Turkey and the European Union:

Is identity a significant factor to explain Turkey’s failure to join the EU?

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THE EUROPEAN UNION
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABGS: General Secretariat for EU of Turkey
AKP: Justice and Development Party
CHP: People’s Republican Party
CEECs: Central and Eastern European States
CIVITAS: Institute for the Study of Civil Society
DPT: State Planning Organization of Turkey
EC: European Commission
EEC: European Economic Community
EU: European Union
EP: European Parliament
EUROSTAT: Statistical Office of the EU
ICT: Independent Commission of Turkey
MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
TAM: Foundation of Turkish Studies Center
TURKSTAT: Turkish Statistical Institute
UN: United Nations
WRR: The Netherlands Scientific Council for government policy
WTO: World Trade Organization
CHRONOLOGY OF TURKEY – EU RELATIONS

1959
• July 31: Turkey applied for association to the European Economic Community.

1963
• September 12: The Ankara Agreement (The Association Agreement), which would develop a customs union between Turkey and European Economic Community was signed.

1964
• December 1: The Ankara Agreement signed between Turkey and European Economic Community entered into force.

1970
• November 23: The Additional Protocol including the regulations on Customs Union was signed in Brussels.

1971
• September 1: The Additional Protocol's commercial adjudications entered into force with a "Temporary Agreement". The EU abolished customs duties and quantity restrictions that were applied to most industrial products imported from Turkey (apart from textile products).

1973
• January 1: Additional Protocol entered into force. Turkey actualized The First Reduction of Customs Duties and Harmonization of Consolidated Liberation List (EU Customs Union Tariff).
• May 21: Negotiations between Turkey and European Economic Community related to enlargement of European Economic Community concluded with an agreement for eventual Turkish accession.
• June 30: A Complementary Protocol to the First Enlargement Agreement was signed in Ankara.

1974
• January 1: Temporary Agreement entered into force with related Complementary Protocol.

1976
• Implementing obligations from the Additional Protocol begin to be realized, Turkey implemented Second Reduction of Customs Duties and Harmonization of Consolidated Liberation List.

1978
• October 11: During the process of the 4th Five Year Plan, Turkey suspended the obligations of Customs Union and received economic assistance of approximately 8 billion USD (IMF/World bank).

1980
• June 30: Association Council decided to cancel the customs duties applied to almost entire agricultural productions in Turkey until 1987 (1/80 Association Council Decision).

1982
• January 22: Formal relations between Turkey and the European Union were suspended – following effective suspension of talks as a result of the 1980 military coup.

1986
• September 16: Turkey and EEC Association Council convened.
• Relations between Turkey and European Economic Community, which were effectively suspended since 12 September 1980, were reinstated.
1987
• April 14: Turkey applied for full membership of the European Community based on Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, Article 98 of the European Coal and Steel Community and Article 205 of the EURATOM.

1988
• December 20-21: Ad-hoc Committee convened for the second time and Turkey submitted an accelerated schedule to European Community to implement outstanding customs union obligations.

1989
• December 18: European Commission in its "Opinion" about Turkey's application of full membership process states that it would not be possible for EC to accept additional new members before completing the process of fully implementing its own internal market (1992) and stipulating necessary provisions in terms of economical, social and political developments that needed to be fulfilled before Turkey's pre-accession negotiations could begin.

1990
• June 6: European Commission submitted a "Cooperation Package" concerning precautions which included the initiation and/or acceleration of cooperation with Turkey across a broad spectrum of economic and political arenas.

1994
• July 30: Commission of the European Communities reaffirmed the principles of Customs Union as stipulated in the original Ankara Treaty (signed between Turkey and European Community in 1963).

1995
• December 13: Council Decision on Turkey-European Union Association No. 1/95 was approved by European Parliament. (343 Admissions, 149 Nays, 36 abstentions)

1996
• January 1: Turkey entered the final stage of the original association agreement and customs union (which had lasted 22 years) by completing the “transition period” in industrial products and manufactured agricultural products on December 31st, 1995.

1997
• December 12-13: At the end of the Summit of Heads of State and Government in Luxemburg convened by the European Union, Turkey wasn't mentioned among the candidate countries, but it was discussed in the context of enlargement.

1998
• March 3: The document titled "European Strategy of Turkey" relating to improve relations between Turkey and European Union was announced by European Commission.
• November 4: The first "Progress Report" including the opinions of Commission for "Regular Progress Report for Turkey" which were recorded in the light of criteria prepared by European Commission for European Union membership was published. They have since been published annually.

1999
• December 11-12: Enlargement candidacy status was officially recognized for Turkey in European Council Summit Meeting in Helsinki —but without a date for the start of accession negotiations.
2000
• July 4: Secretariat General for European Union Affairs was established in connection with Prime Ministers office with Law 4587 published on Official Journal on 4 July 2000.

2001
• February 26: "The Framework Code" which constitutes the base of the procedures related to Accession Partnership and the base of the donation that Turkey will receive from the Accession Partnership was accepted in the meeting of Fragment Regulations General Affairs Council.
• March 24: "Decision on National Program of Turkey for the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire, application, coordination and monitoring of National Program of Turkey for the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire" was published in Official Journal repeated No. 24352 on 24 March 2001.

2002
• November 20: "Regular Progress Report for Turkey" prepared by the European Commission and noted in the light of criteria for membership to European Union, including the opinion of European Commission entered into force.
• December 12-13: It was stated in Copenhagen Summit of European Council that the negotiations would be opened if the decisions actualizing Copenhagen criteria are taken.

2003
• April 19: EU Harmonization Commission for Turkey was established in General Assembly of Turkish Republic.
• July 24: Council Decision of 23 June 2003 on National Program of Turkey for the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire, application, coordination and monitoring of National Program of Turkey for the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire No. 2003/5930" was published in Official Journal repeated No. 24352 on 24 July 2009.

2004
• April 24: The referendum was conducted in Cyprus. The 69,4 % of Turkish people in Cyprus accepted but the 75,83 % of Greek people in Cyprus refused the Annan Plan.
• October 6: "Regular Progress Report for Turkey" prepared by the European Commission and within the framework of this document, Turkey was said to have fulfilled the political criteria and was recommended to begin to the negotiations.
• December 17: In the summit meeting of EU Head of State or Government, it was stated that Turkey has sufficiently implemented the political criteria and it could open the negotiations for EU accession on 3 October 2004.
• October 3: Made a decision in Luxemburg, European Union started full membership negotiations with Turkey.
• October 20: Constituting first stage of EU accession negotiations, Screening Process started with Detailed Screening Meeting named "Science and Research" and Screening meeting on all chapters were completed on 13 October 2006.
2005
• June 3: Ali BABACAN, State Minister, is appointed as the Chief Negotiator of Turkey in EU accession negotiations.
• June 29: Negotiation Fragment Document and other related documents for Turkey were published.
• July 30: Turkey signed the "Additional Protocol" which extended the Treaty of Ankara, signed in 1963 and constitutes the base of the relations between EU and Turkey, concerning the new ten members on the 1st of May
2006
• January 20: Turkey presented its new plan to the Secretary-General of United Nations Kofi Annan for the solution to the Cyprus issue. In this plan, it was demanded that if Turkey opens its harbors to Greeks, the isolations on Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus must be removed.
• January 26: Commission Decision of 23 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey with No. 2006/35/EC was published Official Journal of the European Union No. L 22 on 26 January 2006.
• June 12: Completing screening on the chapter, named "Science and Research" was opened in Intergovernmental Conference held in Luxemburg. It was stated that criteria in required measure of Turkey carried out and this chapter was closed for a temporarily period in the same meeting.
• November 8: It was confirmed that Turkey did not open its harbors and airports to the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus despite the Additional Protocol and Turkey was given time until the 14-15th of December.
• November 13: The Council of the European Union approved that Istanbul holds the European Capital of Culture in the year of 2010.
• December 11: Admitting the Commission Recommendation of 9 December 2006 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which are the members of EU, meeting in EU General Affairs Council, 8 chapters shall not be opened and none of the chapters shall be closed temporarily until confirming the commitments relating to Additional Protocol of Turkey.
2007
• March 29: Negotiations are opened on the chapter of Policies of Enterprises and Industry.
• April 17: Harmonization Package of Turkey to European Union Acquis was declared.
• June 26: Negotiations are opened on two additional chapters: Financial Control and Statistics.
• December 19: Chapters on Health and Consumer Protection and on Trans-European Transport are opened.
2008
• June 12: Chapters on Company Law and Intellectual Property Law are opened.
• December 18: Negotiations are opened on two more chapters: Free Movement of Capital and Information Society, Media.
• December 31: The National Program of Turkey with regard the accepted European Union Acquis' with No. 2008/14481 was published Official Journal of the European Union on 31 December 2008 with No. 27097
2009
• January 10: Egemen BAGIS, Minister of EU Affairs, was appointed as the Chief Negotiator of Turkey in full membership negotiations.
• June 30: Negotiations are opened on the chapter of Taxation.
2010
• June 2010: Chapter on Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy is opened.
ABSTRACT

Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) has been one the most controversial issue in the EU’s enlargement process. Although the relationship between Turkey and the EU dates back to the Ankara Agreement signed in 1963, the process gained a new momentum in 1999 when Turkey was granted candidacy status to the Union membership in Helsinki Council. With the opening of the accession talks with Turkey in 2005, the borders of Europe and the European identity have sparked a debate in political, public and scholarly arena. It is not easy to make a prediction on the future borders of the European Union and European identity if Turkey, with big Muslim population, joins to the EU. However, some answers for the reasons of Turkey’s failure to join the EU, can be given.

This paper argues that Turkey’s satisfactorily fulfillment of the EU’s official membership criteria is not sole determinant for Turkey to access to the EU. In this process, identity has played significant role in the EU side for the evaluation of Turkey’s EU membership. In other words, Turkey’s accession to the EU has been determined by the perceptions of Turkey’s fit into predetermined EU identity. In this sense, Turkey will be able to join to the EU when the members of the EU perceive that Turkey’s identity fits to the European identity. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the enlargement process of the EU towards Turkey from Sociological Institutionalist approach.
CHAPTER I

“Europe is defined by the cultural richness of ancient Greece and Rome as well as the creative energy of the Renaissance and its impact on rational and scientific thinking. Turkey could not be a member of the EU because of the simple fact that it has never been part of this European history and has never participated in the cultural traditions of Europe”

Giscard d’Estaing, Former President of France

“The European Community must not be considered in isolation but together with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with which it has deep rooted and vital cultural and historical links.”

European Parliament

1.1. Introduction

Today, European borders and European identity have mostly been commemorated with the European Union despite the fact that some countries that are located in the European Continent are not members of the EU yet. Turkey’s likely membership to the European Union is an interesting case that deserves to be analyzed because if Turkey with 73 million Muslim dominated population (TurkStat, 2010), joins to the EU with over 500 million Christian population, it will not only effect political-economical shape and institutional structure of the European Union but also it will change the European identity and European borders.
Turkey is a member of many Western international organizations. It is a founding member of the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a member of the Council of Europe since 1949 and of NATO since 1952 (MFA, 2012). Turkey has a long relationship the EU, which dates back to 1963 when an Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) was signed. This is the longest on-going and yet uncommitted relationship that the EU has ever had with any applicant state.

European Union has realized the largest single expansion both in terms of territory, number of states and population in 2004 and 2007. In addition to Cyprus and Malta, 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe with diverse economic development levels, cultural and political traditions joined to the EU. While Turkey applied to the EU for membership 25 years ago in 1987, Central and Eastern European States 1 and Cyprus and Malta were able to join to the EU in maximum 14 years after their application (European Commission, 2007).

