest to be more amicable (Torbakov, 2005). This is due to the ever changing circumstances that both Russia and Turkey find themselves in since the end of the Cold War. In the not so

distant past Turkey and Russia were on hostile terms and were both supporting regional actors against one another. Turkey, with traditional ties to the West, supports and receives aid from some of Russia's top competitors in the world, namely the U.S. The geographic area of Eurasia and more specifically the Caucasus is a region that is located North East of Turkey that encompasses all of the states between Turkey and Iran and the Southern portions of Russia. In this region both Russia and Turkey have allies that do not get along. Turkey and Azerbaijan are traditional allies while Russia is much more closely linked to Armenia, and as we know, the accusation of genocide during the First World War against Turkey by the Armenians, the two do not get along. "Mutual suspicion dominated the bilateral relations, when Turkey, a longstanding NATO stronghold with close ties to the United States and Europe, set out to gain ground in Russia's traditional sphere of influence" (Kuhn, 2010).

Due to changes in the political structure of Turkey, the international system in the post-Cold War era, Turkey's changing power dynamics, and shifts in Turkish foreign policy, both Russia and Turkey have increasingly found it in their interest to not only open up dialogue with one another, but to work together in the Caucasus to create an environment of stability and economic progress. Before both Russia and Turkey started to truly warm up to one another there were decisive changes in both states. Russia's foreign policy approach towards Turkey, and the region as a whole, changed significantly with the end of the Second Chechen War in 2000. Whereas the deteriorating relations with the United States following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as well as the election and

subsequent policy change under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) between 2002 and 2005, gave rise to a new cooperation doctrine in Turkey and brought the two powers closer together (Kuhn, 2010).

Negotiations during the mid-2000s, between Turkey's Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russia's President Vladimir Putin, spurred on cooperation in national, regional, international security, and economic development in the form of bilateral treaties. This has all come to fruition after several visits between Erdogan and Putin between 2004 and 2006. "According to Erdogan, Putin and himself agree on many security details concerning the region and the world" (Torbakov, 2005). Turkey and Russia's close cooperation in the area of economics and seeing nearly eye to eye on many security related issues in the region, has brought the idea of military conflict between the two states to an all-time low (Euractiv.com, 2005).

This newly established cooperation is rooted in national interests found on both sides to see regional stability become a reality. While the Caucasus is not a significant energy producer in itself, it is very important for the transportation of energy resources and is one of the most important hubs of energy movement from East to West. "Energy security in the Caucasus increasingly demands international cooperation in order to ensure safe transport and sustainable supply because none of the countries is able to achieve this by themselves due to their different functions as producer or transit states" (Kuhn, 2010). Even though Turkey and Russia want to work together in order to keep the established order in the region, both countries have expressed feelings towards their

traditional allies and towards one another. Both Turkish and Russian leaders have articulated wishes for peace in the Caucasus but are reluctant to see change and would rather preserve the status quo.

Because of the volatile nature of the region, both officials from Moscow and Ankara know that the situation has the potential to become very intense in a short period of time, so both governments have expressed a willingness to use force if necessary in order to avoid a full scale war in the region (Torbakov, 2005). Many people believe that these strengthening of ties between Russia and Turkey add a significant amount of leverage in the form of security and economics for the two Eurasian powers (Aras, 2005). For this reason Turkey and Russia are principally interested in working together in order to halt any more hostilities between breakaway regions or interstate conflicts. Due to the Azerbaijani and Armenia conflicts, both Russia and Turkey have taken a great interest in the matter and have become joint mediators to keep the region from being engulfed in conflict.

One of the main reasons for this is because both Russia and Turkey want to continue to see an uninterrupted steady flow of oil and other hydrocarbon fuels from the area (Torbakov, 2005). In this region the idea of energy security is central to many national interests and regional interests specifically, “thanks to the geographical position Turkey enjoys, part of its national strategy involves facilitating the transit of energy across its territory, which is central to the East-West energy corridor” (Davutoglu, 2008). The most significant oil-pipeline project in this regard, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, initially

travels to the West and later descends to the south. It connects the trans-Caspian to Turkey and enables Turkish access to Central Asia and also extends Turkey's ability to promote its regional aspirations and power there. Not only is Turkey discussing the possibility of helping to mediate the Azerbaijani and Armenian conflict, Turkey also wishes to help mediate in the Georgian and Abkhazian conflict as well due to the large population of Abkhazians in Turkey that see it in their interest to become involved in the conflict (Torbakov, 2005). As seen from trends in the recent past, Turkey has been working alongside Russia in the region in order to create a more secure Eurasia, which helps Turkey in a multitude of ways.

If Turkey were to continue on the path it is currently on, Turkey would be in the best of positions with the West, US and EU, and Russia. By not becoming too close to Russia, but by continuing this level of cooperative work, the United States would not have reason to be nervous about the dynamic of growing relations between Turkey and Russia, because of Turkey's key membership in NATO. Rather regional and global aspirations of energy security in the region would enhance all sides of the spectrum. "Turkey shares common interest with Russia, Iran and the United States for the successful operation of natural gas and oil pipelines that run in various directions through the Turkish territory" (Davutoglu, 2008). Turkish power and stability in this energy corridor might actually help enhance ties with the U.S. due to common security interests. Also by keeping friendly terms with Russia while trying to get into the EU is

advantageous to Turkey because Russia and the EU are on very friendly grounds with each other due to Russia's energy exports to the EU.