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1 Central and Eastern European States: Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania
Former European Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein summarizes negative attributes towards Turkey’s EU membership in European political and public arena in simple words. He states “Turkey is too big, to poor, too different” (Spiegel, 2004). What explains the reason of lack of process for Turkey’s membership to the Union in reality? Is it only Turkey’s less willingness and inability to meet the official conditions required for the EU membership or it is that the EU finds Turkey less European than other applicants and is more reluctant to take Turkey into the Union as a full member? In other words, has Turkey been treated differently than the other applicants of Central and Eastern European States (CEECs)? What is the role of Turkey’s identity in this process?

The main argument of this paper is that Turkey’s satisfactorily fulfillment of the EU’s official membership criteria is not sole determinant for Turkey to access to the EU. In this process, identity has played significant role in the EU side in questioning of Turkey’s EU membership. In other words, Turkey’s accession to the EU has been determined by the perceptions of Turkey’s fit into predetermined EU identity. In this sense, Turkey will be able to join to the EU when the members of the EU perceive that Turkey’s identity fits to the European identity. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the enlargement process of the EU towards Turkey from Sociological Institutionalist approach.

Considering that there are not big differences between Turkey and some of CEECs in respect of economic and political conditions, Sociological/Constructivist Institutionalism provides more plausible explanation on the reasons of EU’s enlargement towards CEECs closing the door to Turkey’s EU accession. This theory basically underlines the importance of collective identity formation and the concept of appropriateness in international policy choices. It is important to examine the role of identity in the EU enlargement process towards Turkey because
potential candidates are not going to be able to join to the EU by only fulfilling the official criteria in the future enlargement period if EU is a value based community rather than a secular, civic community and equally open to every eligible state.

In order to give clear explanation on the role of identity in enlargement process of the EU, which is main topic of this paper; Second Chapter is devoted to concept, process and theories about EU Enlargement including sociological/constructivist institutionalism, which is the main theory used to answer the research question of this paper. Third Chapter provides background on Turkey-EU relations. Turkey’s Europeanization (Westernization) efforts and historical evolution process of the EU-Turkey relations are mentioned in this Chapter. Chapter four is given to where Turkey stands for EU’s economic and political criteria by making comparison of Turkey and CEECs in respect of economic and political conditions. The likely impact of Turkey on the EU institutions, possible migration from Turkey to the EU countries and unresolved Cyprus issue are discussed in this Chapter. In order to prove the strength of argument about the role of identity on enlargement process towards Turkey, EU’s financial and moral support to candidate countries is analyzed. Discussion of European identity and whether Turkish identity fits into this predominated European identity as well as European public and political opinion about Turkey’s EU Membership are explained in Chapter five. Chapter six is given to policy recommendations for both Turkey and the EU. Chapter seven offers the conclusions.
CHAPTER 2

EU Enlargement and Theoretical Approaches to EU Enlargement

2.1. Concept of EU Enlargement

The European Union is an economic and political partnership based on high cooperation among its 27 member states in many policy areas. EU enlargement is one of the policy tools of EU used to further integrate the Europe and encourage the transition of the countries involved to democratic societies and free market economies. According to Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2002), “The enlargement of the European Union is a key political process both for the organization itself and the international relations of Europe in general”. After its foundation as a European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, it has transformed from a kind of west European organization into an economic and political union. The number of its members has increased from 6 to 27 with a population more than 500 million people within 50 years. EU enlargement has affected not only the political shape of Europe but also its institutional frame and major policies. EU enlargement has impact on its budget, agricultural and trade policies, representation of the member states in EU institutions. It also affects the identity, norms, goals and effectiveness of the organization (Schimmelfenning et al., 2002).

2.2. Process of EU Enlargement

According to Article 49 of Treaty on European Union of 1992 (Maastricht Treaty), any European country may apply for EU membership which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and rule of law (EUR-LEX, 2010). However, the Treaty doesn’t suggest which states are European. According to the procedure, a country that wishes to join the EU first submits an application for membership to
the Council of the European Union\textsuperscript{2} (EC, 2012a). The Council then asks the European Commission to assess the applicant’s ability to meet the conditions of membership.\textsuperscript{3} If the Commission gives a positive opinion and the Council unanimously agrees to a negotiating mandate, negotiations are formally opened between the candidate and all the member states (EC, 2012a).

The candidate states are expected to meet a set of economic and political criteria, known as “Copenhagen Criteria” set out in December 1993 by the European Council. Copenhagen criteria require a candidate country to have: “stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of competition and the market forces at work inside the Union and the ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union” (EC, 2012a). In addition, EU should have capacity to absorb new members. “It means the EU’s capacity to continue deepening as it widens. It concerns whether the EU can take in new members at a given moment or in a given period, without jeopardizing the political and policy objectives established by the Treaties” (EU, 2006).

Accession negotiations are long and complex technical and political processes in which candidate countries must adopt and implement 80,000 pages of rules and regulations known as acquis communautaire. The acquis is divided into 35 subject-related chapters that range from

\textsuperscript{2} The Council is the legislative body of the EU and comprised of national ministers of member states. It is also called as the Council of Ministers or the Council. See for details: http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu/index_en.htm

\textsuperscript{3} European Commission (the Commission) is responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the Union's treaties and the general day-to-day running of the Union. See for details: http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu/index_en.htm
free movement of goods to agriculture and competition. All candidate countries receive financial assistance from the EU, mainly to aid in the accession process. These chapters can only be opened and closed with the unanimous approval of all EU member states acting in the Council of Ministers. Once the Commission concludes negotiations with an applicant state, the agreements reached are incorporated into a draft accession treaty, which must be approved by the Council and the European Parliament that is another legislative body of the EU representing the EU citizens (EU, 2012a). As the accession treaty is signed by the EU and the candidate country, it must then be ratified by each EU member state and the candidate country (EC, 2012a).

2.3. EU Integration and Main Enlargement Theories

EU integration is a dynamic process which affects not only EU institution but also its members and candidate countries in many ways. Today’s EU is so different from its past structure. Haas (1968) defines EU integration as “A process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”

EU integration and enlargement have been explained by different theoretical perspectives. These theories contain three operations: Judgments of political facts, or estimates of probability; Observation of causal relationships between elements of political facts (logical compatibility); Valuations and norms, which distort the perception of facts (Sabine, 1968). In the early phases of EU integration, (1960’s onwards) functionalism and transactionalism focused on the explanation of integration asking how can integration outcomes be explained and why does European integration take place? In the second phase of integration, (1980’s onwards) the main
theme was governance, which was analyzed by Neo-functionalism and intergovernmental institutionalism.

Constructing the EU became the new theme of EU integration process after 1990s (Diez & Wiener, 2004). Today, EU enlargement is a matter of discussion between rational and constructivist approaches. These approaches examine the constructing of the EU. They question how and with which social and political consequences does integration develop.

2.4. Rationalist and Sociological/Constructivist Institutionalism

Schimmelfenning et. al. (2002) argue that “Rationalism and constructivism do not provide us with fully elaborated and internally consistent competing hypotheses on enlargement that we could rigorously test against each other.” They maintain that “rationalist and sociological theories of institutions differ in their assumptions about their expectations about enlargement especially on social ontologies (individualism and materialism in rationalism and a social and ideational ontology in constructivism).” While rationalist institutionalism assumes consequentiality as the logic of action (enlargement), sociological/constructivist institutionalism attaches importance to appropriateness (Schimmelfenning et. al., 2002).

The rationalist institutionalism claims that the EU’s transformatory power is limited while sociological approach includes ideational, normative and cognitive factors to the definition of EU institutions and see the EU as a model promoter of socialization and norm diffusion (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Rationalist institutionalism emphasizes the instrumental, regulatory and efficiency-enhancing functions of international organizations. Rationalist institutionalism conceives institutions as intervening variables between the material interests of the actors and collective outcomes. Institutions provide incentives and constraints by altering cost/benefit calculations, not identities. International organizations are instrumental associations designed to
help states pursue their interests more efficiently reducing transaction costs. International organizations provide collective action more efficiently. International organizations are clubs in the sense that members would not join unless a net gain resulted from membership (Schimmelfenning et. al., 2002).

According to sociological/constructivist institutionalism, enlargement politics will generally be shaped by ideational, cultural factors. The most relevant of these factors is ‘community’ or ‘cultural match’, that is, the degree to which the actors inside and outside the organization share a collective identity and fundamental beliefs. The organization expands (its institutions) to outside states to the extent that these states share its collective identity, values, and norms. “The higher the degree of community and the better the cultural or normative match, the faster and the deeper the process of horizontal institutionalization.” Enlargement will continue until the (cultural) borders of the international community and the (formal, institutional) borders of the international organization match (Schimmelfenning et. al., 2002).

Sociological/constructivist institutionalism basically claims that actors act not only according to exogenously determined utility functions but also according to the values and norms that are endogenous to the process of social interaction. It emphasizes that institutions shape actors’ identities and interests. They are autonomous and powerful actors with constitutive and legitimacy-providing functions. However, international organizations are ‘community representatives’ as well as community-building agencies. The goals and procedures of international organizations are more strongly determined by the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the international community they represent (which constitute their cultural and institutional environment) than by the utilitarian demand for efficient problem solving (Schimmelfenning et. al., 2002).
According to Sociological/constructivist institutionalism, the logic of appropriateness for actors is shaped by roles and norms, which affect negotiation or bargaining process (March & Olsen, 1989). It emphasizes building and reshaping effects of principles and norms on social actors to such an extent that norms of the institutional setting become embedded in the minds of the members of the institution. Preferences of the social players are set in accordance with those norms and principles. For this reason, decisions are taken in line with those ‘constructed preferences’ as an outcome of this interaction (Parsons, 2000).

The rationality of actors is derived from the identity of the community they belong to (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005). Human actors follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations (March et. al., 1989). The criteria for social action justification depend on values stemming from a particular cultural context. Collective decisions are a matter of identity, rather than efficiency, which seeks to develop and protect the sense of ‘we-ness’. Interests and identities are endogenous to the process of interaction that institutions represent (Piedrafita et.al., 2005).

Sjursen (2002) explains why the EU has prioritized some countries over others in preparation for membership with three concepts. According to utility concept, the EU enlarges to some countries where the gain to join or access to the EU would be higher than its cost. In this pragmatic approach, “The approach is based on a means-ends type of rationality, where actors are considered to take the decisions made on calculations based on a given set of interests”. In that sense, actors legitimize the enlargement by achieving an output that is beneficial to given interests and preferences. This utility could be not only economic factors but also security gains.

According to values concept, justification relies on a particular conception of the collective belonging and particular idea of the values, which are grounded in the identity of the
community. In this ‘ethical-political approach’, duties and responsibilities belonging to a particular community play a significant role for enlargement decisions (Sjursen, 2002).

The moral conception does not justify enlargement decisions with reference to calculations of utility and the values but rights that refer to universal standards of justice, democracy and human rights (Sjursen, 2002). Lundgren (2005) contributes this conception by defining types of entity developed by the EU. He classifies them as; the EU as a problem solving entity, the EU as a value-based community and the EU as a rights-based post national union.

Turkey is the oldest candidate state hoping to be a member of the European Union for almost a half century. Moreover, Turkey’s aspiration to be a member of the European Family dates back to 19th century. This paper does not argue that Turkey is as democratic and developed as the oldest countries of the EU. However the analysis of historical Turkish-Europeans relationships, economic data and speeches of European politicians and public polls in Europe show that Turkey’s failure to join the EU cannot be explained solely with Turkey’s inability to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. EU’s reluctance towards Turkey’s accession is also significant to understand why identity and values play role in Turkish case. Why Sociological/constructivist institutionalism provides a plausible explanation in Turkey’s EU membership story can be well understood if historical Turkey’s relations with Europe and the European Union is explained and a comparison between the enlargement process of the EU to CEECs and Turkey is made.

The next Chapter provides a background of Europeanization of Turkey and the EU Turkey relations.
CHAPTER III

Brief History of Turkey-EU Relations-Europeanization (Westernization) of Turkey

3. 1. The Late Ottoman Era-Early Turkey-EEC Relations

Europeanization is generally defined as “the domestic impact of the EU” in the literature. The impact of the EU is not confined to EU members. The EU’s membership criteria is not only limited to adoption of its legal framework (acquis communautaire) but also consists of some political demands. The EU uses the attractiveness of its membership incentive for the other states in order to pursue broader political goals (such as democracy, minority rights) through its enlargement policy (Sedelmeier, 2011).

Within the context of EU-Turkey relations, there are three main tendencies explaining Turkey’s Europeanization. The first tendency is about Europeanization of Turkey within the meaning of domestic short term economic interests of Turkey. This explains Turkey’s adaptation of reforms toward Europeanization with expected economic and strategic benefits calculations although customs union between Turkey and the EU is generally interpreted as a political attempt towards full EU membership (Buhari, 2009).

The second tendency in Turkey’s Europeanization literature sees Europeanization as a part of an overall project of modernization, which aims to reach the level of industrialized nations in terms of technological and scientific advantages. However, it does not provide explanation about norms, principles, values and institutions such as human rights. In order to close this gap, a third tendency of Europeanization considers Europeanization as an identity-building process or Westernization, which would transform Turkey into a Western/European country. It examines the Europeanization of Turkey with constructivist ontology and secularism,
liberalism, democratic principles, minority and human rights are important indicators for Europeanization (Buhari, 2009).

In this part of the paper, Turkey’s Europeanization efforts are evaluated mostly focusing on third tendency of Europeanization in order to answer the research question. Although the relationship between Turkey and the EU began in 1963 when an Association Agreement between the partners was signed, Turkey’s Europeanization (Westernization) history dates back to Tanzimat era of Ottoman Empire during 19th century.

The Ottoman Empire was the one of the largest and longest lasting Empires in history. The governmental system was so centralized that only the Ottoman family ruled the empire for seven centuries. Islam and Islamic institutions were incorporated in the state structure in both government and judicial system. Sultan was regarded as the protector of Islam. Non-Muslim communities were organized according to the “millet” system, which gave minority religious/ethnic/geographical communities a limited amount of power to regulate their own affairs under the overall supremacy of the Ottoman administration. The ruling elite group reflected an order and hierarchy. The power of the empire was decreased by 1683 when the Empire could not acquire significant new territories required for it economy (BBC, 2009).

In order to save the empire from collapse, the Ottoman Empire decided to adapt European values and institutions particularly by modernizing the army and the state bureaucracy when nationalistic and positivistic interpretation of enlightenment values were prevalent in Europe. Higher Education Institutions in the field of military science, public administration and medicine were designed in accordance with the European models (Heper, 2005).

Despite these efforts, the Ottoman Empire collapsed after the First World War and lost its territories in the Middle East and North Africa while small portion of Europe and Anatolia
remained as Turkish territories. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 after gaining it independence from allied states including mainly France, Russia, UK and Italy. The new Republic intended to create a European style nation state based on integrated civilized society. Under the leadership of founder of young Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, westernization was accelerated by adapting European democratic institutions and traditions, which are so different from its Ottoman identity. Within this top-down reform process, People’s Republican Party (CHP) was the key to govern Europeanization project although some democratization attempts had failed. Basically, Turkish Europeanization (Westernization) project aimed at a European identity.

Intellectuals who mostly studied in French universities in the late era of the Ottoman Empire were the early republican elites of Turkey. Secularism was adopted from French laicism intending to control the role and influence of religion. Traditional headscarves were banned in state institutions and universities. However, democracy was not the primary issue because of the fragile nature of the republic. As a part of Europeanization project, Arabic script was replaced by Roman script in 1928 and European Civic Law was adopted. Abolition of traditional fez and adoption of European hat were a kind of identity related change as a reaction to the Ottoman image in order to show the difference modern Turk from the Ottoman. They were symbolic intentions to create a feature of Turkey’s European identity (Bilgin, 2008). Some traditions of Europeans such as opera and ballet were financially supported by the state. The Turkish revolution intervened in many areas from education to clothes by law. As Robins says, (1996) “The Kemalist was attracted to the light of universal culture, the world of science, technology, rationalism and science”.
Before the beginning of its relations with the European Economic Community (EEC), Turkey joined to the League of Nations and became a founding member of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is a western security organization. The single party rule of Turkey was ended in 1950. However, the early modernization project created hierarchical state-society relations in which state institutions kept society under control in order to realize Europeanization through state action (Turan, 2007).

3. 2. Early Turkey-EEC Relations

During this period, Turkey’s relations with the West improved while the communist bloc was regarded as a threat for European security. Turkey applied to EEC in 1959 and became an Associate member in 1963 with Ankara Agreement. Security concerns played a significant role for signing of this Agreement because Turkey’s strategic geographic location as a neighbor to the Soviet Union was a barrier to the Communist World (Robins, 1996).

Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement states that “As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community” (ABGS, 2009). The EEC was more like an economic integration in the beginning as oppose to today’s economic and political union. In this sense, while Turkey perceives Ankara Agreement as a roadmap leading to full membership to the EEC/EU, European side prefers to understand it a key to integrate Turkish and EEC economies and to develop closer cultural and political relations between the parties before the final evaluation of Turkey’s membership to the EU (Arıkan, 2006). During that time, cultural and religious differences were on the agenda of the European governments (Eralp, 2009). The Additional Protocol was signed in 1970 to facilitate Turkey’s economic integration.
into the European market. However, the international context and the process of European integration underwent important changes; increasing competency in international trade, rising oil process with 1970’s, the harmonious relationship between Turkey and the EC ended. Earlier consensus about Turkey’s EU membership disintegrated (Eralp, 2009).

With the impact of 1973 oil crisis leading to political instability, Turkey has witnessed a military coup in 1980. Until the restructuring of its democracy in the mid 1980’s, the EEC froze the relations with Turkey while accepting membership applications of Greece, Spain and Portugal, which had similar experiences as Turkey regarding economy and democracy. On one hand the EC significantly helped these countries to stabilize their democracies; on the other hand, EC countries have never questioned the European identities of these countries (Arıkan, 2006).

3.3. Turkey’s Relations with the EEC After 1980’s

With the impact of global economic changes, Turkey changed its economic development strategy to integrate into liberal market economy starting from early 1980s. In 1987, Turkey under the leadership of Prime Minister Turgut Özal applied to the EU to become a full member. It was a part of Turkey’s strategic partnership in western security and political institutions like NATO and the Council of Europe. Although there was not a condition of stable democracy for EU membership in the EEC Treaty except a reference to be geographically European, it became a precondition in the late 1970s. Turkey’s EC membership was seen as the final stage of Turkey’s westernization (Europeanization) project, which would bring democratic stability preventing another military coup and strengthening economic liberalization. Moreover, EC was perceived as a stable market for Turkish exports as well as a rich source of funds and technology (Eralp, 2009).
Turkey’s application was rejected by the EC in 1989 because of economic problems such as structural disparities in agriculture and industry, macroeconomic imbalances, high-level industrial protectionism. Although the Commission acknowledged some developments in human rights and minority rights, these improvements were not regarded as satisfactory for stable democracy condition (EC, 1989).

By the end of the 1980s, the EC had completed its economic unification and it evolved into the European Union (EU) with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined into the Union. During the 1990s, the priorities of the EU changed due to the end of the Cold War. While the EU established association relations with these countries to improve their underdeveloped political and economic development in order to prepare them earlier membership, Turkey’s importance for the EU was significantly diminished because of the reducing security concerns of EU after Cold War (Arikan, 2006).

Turkey and the EU signed an agreement establishing a customs union, which is based on economic considerations in 1995. Turkey expected that Customs Union would be a step towards full membership of the Union (Arikan, 2006). The European Council Luxemburg summit in 1997 decided to open negotiations with Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus while Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania were included comprehensive pre-accession partnership. Turkey was disappointed with the Luxemburg decision of the European Council since the EU only confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for accession and criticized Turkey’s political and economic conditions. In reaction to this, Turkish Government declared to cut political cooperation with the EU and argued that Turkey has not been evaluated within the same framework, the same well-intentioned approach and objective criteria as the other candidate states (Turkish Government, 1997/98).
EU declared Turkey as a candidate country in Helsinki European Council Summit in 1999 although there was not substantial democratization policy implemented by Turkish Government until that time. The Commission’s progress report states that “although the basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria.” Human rights, protection of minority rights, freedom of expression and the role of National Security Council in political life were indicated as the main areas to be reformed (EC, 1999).

However, that European Union giving Turkey a candidate status was an important trigger for Turkey to speed up political reforms required to improve the quality of democracy and decreased the nationalist resistance to the reforms. The government quickly passed new laws, decrees as well as Civil and Penal Code to remove antidemocratic elements in laws. Death penalty was lifted. The judicial and prison systems have been reformed. The control of the civilian government over the military was improved. National Security Council, which develops the national security policy of Turkey, was partially civilianized. State Security Courts designed for struggle against terrorism were abolished. International human rights legislation has been recognized and the supremacy of these conventions over domestic law is accepted. Safeguard against torture have been enacted. Capital punishment has been abolished from Construction and penal code. Legal restrictions on broadcasting in the different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives were lifted (Civitas, 2011). After these reforms, upon the European Commission’s positive signal, the European Council of Brussels in 2004 decided that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria and open accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 (EU Council, 2004).
According to Kubicek (2005), “Turkish civil society had become more visible and vocal, often demanding greater political liberalization” after Turkey’s membership application (Kubicek, 2005). Keyman (2007) argues that “the processes of secularization and de-privatization of religion in Turkey have arisen from the critique of state-centric secularism and its attempt to create a laicist social ethos and national identity” Until the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, westernization (Europeanization) project was a kind of a project intended to produce merely uniform citizens acting according to the nationalistic interpretation of enlightenment values. “The more secularism is used by the state elite as a political project to control religion, the less pluralistic and democratic the state has become in governing its society” (Keyman, 2007). However, conservative sections of Turkish society embraced the European values with AKP government after 2002 (Keyman, 2007). The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) (2004) argues that “the constitutional restrictions on the democratic process at protecting the secular state system are incompatible with the principles of the EU. The observation applies equally to the role of the military as a guardian of this system. The influence of religion on the state is not a problem, but the state’s influence on religion is a problem in Turkey. The constructivist logic of appropriateness has been prevalent in the adoptions of the European norms.”

With the impact of the changes in Turkish-EU relations, the power of AKP single party-majority government, Turkish-American relations and the increasing importance of civil society, Turkish democracy was transformed into a more consolidated and deepened democratic mode of governance and Turkish westernization project became more societal, liberal, plural and multicultural (Aydın & Keyman, 2004).
The relationship between the EU and candidate states has always exhibited a fluctuating trend, however the Turkey-EU relationship is a unique case in the history of the enlargement of the EU in which a negative turn in the relationship took place after the initiation of the negotiations. In principle, the initiation of accession negotiations constitutes the beginning of an irreversible process in which the candidate country’s membership perspective becomes clearer gradually. But this has not been the case for Turkey.

Accession negotiations between Turkey and EU began 3 October 2005 while negotiation has made little progress. To accede to the EU, Turkey must first successfully complete negotiations with the European Commission on each of the 35 chapters of the total body of EU law. Afterwards, the member states must unanimously agree on granting Turkey membership to the European Union. As of 2012, negotiations on one chapter of thirty-five was closed. The negotiation process reveals the hopeless situation mainly due to the unresolved Cyprus issue and the French unilateral veto on several chapters, which are claimed to prejudge membership. Since Turkey refused to open its ports to allow Greek Cypriot vessels and planes, the Council has frozen negotiations on eight relevant chapters. Turkey refuses to do so until the EU eases the international isolation on unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Ministry for EU Affairs, 2012).