This case of Turkish relations with Russia makes sense in both economic-liberal and neoclassical realist terms. First, as far as neoclassical realism is concerned the changing circumstances in the post-Cold War era has allowed Ankara ample room to redefine itself in order to increase its regional power along with its peer competitor, Russia, because they both have the same goals in mind for the region; security, stability, and status quo. These shared visions for the region, and other extenuating circumstances (especially Turkey's falling out with the U.S. during the 2003 War in Iraq), and the success of neoclassical realist tendencies has allowed economic-liberal tendencies and ideas to flourish. Through this open dialogue environment many agreements have come to fruition in the form of what is called "pipeline politics" (the Blue Stream pipeline is an excellent example) and later both Russia and Turkey institutionalized their relationship in terms of economic interdependence. "The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) is one of the latest initiatives for regional cooperation in the Caucasus proposed by Turkey. It was first made public on August 13, 2008 by Turkish PM Erdogan in a meeting with the Russian leadership in Moscow" (Kuhn, 2010). In regard to the Caucasus and Russia, Turkey has enhanced its regional position and power. While Russia maintains the position of regional hegemon, or at the very least aspiring regional hegemon, Turkey has made significant strides and is not only a significant player in the region, but respected by the regional powerhouse. By integrating itself into the region,

Turkey has made it very difficult for another outside power, or Russia, to exert influence in the region without Ankara's approval first.

Turkey and Iraq

Out of all of the regions that Turkey belongs to, its relations with the Middle East is the most multifaceted due to the complexities of the region. These complexities are attributed to, but certainly not limited to; the vastness and diversities of the states, peoples, cultures, and religions within this region. While Turkey has a long and well established track record as a mediator and facilitator in the region, historically Turkish relations in the region have been limited and have had a tendency to lean in a pro-Western stance through its support of Israel and the United States. But since the end of the Cold War, Ankara's souring relations with Europe; Israel, and the US, Turkey has increasingly been more active within the Middle East in both hard and soft power terms in order to diversify its foreign relations and become more influential.

Iraq and Turkey share a common border on Turkey's south-eastern perimeter, which happens to be where the majority of Kurdish people live in the region. While Turkey has improved its relations with most Middle Eastern states, its relationship with Iraq is of utmost importance due to national security issues. This directly has to do with the American-Iraqi war of 2003 and not only its implications on the greater Middle East, but also Iraqi stability, unification, and the Kurdish situation. Ankara's national security

interest in this specific problem is to maintain the unity of Iraq and to halt Kurdish (PKK) terrorists. “Turkey’s primary concerns over Iraq concentrated on two issues: first, the rising PKK terror in the region and the likelihood of Northern Iraq becoming its breeding ground; and secondly, the Iraqi constitution’s Article 140 which had set the deadline for the referendum in Kirkuk to be held by December of 2007” (Davutoglu, 2008). These concerns are quite legitimate and not only affect Turkey, but the region as a whole, because if Northern Iraq were to become a Kurdish state, it will once again throw the power balance off within the Middle East and will have a negative impact on the region and Turkey as a whole as states try to consolidate their power.

To address some of these concerns Turkey has employed a multitude of different responses and policy sets on different levels in an attempt to be a regional power with a strong sense of direction. A diplomatic route that Ankara took was through creation of the multilateral institution known as the Extended Neighboring Countries of Iraq (Davutoglu, 2008). This institution created a forum for the countries that border Iraq to come together to discuss Iraq’s future, the future of the region, and to address concerns of the countries that will be immediately affected by what is happening within Iraq. “Turkey’s efforts have not only helped to establish the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, but also paved way for Iraq to be not solely an American but an international issue to be dealt with within the framework of the United Nations” (Davutoglu, 2008). By doing this Turkey has once again enhanced its regional soft

power capabilities and has created an effective way to discuss issues within the region in regional and international channels.

Another example of Turkey flexing its soft power muscle is how Ankara has also been in direct contact with Baghdad in order to foster closer, deeper, and stronger ties so that the two states may build trust and a deeper understanding of one another's national interests. "Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Iraq has also deepened. At the beginning of 2007, the two shared a normal level of trust; by the end of 2007, their relationship had developed into full-fledged confidence" (Davutoglu, 2008). By doing this, Turkey is able to work closely with Iraq on joint issues, specifically their shared Kurdish population concern. This gives the image to many states in the Middle East that while Turkey does possess significant hard power capabilities, Ankara is devoted to diplomacy and enhancing Turkish-Arab relations.

An instance where Turkey had to use its hard power in the Middle East, specifically in relation to Iraq was against the PKK. Turkey has had excursions into northern Iraq to follow PKK terrorists in order to rout them out of their country or to make sure they are unable to re-cross the border to strike their territory again. But in this instance Turkey did not solely rely on its hard power capabilities but rather a multitude of tactics to take on the PKK issue. "Turkey has gradually drawn the Iraqi government, regional actors, the United States, the European Union and Sunni-Shiite and Syriac communities in Iraq closer to itself. In sharp contrast to its initial plans of isolating Turkey, the PKK has become the party being isolated" (Davutoglu, 2008). This reversal

demonstrates how diplomacy, soft power, and hard power can be reconciled in the best and most consistent manner to give Turkey great advantages not only in the battlefield, but in the region and the international system. Turkey's ability to nimbly handle this volatile situation is a testament to Ankara's growing power, especially in the Middle East, and is a considerably reason, among many others, for why Turkey could be considered an aspiring regional hegemon.