Moreover, Germany’s new formula on “privileged partnership” towards Turkey at every opportunity (Schauble & Philips, 2004) and French unilateral veto on several chapters, which are claimed to prejudice membership is in clear contradiction with the negotiation framework adopted on 3rd of October 2005 with a unanimous vote of EU Council of Ministers. Popular sentiment in the EU has meanwhile also turned against the enlargement process with a special emphasis on Turkey. With the opening of the accession talks with Turkey in 2004, and fifth
enlargement of the European Union, the borders of Europe and the European identity have sparked a debate in political, public and scholar arena. This European crisis is not only about Turkey’s possible membership but also the borders of the Europe and European identity.

Although there is an official negotiation framework of the EU and the political problems can be solved under mutual interests of the Parties, some European politicians prejudge Turkey’s membership. For instance, former French President Nicholas Sarkozy states that “Turkey is not a European country; it is Asian. It is a respected country, but because of it is not being European, Turkey cannot be a member of the Union” (Today’s Zaman, 2012). Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy states that “Turkey is not a part of Europe and will never be part of Europe” (EU Observer, 2009).

These factors have significantly impacted turning Turkish public opinion against the EU. For instance, according to the 2011 “Transatlantic Trends” survey in 2011 made by German Marshall Fund, public support for EU accession in Turkey, those who think that Turkey’s EU membership is a good thing has dropped from a 74 per cent in 2004 to 48 per cent in 2011 (Transatlantic Trends, 2011). Accordingly, Turkey has slowed down the reform process, which would have improved the lives of its citizens. There has been a lack of progress in the fields of transparency, accountability, the fight against corruption, gender equality, the freedom of expression, freedom of the press and labor unions. The economic crisis that began in 2008 in Europe led to recession and rising unemployment. “The deteriorating economy, the recent troubles of the euro zone and a backlash against immigration from the east have all lent force to widespread complaints aroused that the central and eastern European countries were let into the EU too early” (The Economist, 2010). Therefore, Turkey became an easy target, since it was one of the remaining two countries with Croatia and the more problematic one at the negotiation
table. Consequently, although Turkey has been a negotiating country for the past six years, Turkey’s EU membership is currently not on the agenda of Turkey and on the EU.

Turkey’s likely membership presents both challenge and opportunity for the EU. The country’s size, its growing population, its level of economic and social developments and its cultural and religious character are central issues in European public debate. Can economic, and political conditions of Turkey be real incentives of the EU to make Turkey wait in front of its door longer than CEEC? Is the cost of Turkey’s accession much higher than that of CEEC? Is it manageable for the EU? The next Chapter provides some information about economic and political conditions of Turkey. This analysis would also help us to understand whether the EU behaves as a problem solving entity or as a value-based community or as rights-based post national union in its long relations with Turkey in comparison with the CEECs.

CHAPTER IV

Copenhagen Criteria and Turkey’s EU Membership

4.1. Economic Dimension of Turkey’s EU Membership

4.1.1. Where Does Turkey Stand For Copenhagen Economic Criteria?

Under the framework of Copenhagen economic criteria, European Union requires from candidate states to have: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. These requirements push candidates to make some liberal economic reforms in their economic structures to catch up to the level of economic development of old member states. As it is provided below, the Copenhagen economic criteria does not seem an obstacle for Turkey’s EU membership considering that Turkey has implemented a liberal economy policy after 1980s.

The existence of a functioning market economy requires the liberalization of prices, trade
and the existence of a developed financial sector as well as absence of major barriers to market entry and exit. Turkey has already initiated these liberal economic policies in 1996 when the customs union established between Turkey and the EC while there was not such an economic relationship between the EU and CEECs. In this regard, the customs duties and charges having equivalent effects on industrial goods between Turkey and the EU were abolished and the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) of the Community was adopted towards third countries (DPT, 2004).

Moreover, Turkey started to implement a trade policy compatible with the rules adopted in the framework of the WTO and the Common Trade Policy of the EU. Turkish government has decreased price distortions in Turkish market by reducing the weight of the public sector in the economy and the principle of state enterprises determining their prices according to market conditions rather than public intervention. For instance, electricity, telephone and natural gas prices have been regulated by independent agencies. State control has totally withdrawn from many sectors such as airport ground services, petroleum distribution, the cement industry, textiles, tourism, meat and fish products and maritime transport (DPT, 2004).

The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union requires the existence of a stable macroeconomic structure and economic integration with the EU prior to accession. Turkish government took important steps towards achieving economic stability, increasing market confidence and creating a competitive and liberal macroeconomic framework. Public financial management has been improved and the financial sector restructured under the economic program. Under the Law No. 4875 on Foreign Direct Investments, Turkish government laid down principles concerning the promotion of foreign direct investments and the protection of the rights of foreign investors. Law No. 4884 has entered into force ensuring the
simplification of the company establishment process. Independent regulatory agencies have been established for such areas as banking, energy, telecommunications, tobacco and sugar. The Law on Public Financial Management and Control was adopted in December 2003 to increase transparency and accountability in public financial management (European Communities, 2009).

According to the European Commission, (2011a) “Turkey is as a functioning market economy, as long as it firmly maintains its recent stabilization and reform achievements. Turkey's economic policy is tailored to maintaining an open, largely market-driven economy with relatively prudent public finance management and a well regulated financial sector.”

4.1.2. Turkey’s Economic Power and Economic Issues Arising From EU Membership.

Opponents to Turkey’s EU membership argue that Turkey with its poor economy would weaken the integration process of the EU. However, as it is provided in prior section, Turkey has taken major steps towards fulfilling these economic criteria. Turkey is the 17th largest economy in the world and 6th largest economy when compared with the EU countries according to GDP per capita figures in 2010. Turkey is the fastest growing economy in Europe and one of the fastest growing economies in the world in 2010 (IMF, 2011). Turkey’s GDP has increased from USD 231 billion in 2002 to USD 735 billion $ US in 2010 leaving 21 European Union states behind. Turkey achieved overall growth GDP rate of 9.1 percent in 2010, which is much higher than any of the EU states. Turkey’s GDP per capita soared to USD 15.340 in 2010 which is higher than Romania (14287 US $) and Bulgaria (13780) and close to Latvia (16.312) and Lithuania (18.184). The unemployment rate of Turkey decreased to 12%, which is lower than Slovakia (12.5), Poland (12.1), Estonia (16.9), Greece (12.5), Ireland (13.7), Lithuania (17.8) and Latvia (18.7). The inflation rate of Turkey decreased to 8.6 % in 2010 from 30 % although it is higher than the EU states. However, there is also considerable gap between many of CEECs
countries and old members in respect of inflation rate and GDP per capita. For instance while inflation rate is % 6.1 in Romania, it fluctuates around % 1 to % 3 in founding members (Turkstat, 2010a & World Bank, 2011). In addition to this, the ratio of government deficit to GDP of Turkey (-6.7) is less than UK (-10), Iceland ((-11.5), Slovenia (-8.0), Romania (-9.0), Portugal (-10.1), Poland (-7.3), Lithuania (-9.5), Latvia (-9.7), France (-7.5), Spain (-11.2), Greece (-15.8) and Ireland (-14.2) (Turkstat, 2010b & World Bank, 2011).

With regards to bilateral trade relations between Turkey and the EU, the EU’s share of Turkey in its total trade with the world is 41.7% while the EU share of Turkey's exports is 46.2% in 2010. Its import share is 41.7%. The EU is the main source of FDI inflows to Turkey, with a 76% share in 2010 (EC, 2011b). These data shows that economies of Turkey and the EU is highly integrated. When we look at some basic figures regarding economic development of Turkey and CEECs before CEECs joined to the EU, it is clear that Turkey is not poorer than some of the CEECs. As it is seen in the table 4.1, CEECs were very poor countries compare with the EU countries. Turkey’s economy was bigger than all of the CEECs and GNI per capita was higher than Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Bulgaria. Therefore their accession might also create risk in economies of the EU-15.

**Table 4.1. Comparison between EU-15, CEEC-10 and Turkey, 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GNI-PPP (Current Billion Euro)</th>
<th>Per Capita GNI PPP Euro</th>
<th>Export Shares to the EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>376.3</td>
<td>8.865</td>
<td>23,557</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5,530</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>13,610</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9,050</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Increase in Surface Area</td>
<td>Increase in Population</td>
<td>Increase in Total GDP(*)</td>
<td>Change in Per Capita GDP(**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15/EU25</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>-8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU25/EU27</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0, 7%</td>
<td>-4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU27/EU27+TR*</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>-9.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EC, 2004: Issues Arising From Turkey’s Membership Perspective
European Commission published its study regarding the impact of 2004 and 2007 enlargement in 2009. EU Expert Breuss (2009) states that “The last EU enlargement contributed to a statistically “impoverishment” of the enlarged EU. As a consequence the average GDP per capita was reduced by nearly -11 percent in 2009.”

In these circumstances, it is inappropriate to surmise about Turkey’s impact. Even Turkey’s membership would weaken the EU integration process in short term, the economic costs of Turkey’s membership could be counterbalanced by the economic benefits of EU members in mid-term considering that Turkey’s economy has been significantly growing for the past 10 years. Turkey’s population, half of which is younger than 29,7 years old, could also be potential for working force of the EU members (TurkStat, 2011).

Moreover, according to A.T. Kearney (2012) Foreign Direct Investment Confident Index, Turkey becomes 12th place among the most appropriate foreign investment destinations. In that sense, Turkey may become an important destination of foreign investment required to catch the EU countries’ economy if Turkey becomes a member of the EU.

To sum up, the economic concerns about Turkey’s likely EU membership is not valid since its economy is much more developed than at least some of the CEECs. In this period while CEECs, with the contribution of financial and moral support, were welcomed by the EU, Turkey, has been kept behind the door as a candidate state.
Table 4.3. FDI Confidence Index, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Values calculated on a 0 to 3 scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.1.3. Migration Issues Arising From Turkey’s EU Membership

Migration is another aspect that makes Turkey’s likely accession to the European Union different from previous enlargement. Discussion in Europe about Turkey that is the largest single country to be included since the UK, with a young and growing population and GDP per capita below the EU average, is marked by fear of mass immigration diluting the Union as eventual predominance of large ethnic groups in EU (BBC, 2011).
Turkish people constitute the largest group of third country nationals legally residing in the EU (Balkır, 2010). The number of Turkish migrants living in the countries of the European Union is estimated at 4.2 million, with the majority of them living in Germany (2.7 million), in France (380,000), the Netherlands (365,000), Austria (233,000) United Kingdom (150,000) and Belgium (130,000) (TAM, 2006). Immigration from Turkey to the EU dates back to the 1960s when European governments, experienced shortage of labor. With the guest-worker programs, many of the temporarily employed Turkish workers settled permanently in the large cities of their host countries. Since then immigration policies have become more restrictive. Most Turkish immigrants were unskilled workers from rural areas of Turkey. Many of them experienced difficulties to integrate into the society of their host country because of the shock of moving from country to city and from their homeland to a foreign environment (ICT, 2004).

However, Turkish migration flows into EU countries were drastically reduced, becoming limited mainly to family reunification and migration through marriage. For example, since 2006, the number of Turkish migrant from Germany to Turkey is annually 27,200 while migrants from Turkey to Germany is 35,400 in 2009. Emigration from Turkey dropped from the mid 1990s to present approximately 50,000. Also the characteristics of migrants changed, labor migrants are now overwhelmingly highly skilled. Labor migration to the EU largely ceased in the 1970s and 1980s (Düvell, 2011).