With the downfall and now rebuilding of Iraq, Iran being increasingly isolated from the Western world, and the recent turmoil (the Arab Spring) that has reverberated throughout the Middle East, there are few powers that are as well collected, powerful (in both militaristic and economic terms) and respected throughout the region like Turkey currently is. With all of the recent developments within Turkey and the Middle East, Ankara has a significant chance of pushing itself into a regional hegemonic position. This in turn will not only enhance other regional positions, because what happens in one region will have spill over affects in others, but the international arena as well.

Turkey's relationship with Iraq can be explained in both economic-liberal and neoclassical realist terms. Because of Turkey's stagnating process for EU accession, Turkey has started to effectively assert itself within the Middle Easter and has fostered very close ties to Iraq. By creating multilateral institutions to address many regional concerns over the stability of Iraq, and ultimately the region, Ankara successfully integrated the region to a degree and is fostering an environment of diplomacy and negotiation that is backed by Turkey's hard power. While Turkey and Iraq might not

have cultivated especially close ties economically, the institutionalized and interdependency part of economic-liberalism is of pertinence here with the understanding that what happens to one state will reverberate throughout the region and affect the others as well. Neoclassical realism would explain Turkey's shift away from the European Union towards the Middle East because of changing domestic politics and its view of national interest and where Turkey should assert itself in its geographic region. Neoclassical realism also helps to explain Turkey's foreign policies due to the anarchic nature of the international system, Turkey went ahead and attempted to create a more protected environment for its national security by isolating threats such as the PKK. Also because of Turkey's perceived threats to national interest and security, Ankara tried to maintain the status quo within the region by creating ways to promote unification within Iraq so that Turkey would not be drawn into a regional conflict. Ankara has worked hard to maintain the status quo in the region, especially in regard to Iraqi unification as to avoid the birth of a Kurdish state and the subsequent reshuffling of power within the Middle East that could potentially hurt Turkey.

Turkey and the United States

Another significant way for Turkey to increase its regional position and power is to be on friendly terms with the most influential and powerful actor in the international system, America. In the past, namely up until the 2003 war in Iraq, Turkey has been a strong supporter of American foreign policy and has worked jointly with the U.S. in many peace keeping missions as well as military conflicts. A founding member of the

United Nations, a key member of NATO and the Council of Europe, and an associate member of the European Union, Turkey has shown its commitment to being pro-Western and pro-American (Turkish Embassy). Even though both countries do not agree on matters of security all the time, Turkey has contributed strongly to Western peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan, Congo, Kosovo (among many others), and there has been a history of collaboration between the two states which was once hailed as a “special relationship” (Turkey Conflict History, 2010).

After the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, the tensions between the two states have been high and the relationship needs to be reexamined. The war in Iraq has created a separate entity in northern Iraq, which is predominantly inhabited by ethnic Kurds, who are seeking statehood for Kurdistan. This in turn is causing Kurdish unrest in the South Eastern portion of the Turkey, and is one of the larger sources of friction between the U.S. and Turkey today (Larrabee, 2008). It is not only in America’s interest to maintain good reputation with Turkey, but also for Turkey to do the same, for both countries need each other more than they might suspect. Ankara is upset with Washington because Turkey was not only ignored when trying to give advice to the United States, in order to try and avoid a war with Iraq, but was also ignored when Turkey informed the U.S. of its own security problems and how detrimental a war would be for the entire region (Cook, 2006). Washington’s inability to listen to Turkey as a key ally and their inability to perceive Turkey as not only a viable regional power, but as a global player, has significantly strained relations between the two.

While the relations have been strained in the not so distant past, both powers have been trying to mend the rift more recently. Turkish-American relations have a solid geopolitical foundation, a strong historic background, and an institutionalized framework that both can build upon to bring back a robust working relationship that must be reframed for the post-Cold War era. Because some of Turkey's grievances has to do with Washington's view of them as an ally, a reexamination of this partnership must be done in today's context so that both powers may effectively rely on one another in times of need and understand the limits and interest of both states. "Turkey is no longer a sole alliance nation whose support is taken for granted, but a significant country with regional and global influence whose strong vision and the proven capacity to make meaningful contributions need to be taken into account by a healthier communication and cooperative dialogue" (Davutoglu, 2008).

Even with all of this dialogue between the two states and Turkey's displeasure with the U.S., Turkey still needs America not only for economic aid, but also for America's military might and the perks that comes with being backed by the world's only surviving superpower, even with that standing starting to dwindle. One such area that both Turkey and the United States could work together on is the unity and success of Iraq. Both states see it in their immediate national interest to see Iraq through and become a success story, not a failure. While both sides are aiming to do this for different reasons, they both have vested interests in Iraq, "the wide scope of common strategic issues which should not be overshadowed by the disagreements on individual concerns

regarding Iraqi policy” (Davutoglu, 2008). There are many other areas in which both Turkey and America have vested interest in that are parallel with one another, and with the re-adjustment of how the U.S. perceives Turkish power, many of these interests can be worked on jointly to achieve goals that neither country could obtain by oneself. The document “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership” declared by the then Foreign Minister Gul and Secretary of State Rice in July 2006 reflects this conclusion and that the priorities of both sides at an attempt of re-adjustment of bilateral relations is in both states interests (Davutoglu, 2008).