There are different predictions about possible migration from Turkey to the EU if Turkey becomes a member of the EU. For instance, De Mooij and Tang for the Central Plan Bureau of the Netherlands (CPB) (2004), estimates that, with the assumption of Turkey’s accession in 2010, a total of 2.7 million people would migrate to EU countries over a period of 15 years following accession. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it is estimated that this
Balkır, (2010) argues that Turkish migrant may constitute only 0.7 % (2.2 million) of EU 15 population (325 million) that refers to EU countries before 2004 and 2007 enlargement. It is also equivalent to 1.1 % of labor force. However, considering that there will be a transition period not for less than 7 years as is foreseen in CEECs enlargement, we can not predict how many Turkish people will migrate to EU. The high economic growth of Turkey lasting for 10 years may also decrease the migration level. There are also some predictions about potential impact of Turkish migration to EU that basically highlights possible GDP increase in EU 15 (CPB, 2004).

**Table 4.4. Economic Effects in 2025 of Migration from Turkey:**


In 2008, it was predicted that two million citizens of EU member states migrated to other EU states. The EU-27 Member States received 384 000 Romanian citizens, 266.000 Polish citizens and 91.000 Bulgarian citizens. Regarding to number of migrants of non-EU citizens, Moroccans became first with 157.000 while Turkish migrants amounts to 51.000 (EuroStat, 2011).
Table 4.5. Migrants of Non-EU Citizens in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of citizenship</th>
<th>EU citizens (excluding nationals) (1 000)</th>
<th>EU citizens (excluding nationals) (1 000)</th>
<th>Non-EU citizens (1 000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>365</td>
<td></td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>197</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>163</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, EuroStat, 2011

In that sense, the magnitude of immigration depends upon many factors having an impact on the behavior of potential migrants. The length of the negotiating process, the attitude of the EU side on the free movement of persons during negotiations, the length of any transitional period concerning the free movement of persons after accession, and the development of the Turkish economy, Turkey’s social development and its rate of population growth in this process, are among these important elements that would shape possible migration from Turkey to the EU. On the other hand, this immigration would not completely disturb their countries. To the extent that progress is achieved in the area of education and training, this would have a positive impact on overall economic growth in Europe.

Many experts and social scientists working on EU social policies point out that the shortage of skilled labor, starting in the 1980s, will be the basic factor affecting the labor markets in Europe. It is a known fact that the increase of the elderly population in all European countries in the 2000s and the reduced participation of the young population in the labor markets will result in a considerable shortage of skilled personnel in the member states. For instance, J.M Barroso, in his speech on 2010 stated that the working age population will be reduced by about 2
million by 2020 and the number of people aged 60+ is increasing twice as fast as before 2007 (EC, 2010). The Confederation of Business Europe also urges that by 2010, working age population will decline over 3 million by 2020 and over 50 million by 2060 (Balkır, 2010).

To sum up, migration from Turkey to the EU countries does not seem an important problem for the EU. Moreover, Turkey holds an important potential to fill the deficit of skilled labor for the EU in the coming period. Turkey with its young population could provide major contributions for the ageing Europe, because the current trend means that a smaller number of working people will have to support a greater number of retired people. If Turkey joins to the EU in 2015, free movements of workers will not start before 2020. It is predicted that aging Europe’s countries and companies encourage more migration rather than to limit it (Hughes, 2004).

In that sense, Turkey is quickly becoming Europe’s manufacturing center in many sectors, such as electronics. As a natural outcome of this, employment related migration from Turkey to the EU countries would be at a decline. Moreover, the growth in employment in Turkey can be expected to increase even further with the EU membership, will not only attract Turkish workforce, but also the workforce in its neighboring regions.

4.2. Political Dimension of Turkey’s EU Membership

4.5.1. Where Does Turkey Stand For Copenhagen Political Criteria?

The political criteria which were decided at the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 and which candidate countries are required to fulfill to become members of the EU consist in the stable functioning of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

After the EU declared Turkey as a candidate country in Helsinki European Council Summit in 1999, Turkey has made great progress to meet Copenhagen political criteria.
Basically death penalty was lifted and antidemocratic elements in civil and penal code were removed. The judicial and prison systems have been reformed. The control of the civilian government over the military was improved and National Security Council was partially civilianized. State Security Courts was abolished. International human rights legislation has been recognized and the supremacy of these conventions over domestic law was accepted. Safeguard against torture have been enacted. Legal restrictions on broadcasting in the different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives were lifted. After these reforms, the European Council of Brussels in 2004 decided that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria and open accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 (EU Council, 2004).

However, since 2005, political liberalization in Turkey has slowed down. The EU 2005 and 2006 Progress Reports for Turkey noted problems on elimination of torture, limits of freedom of expression (EC, 2005-2006). By 2009, the European Commission Progress Reports became harsher in their assessments. For instance the 2009 Report noted several areas where Turkish laws did not meet the EU standards, including rules on political parties, promotion of minority languages, allegations of torture, corruption, political influence of military (EC, 2009). The Turkish government made constitutional reforms in 2010 to strengthen civil society by decreasing the political influence of military. In line with these, Turkey 2011 Progress Report acknowledged the strong presence of a pluralist and active civil society in Turkey. However. The Commission criticized the shortcomings in the freedom of expression and press freedom as well as the justice system, the situation of women as well as non-alignment of gender equality with EU standards (EC, 2011c).
4.2.2. Turkey’s Democracy and Political Issues Arising From EU Membership.

Satisfactorily meeting political criteria of the EU by candidate states is very significant if the European Union defines itself as rights-based post-national union, the basis of which are legally entrenched civil, political rights and on democratic decision-making process. According to European Commission, the EU defines itself as “a community of values based on peace and freedom, democracy and the rule of law, as well as tolerance and solidarity” (EC, 2012b).

According to Democracy Index of the Economist, Turkey is found as less democratic country than all the EU states while Turkey’s level of political culture is higher than Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. The score of functional government of Turkey is also higher than the scores of many of Central and Eastern European states as well as Portugal, Greece and Italy (The Economists, 2011)

Table 4.6. Democracy Index 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Electoral Process and Pluralism</th>
<th>Functioning of Government</th>
<th>Political Participation</th>
<th>Political Culture</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
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*Source: The Economists Intelligence Unit, 2011*

In contrast to economic criteria, democratic transformation of a country cannot be achieved in short time since it necessitates both domestic and international support. Turkey should maintain its democratic reforms to reach the democratic level of old EU members. However, this argument is also valid for some of the Central and Eastern European Countries.

The table below provides ratings about the today’s democratic conditions in Turkey and in some of the CEECs and between 1990 and 1992, 2004, 2007 and 2012. The scores evaluate political rights and civil liberties including freedom of expression and belief, rule of law and individual autonomy in the relevant countries. In Freedom House’ index, political rights and civil liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. Although scores of Turkey were lower than the CEECs’ ones in 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the differences were small. It is also interesting that Hungary, Latvia and Bulgaria got lower scores in 2012 as compared with 2004 and 2007, which prove that sustainable democracy in Turkey and in some of the CEECs can be achieved in long term with internal and external support.

Moreover, the reasons why the scores of 1990s are given is because of the fact that these dates are important to show the differences between democracy scores of the countries were relatively small and Romania was less democratic than Turkey between 1990 1992. In addition
to this, the EU started to improve economic and democratic conditions of the CEECs by its economic and moral support by 1990, which will be discussed later.


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</table>

PR: Political Rights, CL: Civil Liberties

Today, democracy and human right conditions in some of the CEECs have been criticized. For instance, it is reported that members of minority faiths in Bulgaria have been experienced occasional instances of harassment and discrimination despite constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. The Bulgarian authorities in some areas have blocked the construction of new mosques. Moreover, Bulgaria’s judiciary has benefited from a series of structural reforms associated with EU accession. However, European Commission urged the Bulgarian government to push forward with a judicial reform strategy to combat corruption and organized crime because of indefinite procedural delays. Organized crime remains a serious problem in Bulgaria and scores of suspected contract killings over the past decade have gone

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4 The first figure stands for political rights and the second for civil liberties. In Freedom House’ index, political rights and civil liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest.

http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=publisher&skip=0&publisher=FREEHOU&type=ANNUALREPORT
unsolved (Freedom of House, 2011a).

According to European Union progress report (2011b), Romania is also criticized by showing a lack of commitment on anticorruption and judicial reforms. European Commission cited lenient sanctions and poor conditions in Romanian prisons. The country has the highest tuberculosis rate in the EU, with prisons serving as a central source of infection. The constitution of Romania protects freedom of the press. However, a weakening newspaper market led some foreign media companies to withdraw from the country in 2010. Roma, homosexuals, people with disabilities, and HIV-positive children and adults face discrimination in education, employment, and other areas. Romania is home to the EU’s largest population of Roma, but has reportedly failed to apply for and spend EU funding dedicated to improving their living conditions. The constitution guarantees women equal rights, but gender discrimination is a problem. Only about 10 percent of the seats in Parliament are held by women. Trafficking of women and girls for forced prostitution has become a major concern, with Romania reportedly ranking as the leading source of migrant sex workers in the EU (Freedom of House, 2011b).

In this sense, democratic transformation of a country requires time and support. The EU should evaluate candidate states in that respect equally. In other words, candidate states should be judged according to same criteria. The granting of membership should be based on how well applicant states have managed to comply with the requirements for membership. If the EU moves in the direction of value-based community based on feelings of cultural affinity, we might expect that the countries which are perceived as culturally and with identity aspect closer to the EU, and which share the same religion or are considered as sharing the same history, we should expect that these candidates have been prioritized in the enlargement process.
The EU has also responsibilities to prepare candidates to achieve a satisfactory level of what it expects in regards for democracy and human rights, which means candidate states would have been given similar amount of aid and moral support. Within the framework of this perspective, Lungdren (2004) states that enlargement is not just that EU defines the criteria and the applicants adjust them. The EU and the candidate countries should cooperate with a mutual ambition to prepare the candidates for membership. It is not solely up to the candidates to fulfill the criteria. To prepare the candidate for membership is a responsibility of both the EU and candidates. Therefore, we need to examine financial and moral support of the EU’s to Turkey and CEECs to understand the reason why Turkey was placed behind the CEECs. The findings would support the role of identity in Turkey’s failure to be a member of the EU.

4.3. EU’s Support to CEECs and Turkey

4.3.1. EU’s Financial Assistance to CEECs and Turkey

Financial assistance for candidates “is intended to help these countries to introduce the necessary political, economic and institutional reforms to bring them into line with EU standards” (EC, 2012c). Although the EU’s enlargement decision was declared in 1993, the EU initiated PHARE program in 1989 to help the reform process in the CEECs.

According to Lundgren (2005), European Union was not generous to Turkey in comparison Central and Eastern European countries. For instance between 1990 and 2000, Turkey received 427 million euro from the EU’s different financial sources while Poland received 2 billion. Financial assistance allocated to Romania was 1.5 billion euro during this period. If we calculate the sum of financial assistance with the size of population, the amount of

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5 The Programme of Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Phare) is the main financial instrument of the pre-accession strategy for the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) which have applied for membership of the European Union.
funding per capita was 6 euro for Turkey, 51 euro for Poland and 68 euro for Romania.

Between 2000-2006, the EU allocated 21 billion 840 million euro to CEECs under its assistance programs while Turkey received only 1 billion 748 million euro for the same period. The amount of funding per capita was 2.7 euro for Turkey while 46 euro for Estonia. Although the EU financial assistance to Turkey has increased gradually in time, the amount per capita is still low compared to the amount allocated to other candidate states (Balkır, 2010). As mentioned before, the main purpose of financial assistance to help the candidate states in the reform process because membership poses cost on both the EU and EU membership aspiring countries. Limited financial assistance can be perceived as an indicator of a lack of moral support too (Lundgren, 2005).

4.3.2. EU’s Moral Support to CEECs and Turkey

In addition to financial assistance, it is essential to give clear prospect of membership by the EU to candidate states to improve their economic and democratic standards. In other words, the credibility of EU membership should not be decreased during the accession period. However, in 2004 before the official negotiations began, European Commission (2004) also states that “Turkey’s accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey’s population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics.” If the EU is rights-based institution, Turkey should have been treated and supported equally with the CEECs during the 2004 and 2007 enlargement process.