Despite the fact that the U.S. is a superpower, America still needs a lot of help and specifically in the Middle East, where America has spent a lot of its time and energy for the last half century. Turkey is a pro-western democratiz(ed)ing Muslim state that has strategic bases within its territories that the U.S. could use (Cook, 2006). If these concerns were repaired, the strained relations with the EU over the acceptance of Turkey into the Union would be less detrimental and Turkey would be able to count on at least one outside power to be able to support it in times of need (Larrabee, 2008).

In this situation economic-liberalism fails to explain why US-Turkish relations moved the way they did, whereas neoclassical realism can explain part of it. Economic-liberalism failed to explain why the U.S. and Turkey; both of which had been longstanding allies; once held a “special relationship;” worked together in multilateral and bilateral institutions and agreements; had a falling out instead of becoming closer and

closer. But neoclassical realism is able to explain the “southward” trend in the relationship due to the change in the international system at the end of the Cold War, the change in Turkey’s and America’s domestic political structure and the changing nature of both state’s national interests.

On the flip side of the coin, both economic-liberalism and neoclassical realism can explain the returning upward trend in relations recently. Economic-liberalism would explain it due to the longstanding history and institutionalization that both states have shared in the past, so it would have been natural, or easier for these two states to work out their differences and to start working together again. Neoclassical realism would explain the renewal of relations through the idea of joint national security interests and that both domestic political structures saw the mutual benefits of redefining the relationship and once again working together.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has evolved its foreign policy environment to change with the international system, domestic demands, new national interests and security issues, and growth in relative power to not only its regional competitors, but also global peers. Due to Turkey’s peculiar position in the world and the various security related situations that the country has, Turkey has many different possibilities to choose from and obtain in order to promote its power and position. While both neoclassical realism and economic liberalism can explain part of the picture of Turkish foreign

relations and decisions made in the post-Cold War era, the first of the two international relations theories seems to be able to explain more fully what and why things happened. That is not to say that economic-liberalism is not able to explain what happened or is not as effective, but rather can only explain a smaller part of the picture than neoclassical realism seemingly can, which is also still only part of the whole picture. But with the combination of these two theories, a more complete understanding of the complex situation is afforded to us.

In the realm of Western relations, specifically the U.S., the path that Ankara has chosen, the healthy renewal of dialogue between the two countries, seems to be the best route. By redefining the US-Turkish relationship, both powers can have a better understanding of one another in the post-Cold War era and with a renewal of ties, Turkish power is surely to rise. This is also important in order for Turkey to have a safety net of sorts, if the tensions between EU and Turkey increase to the breaking point; Ankara would not be completely alone but be backed by another significant world power. Turkey should also continue its dialogue with the EU and try and obtain full membership, unless it becomes politically unfavorable due to many factors within Turkey itself, such as the significant downfall in public and elite support. Foreign relations will only be better off for Turkey if it works together with as many entities as possible so that as many avenues as possible may be explored to find the most beneficial path, and having an international actor such as the EU as a backer is something that is very favorable.

Considering the turn in foreign politics that Ankara has undertaken, Turkey should also continue to increase relations with Russia as long as this does not strain relations with the U.S. or EU to unacceptable levels. This relationship with Russia is very important to stability of the Caucasus region and to world energy markets. By working with Moscow, Ankara is able to accomplish goals that would be impossible to do with Russian opposition and thus Turkey has enhanced its regional position here by becoming a key component to Caucasus, European, and Middle Eastern regional politics. Through the strengthening of ties and stability for one of Turkey's regions, it also supports other Turkish aspirations and efforts.

But out of all of Turkey's regions, Ankara has been afforded the best of fortunes in the Middle East. This is true because within this region Turkey holds its most relative power (compared to the other regions, Turkey is a primary and not a secondary player here) and should be considered an aspiring regional hegemon. Turkey holds significant soft power within the region and is one of the larger holders of hard power at the same time. With Ankara's renewed interest in the region it would not be surprising to see Turkey working more proactively in the region for a long time to come. By combining all of these factors together Turkey surely has significant Middle Eastern power.

With the end of the Cold War, the 2003 War in Iraq and the 2007 world financial crisis, Turkey has shown to be resilient and continues to grow despite significant setbacks for the rest of the world. Because of the interconnectedness of the world and where Turkey is placed geographically, what Turkey does in one region will change aspects and

dynamics in another. Turkey has become very adapt and efficient in modern times at playing with this dynamic and thus enhancing its position as a whole and not just in one region that it belongs to (for example the stagnation of EU relations has led to an increase in ME and Russian relations, thus increasing Turkish power as a whole). Turkey is on the right path, for the most part, for promoting its power in all of the regions it belongs to, which could eventually become “Turkey’s region” one day, and will be a significant player for a time to come, barring any unforeseen catastrophic disasters.

PART III. CONCLUSION

A Changing International System

The Second World War all but destroyed the major European powers and their ability to project sufficient force overseas. For the most part, this war significantly changed the mindsets of Europeans from cold hearted realists to more multilaterally inclined constructivists that believe in the rule of law. During the 1990s Europe (the EU specifically) was unable to project significant military power within the Balkans, Europe's own back yard. Even today during the Libyan crisis the diminishment of European military power has become shockingly apparent. During the Cold War Europe was at the center of it all, stuck between the two superpowers, it left Europe geo-strategically very important. But in the post-Cold War era it is a different story. Europe is continuously finding itself on the periphery when it comes to security related issues, where the setting of the international arena is being ever pushed eastward towards Asia, creating a new focus of America and Asia instead of Europe and America.