By showing solidarity and promoting reforms, the EU can have important effect on domestic development process. As it has been seen during the rapid reform process of Turkey after the candidacy status, for the first time, was offered to Turkey in Helsinki Summit in 1999,
the prospect for membership became plausible to Turkey until 2005. However the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU has been dominated by criticism rather than incentives. Although the EU has shown clear and unambiguous signals to the Central and Eastern European Countries (Lundgren, 2005), it has weakened Turkey’s membership perspective. For instance, the EU states that the negotiations with Turkey are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. Moreover, the EU stated that in the case of Turkish accession, “long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements and or permanent safeguard clauses” was to be expected (ABGS, 2005).

The absorption capacity of the EU has been put on the table against Turkey’s membership, which is another discouraging factor for Turkey’s EU membership prospect. The Copenhagen European Council in 1994 added another requirement for the EU membership. The accession of candidate states would be considered with the capacity of European Union’s capacity to absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of European integration (European Council, 1993).

2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper of the European Commission indicates that “The pace of enlargement has to take into consideration the EU’s absorption capacity. Enlargement is about sharing a project based on common principles, policies and institutions. The Union has to ensure it can maintain its capacity to act and decide according to a fair balance within its institutions; respect budgetary limits; and implement common policies that function well and achieve their objectives” (EC, 2005).

To sum up, Turkey has been treated differently from CEECs. Regarding economic concerns, the data shows that Turkey is not poorer at least than some of CEECs. The cost of enlargement to Turkey is not bigger than total of CEECs’ cost to the EU. Even if Turkey would
cost for the EU enlargement, the economic costs of Turkey’s membership would be counterbalanced by the economic benefits of EU members in mid-term considering that Turkey’s economy has been significantly growing for the past 10 years.

Regarding political factors, Turkey has not been sufficiently supported in both financially and morally by the EU. As its was seen between 2002 and 2004, the more the membership perspective became clear, the more reforms Turkey did. However, the EU could not give clear prospect of membership to Turkey after negotiations has started which was necessary to improve its economic and democratic standards. As the membership process got blurred because of the EU’s reluctance for giving prospect membership to Turkey, the accession process lost its attractiveness for Turkey leading to slow down of political reform process.

Finally, considering that Turkey would not cost the EU more than CEECs’ enlargement, did the EU prioritize enlargement to the Central and Eastern European States due to a particular sense of kinship-based duty? How did identity play role regarding EU’s prioritizing CEECs during the enlargement process? To answer these question, we should look at first the borders of Europe and what Europeanness mean and how Turkey and its identity have been perceived different by Europe. This case will be discussed at Chapter V.

4.4. Institutional Dimension of Turkey’s EU Membership

As in previous enlargements, the accession of Turkey would have an impact on various EU institutions on decision and policy-making process. Since in the EU institutions, voting and decision making powers are determined according to individual members’ population, Turkey’s accession to the EU would change balance of power in the decision making in the EU institutions because of Turkey’s population size. There are three main bodies of the EU in its institutional set up: European Parliament, European Commission and the Council of Ministers (The European
4.4.1. Main European Institutions

The European Parliament (EP), the legislative body of the EU, has three main roles: debating and passing European laws, with the Council, scrutinizing other EU institutions, particularly the Commission, to make sure they are working democratically, and debating and adopting the EU's budget, with the Council. The EP cannot initiate legislation but it is the single body that can block or amend some legislative proposals. The EU laws and directives introduced by the European Commission must be approved by the EP and the European Council (EC). EP has a right to control the EU budget. The EP has a kind of democratic supervision power, especially on the Commission. The President of the European Commission is elected by the EC and approved by the EP (McCormick, 2009).

The European Parliament (EP) has 786 members. Members of EP are grouped by political affiliation except for nationality. Any country cannot have seats more than 99 in the EP and Germany is the most populous country of the EU, and it has the most parliamentarians in the EP.

Table: 4.8. Allocation of Members of European Parliament Based On EU Nations

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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Council of Ministers is the forum where national ministers from each EU country meet to adopt laws and coordinate policies. The Council passes EU laws and coordinates the broad economic policies of EU member countries. It signs agreements between the EU and other countries, approves the annual EU budget and develops the EU's foreign and defense policies. Moreover, the Council coordinates cooperation between courts and police forces of member countries (McCormick, 2009). Decisions in the Council of the EU are taken by qualified majority as a general rule. The bigger a country’s population, the more votes it has, but in fact the numbers are weighted in favor of the less populous countries.

**Table 4.9. Allocation of Members of the Council of Ministers Based On EU Nations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Countries</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany, France, UK, Italy</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederland</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When the Council votes, 'qualified majority voting' applies. A qualified majority is reached when: a majority of the 27 EU countries vote in favor and at least 255 of the possible 345 votes are cast. Furthermore, a member country can ask for a check to see whether the majority represents minimum 62% of the total population. If this is not the case, the proposal cannot be adopted. In votes concerning sensitive topics - like security and external affairs and taxation - decisions by the Council have to be unanimous. This means that one single country can veto a decision. From 2014 a system known as 'double majority voting' will be introduced. For a proposal to go through, it will need the support of 2 types of majority: a majority of countries (at least 15) and a majority of the total EU population (the countries in favor must represent at least 65% of the EU population) (EU, 2012).

The European Commission is one of the main institutions of the European Union. It represents and upholds the interests of the EU as a whole. It drafts proposals for new European laws. It manages the day-to-day business of implementing EU policies and spending EU funds. The 27 Commissioners, one from each EU country, provide the Commission’s political
leadership during their 5-year term. European Commission proposes new laws to Parliament and the Council. It manages the EU's budget and allocating funding and enforces EU law (together with the Court of Justice). European Commission represents the EU internationally, for example, by negotiating agreements between the EU and other countries (McCormick, 2009).

4.4.2. Impact of Turkey’s Prospective Accession on the EU Institutions

It is true that Turkey will be the second biggest country of the EU after Germany if Turkey joins to the EU. And it is anticipated that will be the biggest country in the EU by 2025 in terms of population. Turkey’s accession would significantly affect the allocation of seats to current Member States in the EP because of its large population. Turkey’s accession would not change the number of small members have, but medium and large countries’ parliamentarians would have to loose power leaving their seats to the Turkish parliamentarians. Turkey will be one of the five largest states in representation terms in the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. However, Turkey will not effect the European Commission since it is a supranational body rather than intergovernmental. However, if Turkey joins to the EU, many bureaucrats will have chance to work in the European Commission.

State Planning Organization (DPT) in Turkey estimated that if Turkey became the member of the EU, Turkey would have 28 or 29 vote in the Council of Ministers and 80 seats in the European Parliament. Turkey, with 13.6% of the EU population, would have a representative power of about 11% in the European Parliament and some 9% in the Council of Ministers (DPT, 2004). This means that Turkey would have the same votes in the Council of Ministers as France, and it would have more seats in the European Parliament than France. Compare to populations small states are more powerful than big states in terms of allocation of votes in the Council. For instance, Germany has 29 votes with the population of 83 million, Greece has 12 votes with the
population of 10.6 million Almost all of the CEECs but Poland are small or medium size countries, and their accession affected the EU institutions deeply. Traditionally, small countries like CEEC are assigned more votes or seats than larger countries in the Council of Ministers and EP.

These show that Turkey can have a significant role in decision-making process of the EU. However, Turkey’s impact (28-29 seats) in the Council of Ministers would not be much bigger than Poland (27 seats). Despite Turkey would change allocation of seats both in the European Parliament and in the Council of Ministers, Turkey can not dominate decision-policy making of the EU by itself considering that the Council applies 'qualified majority voting' which requires a majority of the 27 EU countries vote in favor and at least 255 of the possible 345 votes are cast. Turkey can block a decision in the Council of Ministers if it acts together with other states, for instance, Turkey can work together with poor members of the EU when negotiating the financial packages and this may disturb rich members. In votes concerning sensitive topics - like security and external affairs and taxation, Turkey can be effective since decisions by the Council of Ministers have to be unanimous. This means that one single country can veto a decision. This argument is also valid for CEECs. However, from 2014 a system known as 'double majority voting' will be introduced. For a proposal to go through, it will need the support of 2 types of majority: a majority of countries (at least 15) and a majority of the total EU population (the countries in favor must represent at least 65% of the EU population).

With regards to Turkey’s likely impact on European Parliament, Turkey, with 13.6% of the EU population, would have 80 seats in the European Parliament by having representative power of about 11% in the European Parliament while combined CEEC with its population of 21.6% of the EU, have 190 seats in the EP that corresponds with 25.8% of the seats (EP, 2009).
It is true that Turkey would have more seats (80 seats) than any other CEECs but the European Parliament has to approve EU legislation together with the Council in which Turkey’s impact on the European Council would not much bigger than Poland and the one of combined CEECs.

As a conclusion, the impact of CEECs in the EU institutions were not questioned during their accession process although their combined impact on the EU institutions is bigger than Turkey while Turkey’s potential impact in the EU institutions have been seemed as an obstacle on the way of EU membership.

4.5. Cyprus Issue and Turkey’s Membership to the EU

Unresolved Cyprus issue may seem one of the obstacles on Turkey’s EU membership. Because, in 2006, the EU unanimously suspended eight chapters because Turkey refused to extend its customs union with the EU and allow Greek-Cypriot vessels access to its ports and airports. Today, Turkey is first imposed to open its ports to Cyprus as a precondition for the continuation of accession negotiations and a solution in Cyprus has become a condition for Turkey’s EU membership (Eralp N, 2011).

The main responsibility regarding the settlement of Cyprus problem lies in the EU side. Because the EU brought this problem upon itself by accepting Cyprus even though they had yet to resolve their inter-communal differences. Another condition for candidates is ‘good neighborliness’, which means the willingness to cooperate with neighbors. The 1999 Helsinki Summit of the European Council required "peaceful settlement of border disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter." Although the EU presented these norms and values as political conditionality regarding the applicant states, it nevertheless did not apply them consistently - as the recent enlargement to include Cyprus without solving its border dispute has revealed. (Güney, 2004).
The Cyprus problem started in earnest after independence from Britain in 1960, when the 80% Greek Cypriot community and 20% Turkish Cypriot community set up a joint republic, guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. The Republic broke down in 1963, when the Greek Cypriots excluded Turkish Cypriot leaders from government and drove the Turkish Cypriots into isolated villages. After the colonels’ regime in Athens backed a Greek Cypriot coup in Cyprus in 1974 that aimed to unite the island with Greece, Turkey invoked its right to intervene as guarantor and staged a military invasion, eventually occupying the northern 37% of the island (ICT, 2009).

UN-mediated talks to reunify the island and remove Turkish troops had not progressed. The Turkish Cypriots, backed by Turkey, voted 65% in favor of the UN-brokered deal, known as the Annan Plan, whereas 76% of Greek Cypriots voted against it at 2004 referendum. Even though the EU had publicly and insistently backed the Annan Plan, it nevertheless allowed the Greek Cypriots to enter as the sole representatives of the island. The Republic of Cyprus as a member has also blocked a Direct Trade Regulation that would have allowed Turkish Cypriots direct access to EU markets (ICT, 2009).

Since the EU and Turkey are currently paying the political cost of the Cypriots’ failure to compromise, EU leaders should engage more actively to prevent the Cyprus problem derailing Turkey’s accession process because the chance of a federal solution and demilitarization of the island will certainly not come again in this political generation. In this sense, EU leaders must show that peace through compromise can bring many benefits. Turkish Cypriots will win full citizenship rights and integration into the EU, with all the economic and political advantages that entails. Greek Cypriots will be able to live without fear of Turkish soldiers. The EU could do this through reviving its 2004 promise to end Turkish Cypriot isolation through direct trade and try to
overcome obstacles to direct international flights to the Turkish Cypriots’ own airport. The EU must assume its responsibility for the injustices and absurdities of the situation.