American and European divergence on the use of power, foreign policy decisions in general, has become apparent in the post-Cold War era. Europe has been moving towards Kant's "Perpetual Peace" in which rule of law and peace keeps their world in check while America seems to be stuck in a Hobbesian anarchic world where power is the main driving force. Americans, more than Europeans, tend to lean towards unilateralism and the use of force. These are generalizations of course; there are both

sides (people who want to cooperate or use force) in both Europe and America (Kagan, 2003). But what is the causation of these differences? The power equation within the international system seems to be the answer, America is now reigning supreme in militaristic might, and on par with the EU economically, thus forcing the two actors to look at the international system from different angles.

A push away from Europe would force Washington to find replacements at the international security level. That is not to say that Europe and the United States would become enemies, quite the contrary, but America would be forced to find new key allies to help in the international security realm when needed. These allies could come from anywhere; but the most likely prospects would be traditional allies that America has had discrepancies with recently, such as Turkey. Pakistan could also be a viable option if many of their domestic issues are addressed and resolved. Other potentials could be India, arguably the world's largest democracy (is India truly a Democracy?), Columbia (recent signing of a free trade agreement), Indonesia, Vietnam, or any other large emerging state that the Washington is not already profoundly close to.

With the diminishment of the Europeans in terms of military power, and some of them even in terms of economic power, this (along with many other factors) is permitting new poles of power to emerge in the international arena; be it old powers that are able to renew themselves, or new powers that have never been in this position before. This steady evolution of the international system in the post-Cold War era from a unipolar system, to a uni/multipolar, or to what could be a multipolar world is allowing many

actors in the international arena to make moves to obtain more power. Depending on the actors' particular position in the system, some want to maintain the status quo, while others want to grab as much power as they can for themselves, while some will try and diminish prospects for others at obtaining power. This is also true for many of the additional emerging poles of power in the international system, specifically the BRICs. The BRICs are the premier growing powers in this period, if all else stays constant, meaning there is no significant war, economic disaster, significant natural disaster, etc. these actors will be among the ones who benefit the most from this transition to a multipolar world, for their share of world power will increase significantly relative to others.

The BRICs, standing for Brazil, Russia, India and China, are the world's four largest emerging economies and are projected to overtake today's largest economies by 2050. The four BRIC countries are distinguished from a host of other promising emerging markets due to their demographic and economic potential to rank them as the world's largest and most influential economies of the 21st century, while also having the opportunity to realize this potential. Although sometimes the BRICs are also mentioned in what is called the N-11, or the Next 11, which describes the next eleven largest emerging economies of the world and are supposed to have a much larger share of the global economic position, and thus more power in the international arena. The N-11 consists of; Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines,

South Korea, Turkey and Vietnam and “Are all countries that are supposed to have important roles on a global economic stage by 2050” (Friedman, 2010).

The “Big Four” as some refer to them as, comprise of more than 2.8 billion people, or 40 percent of the world’s population, cover more than a quarter of the world’s land area over three continents and account for more than 25 percent of global GDP (BRIC Countries - Background, Latest News, Statistics and Original Articles). Not only are the BRICs projected to have extraordinary growth and potential, but they are already forging ahead in today’s economic scenario. In the last ten years the BRICs have contributed to over a third of world GDP growth and grew from nearly a sixth of the world economy to nearly a quarter of it in PPP terms (Goldman Sachs, 2010). While the last ten years have been good for the group, the BRICs also lead both advanced economies and emerging ones in stabilization after the 2007/08 crisis. Out of the BRICs, China is the one expected to lead the way in recovery and return to its trend growth by mid-2010 (Goldman Sachs, 2009), which it nearly did according to the World Bank data base (World Bank, 2012). If this seems quite amazing, so is their projected output at the global stage, which there are claims that by 2018 the four economies combined will overcome the U.S. and by 2050, if trends continue the way they are now, these four countries will have over taken today’s four largest economies.

How were these four emerg(ed)ing economies given this acronym and deemed to belong in this group? Goldman Sachs’ Jim O’Neill argued in his article “Building Better Global Economic BRICs” (2001), on the basis between the largest emerging economies

and the then G-7, where he compared GDP projections in various manners, in conjunction with exchange rates and purchasing power parity (PPP) rates (O'Neill, 2001). But is this the proper way to measure the size and strength of an economy? GDP projections are the most common ways to do this, but this is still imperfect due to the fact that that it overlooks volunteer work, unpaid domestic services, black markets/informal economies, bartering, the sustainability of growth, income disparities, and externalities like environmental degradation (Friedman, 2010).

Friedman argues that, GDP is the most common measurement of growth for the lack of a more reliable and convenient measurement that is readily available. Friedman also argues that if you look at the 2009 top economies; US GDP of about \$14.3 Trillion and the rest of the top 12 were Japan (\$5.1 Trillion), China (\$4.9 Trillion), Germany (\$3.3 Trillion), France (\$2.6 Trillion), UK (\$2.2 Trillion), Italy (\$2.1 Trillion), Brazil (\$1.6 Trillion), Spain (\$1.5 Trillion), Canada (\$1.3 Trillion), India (\$1.3 Trillion) and Russia (\$1.2 Trillion), but broke down GDP into two categories of total GDP of a country as equal to the population of the country times the GDP per capita. This created a slightly different picture, where China and India have relatively low GDP per capita but very high populations; France, UK, Italy, Spain and Germany have high GDP per capita and populations ranked 14-27th in the world as upper middle populations; and US and Japan - which are unique - because they are the only upper income countries with a population in the top 10 in the world (US is 3rd largest population in the world) (Friedman, 2010). But even so, with these growing economies, it has become

increasingly clear that there has begun a slow yet relentless power shift in the international arena away from the U.S. in terms of economics.

Turkey is another such actor that is gaining ground with this shifting international system and will want to use all the tools at their disposal in order to ensure that when the dust begins to settle, that they end up in a better position in the end than from where they started. The change to a multipolar system can be highly beneficial for a middle power like Turkey due to the fact that it can potentially gain more power relative to other actors because the power field will be comparatively more even. Turkey is placed in such a geostrategically important spot; has nurtured its economy to the point that it is one of the most robustly growing in the world, has created political dynamics that are very favorable for itself, has both a hearty military industrial complex and a very strong complimentary soft power stockpile, that with this changing dynamic it will not be surprising to see Turkey situate itself quite comfortably among the top tier powers.

The changing dynamics within the international system are things that Washington must come to terms with in order handle the transition when it happens (if it hasn't already) and to maintain this current structure (the U.S. being the premier military in the world and one of the largest and most powerful economies). Having a superior grasp of these changing dynamics will better prepare the United States for this transition. There are many ways to go about doing this, but one thing that is sorely needed is having a more cohesive foreign policy – per president - to create longer lasting uniformity in America's long term goals and needs in the international system. This lack of cohesion

in the foreign policy direction has been apparent since the end of the Cold War (Hadar, 1994). Examining national security strategies of past presidents shows that there has been an effort to streamline some of this foreign policy, but the actual implementation has missed the mark. Additionally the U.S. needs to move away from unilateralism to a more multilateral policy set. The United States historically has also been very good at understanding the role in the international system, but since the end of the Cold War and the promotion of American Exceptionalism, polarization of American politics, etc. this area has been examined less and less (Roskin, 2008).

Washington needs to evolve with the times, since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has moved towards a unilateral mindset but now that must change. America still stands at the apex of the global community (without American endorsement at the international level many plans or policies would, and do, falter) but not by the same margins that Washington has been accustomed to. There must also be a greater understanding that the U.S. might not have the power to act in unilateral fashion in all situations (also begets the question if it is legal to do so at the international level and morally justifiable within our own context). Washington needs to make sure that the gap between aspiration and achievement is as close as possible in order to avoid missing the mark in obtaining outcomes (Evans, 2001). America can still be a world leader, but first there is a need to start fostering closer ties with key allies and actors in the international system again. Before this can happen the United States needs to begin taking care of its own society and address some major lingering issues, such as the 2007/08 financial crises

that is still having enduring effects on the population and the economy. The longer that there are economic problems, the more quickly the decline of the U.S. and the rise of other emerging nations will become apparent and accentuated.

Another changing dynamic in the international system that the United States must contend with is that of Middle Eastern oil. While this in itself is nothing new, it is extremely important to the U.S. for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from domestic economic importance to strategic militaristic significance. Oil became important to the world with Winston Churchill's decision at the onset of the First World War to turn their naval fleet from one of coal to oil. This in turn revolutionized not only modern warfare but also industrial capacities and the strategic importance of oil and thus the Middle East. Oil is what makes the world go round today; without oil everything would go by the wayside and cease to function properly in today's context.

One reason why Middle Eastern oil is so vital to the U.S. is because consumption outstrips production, making the import of oil necessary. While the United States does not import as much oil from the Middle East as it once did, out of the top ten, there are only two countries from the Middle East that make this list (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2011). Oil is also extremely important to the U.S. due to the fact it is such a strategic asset to control. With oil one can dramatically increase industrial, military, and consumer production by either controlling the production or the sales of the commodity. By controlling these two factors one can determine prices, availability, capacity, or distribution in order to develop or to hinder specific targets. One way that

America did this was through the “Seven Sisters,” which encompassed several of the Standard companies and Royal-Dutch Shell, who for a time, controlled most of the oil production along with most of the royalties that came from this production in the Middle East (Yergin, 1991). Oil has been of such vital importance in wars throughout history since, and even during, World War II that it has been fought for in order to preserve the status quo, maintain oil capacities, national security, and interests. “Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson...summed up most succinctly just how high the stakes were in the Persian Gulf. ‘Middle East oil...was as essential to mutual security as atomic warheads’ (Little, 2008). Having control of this resource is what makes the Middle East so important for strategic reasons as mentioned above, in addition to having control of this resource, it in turns ensure that no other actor in the system can have it and exploit it to their advantage.

“America should ‘act independently of its major allies when the advantage of achieving U.S. objectives by such action clearly outweighs the danger of lasting damages to its alliances’ (Coady, 2008). This train of thought needs to be changed; the system is no longer in that international paradigm of the Cold War or even the direct post-Cold war years. This is a new age where non-governmental organizations and other small networked organizations can have large and lasting impacts on major players in the international system, so there is a need for a new foreign policy paradigm that is less macro and more specific.

There is also a need to understand that it is now a more globalized community than ever before and as time progresses these connections and levels of interdependency are increasing at rates unseen before. While the United States has historically been able to hide behind its two greatest walls, the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, they are increasingly shrinking with the progress of technology in transportation and telecommunications. With the increasing rate of globalization the United States is being forced closer to the rest of the world. This is creating an atmosphere where America needs to hold ideals high and support others who recognize these ideals and support these individuals not only domestically, but also abroad. As national economies become more integrated internationally, the United States cannot thrive in isolation from developments abroad; America's economic health is vulnerable to disturbances that originate outside the borders. As such, "cooperation with other states and international organizations is vital to protecting the health of the global economic system and responding to financial crises" (The White House, 1998).