CHAPTER V

The Role of Identity in the EU Enlargement Towards Turkey and CEECs

5.1. The European geographical borders and Turkey’s Europeanness

Unlike the other continents, Europe does not have clear geographically boundaries. In the West, Europe’s boundary is defined by the Atlantic Ocean while the north border is defined by Arctic Ocean. Although Ural range, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea are generally regarded as the traditional boundaries of the Eastern Europe, it has consistently changed throughout the history. (Hamilton, 2011)

Geographic borders may play a role in some degree as was seen in the Moroccan experience. Morocco applied for the EU membership in 1987 It, however, was refused by the EU on the grounds that Morocco was not a State in European continent (Arnold, 2007) Within the most common European borders definition, Turkey’s European part encompasses only % 3 of total area which is 23,764 km2 (9,175 sq mi) while % 97 of the country’s area is situated in Anatolia which is known Asia minor. Anatolia with 756,816 km2 (292,208 sq mi) area, is a large, roughly rectangular peninsula situated bridge like between Europe and Asia (Wikipedia, 2012).

Can the fact that only % 3 area of Turkey is situated in the European continent be an obstacle for Turkey to be a EU member? This is not the case because the EU, because of Turkey’s geographical borders, has never refused Turkey’s application for the EU membership. Moreover, the European part of Turkey with over 7 million populations is bigger than some of the EU members. If this is the case, how can we explain Cyprus’ Europeanness with a population
of 1.1 million, which is situated geographically in Asia? The UN classification of world regions places Cyprus in Western Asia, the CIA’s World Factbook in the Middle East (Hamilton, 2011).

5.2. The Concept of Identity

Before explaining what Europe and Europeanness are, and whether the identity plays role on Turkey’s Europeanness, we should first examine the concept of identity. Identity, in general terms, means the definition and existence of belongingness (Eralp, 1997). Identity means similarity, common traits and sameness among individuals. Identity can be described by contrasting it to other identities. So, one eliminates the other identities while forming his own identity (İnaç, 2002). According to Wheelis, (1958) identity “is the feeling of the unity and wholeness which is based on the harmonization of the behavior, actions and value judgments of the people.”

Apart from individual identity that is not a subject of political sciences, the term collective identity has the concepts, religious identity, political identity and cultural identity. However these terms are also the components of national identity (Waever & Buzan & Kelstrup, & Lamartine, 1993). Identities such as ethnic group, society, nation and civilization are attributed identities are created in the socialization process (Yurdusev, 1997). People who live in the same state have the similar traditions, practices and experiences form the nation-state identity (Schöpflin, 2000). European Union is a good example of supranational political identity.

5.3. Historical Dimension of European Identity (Europeanness)

Although the idea of Europe dates back to ancient times, it is not possible to mention a European identity within this period because the concept of Europe only has a geographical meaning (İnaç, 2002). The idea of Europe started with the ninth century though the word “Europe” was not uttered. Those times were the medieval dark ages of Europe when religion was
dominant in all aspects of life. So, after the ninth century the term “Christendom” became equal to Europe. The church was the only institution holding and using the power. Christendom was unified and there were not any conflicts in terms of religion (Lukacs, 1965). With the end of middle ages, with the start of reformation and enlightenment the dominance of religion collapsed. There was a turn to classical period, science and reason; antiquity was discovered (Lukacs, 1965).

At the end of 17th century there was the new concept of Europe, which was political rather than religious. In the 18th century, there was also a political unity and cultural unity. The main idea was that the political Europe and the political unity should be complemented with the civilization of Europe, which is different from the other continents. On the other hand, despite the secularization process the connection with Christianity has not completely diminished. The new Europe which has changed too much after Reformation and Renaissance was the secularized version of Christian Europe (Delanty, 1995).

In the 18th century with the effect of the geographical discoveries, we see a rise humanism, secularism, industrialization, democracy and rationalization. The geographical discoveries played an important part in European identity. The distinction between the colonizer and colonized, “we” and the “other” contributed to a greater extent to Europeanness. The Europeans started to call themselves both European and civilized changing from Europe and Christian (Inaç, 2002). They considered themselves to be superior to the others, namely the colonized. Actually, the colonized provided the Europeanization of Europe and the European used this distinction to classify the communities in overseas (Woolf, 1992).

When we come to the 19th century, it is observed that nationalism and nation-state identity gains the upper hand in determining the allegiance of people. With the French
Revolution along with the concepts such as equality, liberty etc. nationalism, self-determination prevailed Europe. So, we see a distancing from the more Europeanist approach to national approach. In this period the religious identity diminished more and there was strong emphasis on nationalism. Today’s nationalist approaches to the idea of Europe and a European Union, which has an identity called European identity, derives mainly from this period of increasing nationalism. At the beginning of the 20th century it is hard to talk of a European identity and European Unity. There are two world wars originating from Europe, and having today’s collaborators as enemies (Lukacs, 1965).

After the Second World War, the difficulty of defining borders of Europe has led to creation of the European Union. European Union is the latest indicator of Europeanness today. With the coming into force of Maastricht Treaty in 1993, which transformed the economic union towards a European political union, the question of European identity has been increasingly contested. However, the enlargement process towards Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and in 2007 and the especially the candidacy of Turkey for full membership acknowledged in 1999 made defining the European identity much more complicated.

### 5.4. European Identity and the Role of Other and Turks

The construction of a European common identity has depended on the existence of Europe’s cultural others. “European people defined themselves as “civilized” against the other which were “uncivilized-barbarians” “According to Edward Said, the Orient was a European invention as a space of romance, exoticism, and fear, upon which Europe painted its other and, by projecting its internal differences, came to know itself and define its identity” (Kösebalaban, 2007).

In other words, Europe has defined itself in terms of what it was not. The non-European
barbarian people played a role in the evolution of the European identity and in the maintenance of order among European states. Muslim Turks with their military power and physical proximity represented the most serious political and religious challenge to Europe and served as a common source of fear.

In 1071, Sultan Alparslan first defeated the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV at the battle of Malazgirt (Manzikert), capturing in 1081 of Iznik (Nicaea), a city of great importance to Christianity only a hundred miles from Istanbul. The capture of Istanbul (Constantinople) marked the end of the Roman Empire, a state which had lasted for nearly 1,500 years; it was also a massive blow to Christendom. Between 1520–66 Turks was firmly established in Eastern Europe and the image of the Turk permanently imprinted on the mind of the European public. Even though the Crusades were militarily a failure, the Crusader became a unifying ideology of Western Christian unity and the name “Turk” represented in European Christian consciousness a power that was both feared (Kösebalaban, 2007).

Most dramatically, the Christians’ confrontation with Turks at the siege of Vienna by the Ottomans in 1683 that consolidated a common European fear and panic, helped another contemporary influence in the minds of Europeans against Turks. The historical memory of the siege of Vienna serves as the most significant reason why Austria remains the most ardent opponent of Turkish membership. (Europeanvoice, 2004)

As of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans became the ‘sick man of Europe’ and the empire collapsed at the end of World War I. Europe entered into a process of internal competition characterized by two world wars. Europe did not have external challenges during that period. The end of the Second World War led to the Cold War, when a strong Soviet Union shifted the dominant other in European identity to Russia. The end of the Cold War, the collapse
of the Soviet Union, and the unification of Western and Eastern Europe under the umbrella of European integration created a new geopolitical context in which Russia lost its salience as the other. (Kösebalaban, 2007)

5.5. Contemporary European Identity

The pressing issues of the geopolitical significance of Europe, the future shape of the EU, the nature of further integration, and whether this integration would lead to an organization that is more than simply one of regional cooperation, are now directly related to the identity of an emerging European society. If European integration has progressed relatively smoothly during its early days, it was mainly due to the fact that it appeared to be a highly technical and bureaucratic project that did not arouse emotions nor grab the attention of large numbers of people. However, imagining a future European identity is hardly a technical matter.

“In fact, what Europe was, let alone what European identity now is, has never been clear and the meaning of Europe has changed and shifted throughout history” (Keyman & Baban, 2008). Moreover, it has been suggested that at the center of the legitimacy crisis of the EU lies its identity crisis or lack of it (Burgess, 2004). It is highly problematic to give a precise answer to the question of where Europe starts and ends and what is the EU’s collective identity because there is confusion on the elements of European Identity in the EU today.

There are two different arguments about the European Identity. While supporters of post-national Europe argue that European identity should be based on a multicultural and pluralistic the others such as the Christian Democrats argue that European identity should be grounded upon a particular cultural framework which is defined by its Christian heritage and shared history (Keyman & Baban, 2008).

Turkey’s membership plays a critical role then in this particular context as it forces the
debate about European identity into the public. In other words, through Turkey’s membership, Europe is forced to debate the nature of its own identity. There are arguments against Turkey’s membership on the basis of cultural difference and there are others challenging the cultural exclusion argument by emphasizing Turkey’s Europeanness. In other words, arguments against and for Turkey’s membership are in fact arguments about what Europe is and what it will be in the future.

Arguments against the membership of Turkey have two central assumptions. The first one is that European history represents a linear progression from ancient Greece to Enlightenment. The product of this linear and uninterrupted history is a homogeneous European culture that is shared by all European countries. The second assumption is that this homogeneous European culture and its values are culturally sealed and essentially internal to its participants. Therefore, even if Turkey internalizes these values, it still cannot be a European country due to its Otherness (Delanty, 1995 & Elbe, 2001). Commentators who argue that Turkey has never been part of the European cultural tradition also argue that this absence from the European history is not just a simple exclusion but also an essential lack that eternally prevents Turkey from becoming a European country. “This essentialized interpretation of European culture has already been demystified as nothing but a social construct” (Delanty, 1995 & Elbe, 2001). Contrary to this neat picture, European history has been full of discrepant moments and discontinuities which have resulted in many different meanings of Europe that have constantly shifted over the course of history. (Elbe, 2001)

As a result, it is not possible to have a fixed and unchanging notion of European identity. Instead, the very meaning of European culture is defined and framed by diverse and sometimes conflicting cultural traditions. In this respect, the growing presence of Muslim communities
within European countries and Turkey’s membership to Europe are not examples of Europe losing its identity but are examples of a redefinition of what Europe will come to represent in the global age.

Some opponents of Turkey’s EU membership question Turkey’s EU membership on the grounds of historical, cultural and geographical belonging. For instance, the former French President, Valery Giscard D’estaing, argued that Europe is defined by the cultural richness of ancient Greece and Rome as well as the creative energy of the Renaissance and its impact on rational and scientific thinking. He maintains that Turkey could not be a member of the EU because of the simple fact that it has never been part of this European history and has never participated in the cultural traditions of Europe (Radikal, 2004). He further stated that “the EU needs to have strong core identity which would encourage Europeans to realize that they are part of a larger community and to develop European patriotism” (Radikal, 2004).

According to them, while East European countries are qualified to join the European project due to their Christian character and their affinity with the Enlightenment project, Turkey should be kept outside the European project as it was part of the “nomadic traditions of Asiatic culture” (Besancon, 2002).

Pope Benedict XVI, while he was a cardinal, declared that “because Turkey always constituted an antagonism in the European history and presented a danger to Christianity, it should not be included in the European Union” (Editorial, 2004). The Dutch commissioner of the EU, Frits Bolkenstein, states that if Turkey were let into the EU, “the battle of 1683 which ended the siege of Vienna by Turks would have been in vain” (Reynolds, 2004).