The use of military force should be a last resort, not a first. But the use of unilateral force only when absolutely necessary and essential to national security interests, and if all other means fail, is an avenue that must remain open. Costs of multilateral interventions versus costs of unilateral interventions are staggering. While in most multilateral situations Washington ends up paying the brunt of the cost, militarily, economically, and in lives (in such cases as wars), but this is still better than bearing all of the costs alone and isolating one's self in the international community at the same time

with unilateral actions. There should also be an increase in the conditions necessary to work in a unilateral fashion, not only for the United States, but for the rest of the world. Nations throughout the world should be held more accountable for their actions.

In order for this to happen not only does there need to be a return to the United Nations and a stronger push for its legitimacy, but perhaps a restructuring of the UN framework to grant it more power at the global level. This is an idealistic scenario though, for the current Security Council - including the United States, would not relinquish the power configuration that was created in 1945 for a new reformed structure that more accurately represented the dynamics of the globalized international system of today. If this scenario does not pan out then the time has come to have a more realistic foreign policy – scaling back the United States’ global ambitions, respecting the limits to America’s capabilities, recognizing and embracing the constraints of the international system (Lindberg, 2007-2008). But this is also an unlikely scenario due to the fact that the U.S. will still be the most influential power in the international arena for the time to come. But none-the-less, America holds the capability to change with the times and can work in a more multilateral mindset in the future with a greater understanding of the international system, American capabilities, and limitations.

All in all the people who create and implement foreign policy, be it academics, federal employees, or the likes in-between, there is a need for a greater understanding of the international system today and where United States is placed in it. The transition from a unipolar to a uni/multipolar or even a multipolar system has created new dynamics

that Washington must address in order to consolidate its power to maintain a position of dominance for as long as possible. The grounds that were laid out earlier in this paper are just some of the things that could be done in order to achieve these goals; they do not need to be implemented immediately, but rather taken into consideration and implemented at a pace that is both acceptable to the United States and the planet as a whole.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Turkey Conflict History*. (2010, April). Retrieved January 27, 2012, from International Crisis Group: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/turkey.aspx>
- Agency, C. I. (n.d.). *The World Factbook*. Retrieved February 18, 2012, from Turkey: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>
- Aras, D. B. (2005, February 14). *Turkish-Russian Relations and Euroasia's Geopolitics*. Retrieved December 21, 2011, from Global Politician: <http://www.globalpolitician.com/2344-russia>
- Belasco, A. (2011). *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
- BRIC Countries - Background, Latest News, Statistics and Original Articles*. (n.d.). Retrieved November 24, 2011, from Global Sherpa: <http://www.globalsherpa.org/bric-countries-brics>
- Central Intelligence Agency. (n.d.). *The World Factbook*. Retrieved December 8, 2011, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>
- Central Intelligence Agency. (n.d.). *World Fact Book*. Retrieved December 5, 2011, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>
- Coady, J. A. (2008). *Change and Continuity in American Grand Strategy: A comparative Analysis of the Clinton and Bush Foreign Policy Doctrines*. London: University of London.
- Conley, H. A. (2011). Review article - The end of the West: the once and future Europe. *International Affairs*, 975-984.
- Cook, S. A.-R. (2006, June 22). *Building a New Era in U.S. - Turkey Relations*. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from Washington Post: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/AR2006062101613.html>
- Cookson, J. H. (2008). *The World in 2050 - Beyond the BRICs: A Broader Look at Emerging Markets Growth Prospects*. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP.
- Davutoglu, A. (2008). Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007. *Insight Turkey*, 77-96.

- Duffield, P. J. (2009). *Balance Sheet: The Iraq War and U.S. National Security*. Stanford Press.
- Euractiv.com. (2005, November 17). *Turkey-Russia Relations*. Retrieved December 20, 2011, from Euractiv.com: <http://www.euractiv.com/foreign-affairs/turkey-russia-relations/article-134083>
- European Union. (n.d.). *External Action*. Retrieved February 5, 2012, from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence>
- Evans, G. (2001, December). Nation Building and American Foreign Policy.
- Feaver, P. D. (2009). Debating American Grand Strategy After Major War. *Foreign Policy*.
- Foreign Affairs. (2008). Turkey Emerged. *Foreign Affairs*.
- Friedman, H. S. (2010). BRIC and Beyond: Economies that Will Shape the 21st Century.
- Fukuyama, F. (2006, February 19). New York Times. *After Neoconservatism*.
- Garamone, J. (2012, March 9). American Forces Press Service. *Panetta Discusses U.S. Focus on Pacific, Middle East*.
- Gazioglu, S. (2003). Cpital Flows to an Emerging Financial Market in Turkey. *IAER*.
- Genest, M. A. (2004). *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations*. Belmont: Wadsworth/ Thomson Learning, Inc.
- Goldman Sachs. (2009). *BRICs Montly (May)*. Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research .
- Goldman Sachs. (2010). *BRICs Monthly (May)*. Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research.
- Hadar, L. T. (1994). Muddling Through in the New World Disorder - And in the Middle East. *Journal of Palestine Studies*.
- Harry S. Truman Library & Museum. (n.d.). *Student Activity: Harry Truman and the Truman Doctrine*. Retrieved March 11, 2012, from Truman Library: <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm>

- Howe, S. (2002). *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1999). The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs*, 35-49.
- Ignatieff, M. (2003, September 7). Why Are We In Iraq? (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?). *The New York Times*.
- Invest in Turkey. (n.d.). *Turkey at a Glance*. Retrieved November 22, 2011, from Economic Outlook: <http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/turkey/factsandfigures/Pages/Economy.aspx>
- Jackson, I. (2007). Reviewing Iraq. *Contemporary Review*.
- Jackson, R. a. (2010). *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
- Jr., J. N. (2002, May 8). The Paradox of American Power.
- Jr., J. N. (2003). U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq. *Foreign Affairs*.
- Jr., J. S. (2004, January 26). *Is America an Empire?* Retrieved April 1, 2012, from Project Syndicate: A World of Ideas: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/is-america-an-empire->
- Kagan, R. (2003). Power and Weakness. *Policy Review*.
- Karon, T. (2003, February 27). Time World. *President Bush States His Iraq War Aims*.
- Keating, M. (2011, September 13). PAFG 635 - Globalization and International Development. Boston, MA, USA.
- Keating, T. F. (2002). *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press.
- Khalidi, R. (2005). *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East*. Beacon Press Books.
- Khong, D. M. (2003). *Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Kitfield, J. (1998). Bombs Over Baghdad, Again, Maybe (US policy towards Iraq). *National Journal*.

- Kuhn, S. M. (2010). *Energy Cooperation in the Caucasus: Continuity and Change in Russia-Turkish Relations*. Malmo University.
- Larrabee, S. F. (2008). *Turkey as a U.S. security Partner*. Santa Monica: RAND.
- Lindberg, D. C. (2007-2008). A Moral Core for U.S. Foreign Policy. *Policy Review*.
- Little, D. (2008). *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*. Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press.
- Mamdani, M. (2004). *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. Doubleday a division of Random House, Inc.
- Manca, L. (2005). *The Multilateral Mirage: A Post-Cold War Examination of US Security Policy*. Ottawa: University of Alberta.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago .
- Mulaj, T. D. (2010). America after Iraq. *International Affairs*, 1287-1298.
- Naim, M. (2003). The Five Wars of Globalization. *Foreign Policy*, 28-37.
- Nitschke, H. (Oct. 27 2011). A Growing Economy Ripe for Investment Makes Turkey Rich Pickings for Global Firms. *Legal Week*.
- O'Neill, J. (2001). *Building Better Global Economic BRICs*. Goldman Sachs.
- Onis, Z. (2011). Multiple Faces of the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique. *Insight Turkey*, 47-65.
- O'Reilly, M. J. (2008). *Unexceptional: America's Empire in the Persian Gulf, 1941-2007*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. (2004). *Oil Outlook to 2025*. OPEC.
- Restad, H. E. (2010). *Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of American Exceptionalism and Unilateralism*. Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics Univeristy of Virginia.
- Rose, G. (2005, August 18). Get Real. *The New York Times*.
- Roskin, J. J. (2008). *Politics of the Middle East: Cultures and Conflicts*. Pearson Education Inc.

- Schulz, M. S. (2001). *Introducttion: A Framework for Understanding Regionalization*. London: Zed Books.
- Simon, S. (2007). America and Iraq: The Case for Disengagement. *Survival*.
- Slecuk, A. E. (n.d.). A Brief Account of the Turkish Economy 1980-2000.
- Sorensen, R. J. (2010). *Introduciton to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford Press.
- Steinmetz, G. (2005). Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective. *Sociological Theory*, 339-367.
- Syagili, H. S. (2011). Structural Changes in Exports of an Emerging Economy - the Case of Turkey. *Journal of Structral Change and Economic Dynamics*.
- Szabo, S. F. (2011). Welcome to the Post-Western World. *Current History*, 9-13.
- Thayer, C. L. (2007). *American Empire: A Debate*. New York: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
- The Economist. (2010). *America and the Middle East: Great Sacrifices, small rewards. Has America's obsession with this region been worth it?* CAIRO.
- The Guardian. (2011, February 1). After BRIC comes MIST, the acronym Turkey would certainly welcome. *The term MIST has been coined to describe the next tier of large emerging economies - Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey. Can Turkey live up to the hype?*
- The White House. (1998). *National Security Strategy*. Washington D.C.
- The White House: Washington. (2010). *National Security Strategy*. Washington D.C.: The White House.
- Torbakov, I. (2005, August 7). *Russia and Turkey Forge New Ties on Security, Trade*. Retrieved December 20, 2011, from Eurasianet.org:
<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080805.shtml>
- Turkish Embassy. (n.d.). *Foreign Policy - Synopsis*. Retrieved March 1, 2012, from Turkish Embassy, Washington, United States of America:
<http://www.washington.emb.mfa.gov.tr/MFA.aspx>

- U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2011, November 29). *Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries*. Retrieved March 28, 2012, from Independent Statistics & Analysis: U.S. Energy Information Administration: ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html
- Wall Street Journal. (2011, July 1). Turkey's Economy Surged 11% in Quarter. *Country's Rapid Growth Outpaced China and Argentina, Despite a Falling Currency and a Struggling Stock Market*.
- World Bank. (2012). *GDP growth (annual %)*. Retrieved April 15, 2012, from The World Bank: Working for a World Free of Poverty: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>
- Yergin, D. (1991). *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power*. New York: Free Press.