In reaction to these arguments, some argue that the European culture starts in the eastern Mediterranean and, therefore, includes Turkey (Gnisci, 2004). Others have indicated that,
historically, the Ottoman Empire was part of the European State system and that Turks were part of European history for six hundred years (Besson, 2004). Still others have pointed out the multicultural and multi-religious nature of the Ottoman Empire as an example of tolerance and inclusion, which later found its way into core European values (De Trazegnies, 2003).

To sum up, although European identity has been amplified through the process of European integration with key values such as representative democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law and social justice (inclusive aspects), it has always been linked to the continent’s history, geography and culture. (Exclusive aspects) Therefore, European collective identity promoted by the EU is hybrid in terms of embodying both inclusive and exclusive aspects (Rumelili, 2004).

With regards to explaining Turkey’s failure to join the EU, we see that ideational factors have played significant role from the perspective of sociological institutionalism. Although there is not a homogenous contemporary European identity today, Turkey has not been perceived a part of European family in the enlargement process because exclusive aspects of European identity has dominated in collective European Identity. Why Turkish identity is perceived as other to the European identity is primarily result of image of Ottoman Turk is embedded in the minds of Europeans with an alien substance. With its social customs, traditions, language, religion, Turkey’s Europeanness has been perceived as incompatible with democratic values and respect for human rights (Torreblanca, 2004). However, such negative attributions on Turks are also reflections of Europeans own confusion on its identity.

If we look at the EU’s CEECs enlargement from this point of view, the CEEC wasn’t “the other” for Western European politicians but it constituted the “kidnapped West”. Whereas the Soviet Union represented the ‘other’, the East Europeans were ‘one of us’ (Sjursen 2002).
Return of the "kidnapped West" back to Europe was the EU’s overriding concern, which explains why the CEEC was prioritized over Turkey. In many speeches and official statements, the accession of the CEEC into the Union has been described as Europe’s "other half finally coming home", as the existing EU members and the ex-communist states are said to share the same past, have the same roots and understand one another, while this was not the case with Turkey. The EU felt it had special responsibility to CEEC where we can figure out from European Parliament documents “As stated by the European Council held in Rome, “the Community is aware of its special responsibility towards these countries (...) the Community has a duty to help consolidate and develop the general process of reform being undertaken in these countries” and from Council Declarations “The Community and its Member States are fully conscious of the common responsibility which devolves on them in this decisive phase in the history of Europe” Another European Parliament report points out that “the European Community must not be considered in isolation but together with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with which it has had, and still has, deep-rooted and vital cultural and historical links” (Lundgren, 2005).

Muftuler-Bac argues that inspite of the fact that Turkey has a more developed market economy than most of CEEC and it had no worse political problems than them Turkey remained the only country that was not yet visibly on the track to membership after the 1997 Luxembourg Summit. She explains this as adoption of another criterion, apart from politics and economics, which can keep Turkey in the waiting room perpetually. This criterion is culture (Erkan, 2002).

Closeness, described as consisting of a common history, culture and common values, between the EC and the CEEC were stated lots of times after collapse of Communist Block. The demise of the Soviet Union offered an opportunity for CEECs to return to the Europe and added
a cultural dimension to the process. Besides, ethnic, religious and historical conflicts replaced the Cold War and this emphasized Turkey’s non-Christian character. That’s why the newly freed CEEC jumped the line ahead of Turkey, which is not regarded as a natural member of European family. According to some statements Europe has a common cultural heritage and it has roots both in the East and the West, and therefore the European Community must not be considered in isolation but together with the CEEC (Sjursen, 2002).

Moreover, when we look at the Luxembourg process, we can see how this patron-client relationship makes the work easier. In line with what NATO was planning, Germany wanted to limit enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; France and Spain supported the Southern European and Mediterranean dimension of enlargement, and the Scandinavian countries strongly supported membership of the Baltic countries (Sjursen, 2002). France was the boss of Romania in the EU, because it needs a relatively large ally to counter the power of Germany among CEEC. Romania, having big economic and political shortcomings, was in the Luxembourg List thanks to strong support of France (Bac & Mcclaren 2003), nevertheless it couldn’t access to the EU in 2004. And finally, there is no need to talk about Greece’s support to the Cyprus, which had the best economic indicators among the countries in the Luxembourg List.

Lack of kinship and patron-client relationship between Turkey and any EU member state is one of the most important deficient Turkey faced on the way of the EU. EU generally sees Turkey as a partner and described the two parties as highly interdependent. According to the EU, Turkey isn’t a part of Europe but it is a bridge between Europe and Asia, between Islam and Christianity. Although EU ensures Turkey to be treated on an equal footing with the other candidate countries, it never described bringing Turkey into the Union as a duty, a responsibility or a political necessity. In other words, the EU had never perceived Turkey on an equal footing
with CEEC in terms of culture and almost never considered it as a part of the European family (Sjursen, 2002).

5.6. **European Attitudes Towards Turkey’s EU Membership**

According to Sociological/constructivist institutionalism, international organizations are community representatives as well as community-building agencies. Enlargement is generally shaped by ideational, cultural factors (Schimmelfenning, et. al., 2002). The concerns of European Union’s citizens are influenced by the ideational, cultural and religious factors, which are revealed by public polls in Europe. The European Commission has been monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States by Eurobarometer. In this study, Special EuroBarometer 255 and Standard Eurobarometer 66 of 2006 and a survey made by German Marshall Funds are taken into account to analyze Turkey’s EU membership since they provide the latest EU official data regarding enlargement including Turkish case.

According to the polls of the German Marshall Fund, only 23 of the EU citizens support Turkey’s membership (Table 5.1.)

**Table 5.1. European Attitudes Towards Turkey’s Membership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (1)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) EU-7 for 2002-06 and EU-11 for 2007-10.

The question “Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be... to the accession of Turkey to the European Union? ” is asked to the citizens of EU in 200.” (Special Barometer 255, 2006). Special Eurobarometer 255 shows that only 38% of
EU 15 citizens are in favor of Turkey’s accession to the EU while 49 % of EU 15 citizens oppose it. Similarly, only 39 % of EU 25 citizens are in favor of Turkey’s EU membership while 48 % of EU 25 citizens oppose it. The strongest opposition comes from Austria (81 %), Germany and Luxembourg (69 %), Cyprus (68 %) Greece (67 %), Czech Republic (61%) Belgium, Slovakia and Slovenia (55%) and France (54%).

Table 5.2. European Attitudes Towards Turkey’s Membership

QD16.5 Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be... to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Turkey In favour</th>
<th>Turkey Opposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU25</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 AC</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY (TCC)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Special Eurobarometer 255, 2006.
The EU Citizens’ weak support to Turkey’s accession is also observed in Standard Barometer 66. While only 26% of EU 15 members’ citizens supports Turkey’s accession to the EU, 37% of EU 10 members’ citizens, which became member of the EU in 2004 support Turkey’s EU accession. In terms of Bulgaria and Romania, %42 of EU 15 citizens and %68 of EU 10 members’ citizens were in favor of Bulgaria’s EU accession while support of EU 15 citizens to Romania is 38%, which is higher than Turkey. 55% of EU 10 members’ citizens also supported Romania’s accession to the EU (Standard Eurobarometer, 66, 2006).

**Table 5.3. European Attitudes Towards Turkey’s Membership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EU15 % in favour</th>
<th>NMS10 % in favour</th>
<th>EU15 EB66 – shift EB64</th>
<th>NMS10 EB66 – shift EB64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia (FYROM)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Standard Eurobarometer 64, 2006, European Commission. p.223

Overall, %59 of EU 25 citizens opposed to Turkey’s membership to the EU while 28% of EU 25 citizens gave support to Turkey. Opposition to Turkey’s membership (59%) is also higher than Bulgaria (40%) and Romania (46%) (Standard Eurobarometer 66, 2006).
Table 5.4. European Attitudes Towards Turkey’s Membership

The majority of European citizens (52%) also believe Turkey’s accession to the EU as mainly in the interest of Turkey itself. 20% would see a mutual interest to both the EU and Turkey for its entry in the European Union (Special Eurobarometer 255, 2006).

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 64, 2006, European Commission.
Table 5.5. European Attitudes Towards Turkey’s Membership

The following results give more valuable insights about Turkey’s membership to the EU. It provides us some clues about the European’s perceptions regarding Turkish identity. European Union citizens believe that Turkey should respect membership respect for human rights (85 %) and improve its economy (77 %) should Turkey want to join the Europe Union in about ten years. However, only 40 % of respondents believe that Turkey historically belongs to Europe. 61% of respondents also feel that cultural differences between Turkey and the EU states are too significant to allow Turkey to join the EU (Standard Eurobarometer 66, 2006).

Source: Special Eurobarometer 255, 2006,

![Bar Chart](chart)
These results support the argument “Turkey’s adoption of the EU’s official membership criteria is not sole determinant for Turkey to access to the EU.” of this study. The majority of current EU citizens are skeptical of Turkey’s joining the EU. Even if Turkey satisfactorily meets the official criteria of EU by improving its economy and human rights condition, the membership is not guaranteed for Turkey because ideational factors (cultural differences, belongings to European History) still play role in enlargement decision towards Turkey.
CHAPTER VI
Policy Recommendations

6.1. General Introduction

Although the EU has some characteristics of an international organization since membership is voluntary and decision-making process is based on consent, the qualities of the EU transcend the characteristics of an international organization. The EU has internationally recognized borders and members of the EU are subject to rules in some areas such as common law and trade (McCormick, 2009). Since the foundation of European Economic Community in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome (EU, 2012), European Union has become a key actor for the integration of European states. The economic integration would eventually lead to political integration by creating an area and community of peace and prosperity in Europe (Güney, 2004). Democracy, rules of law, human rights and respect for minority rights have been key components of European Identity in this integration project.

The relationship between Turkey and the EU has always exhibited a fluctuating trend. Between 1963 and 1999, the relationship between Turkey and the EU was mostly dominated by economic, political and security issues. However, it gained a new momentum in 1999 when the EU declared Turkey as a candidate state on the way towards the EU membership. In addition to economic and political issues, debates in European political and public arena about Turkey’s Europeanness and crisis on the European identity have made this relationship much more complicated since 1999.

Turkey-EU relationship provides a unique case in the history of the enlargement of the EU in which a negative turn in the relationship took place after the initiation of the negotiations. In principle, accession negotiations constitute the beginning of an irreversible process in which
the candidate country’s membership perspective becomes clearer gradually. This has not been
the case for Turkey. Turkey-EU relations have been going through a very problematic period at a
time when Turkey’s economic power, regional importance and self-confidence are increasing,
whereas the EU has been trying to overcome the most significant financial crisis in its history.
Who is responsible for the lack of progress? Where does the obligation lie? I believe that it rests
on both sides and both Turkey and the EU have to keep their bargain. Because, accession of
Turkey to the Union would not only be challenging both for the EU and Turkey but also it, it
would offer important opportunities for both sides if it were well managed.

6.2. Recommendations for Turkey

The EU has played important role in helping transform Turkey’s economy and political
culture as well as democratic institutions (Morelli, 2011). In this sense, Turkey’s membership to
the EU is very significant for Turkey to further improve its economic and democratic conditions.
Because, Turkey’s accession to the EU should boost Turkey’s growth essentially via increased
trade, higher investment due to higher foreign direct investment inflows.

From the economic point of view, Turkey’s EU membership would be challenging for the
EU integration. Accession of Turkey would increase regional economic disparities in the EU
However, it will depend on future economic developments in Turkey. Turkey is considered to be
a lower middle-income economy. Its per capita income is relatively low compared to the EU
average. The GDP per capita in terms of Purchasing Power (PPS) is at 49 % of the EU-25
average, although it is higher than the level of Bulgaria (44 %) and Romania (46 %) and close to
Latvia (51 %). Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Poland are around 40 % below the EU27 average
(Gasic, 2011).

Considering that economy is the most important key of European Integration, Turkey must
maintain macroeconomic and financial stability and enhance its productive capacity by increasing its human and physical capacity to reach the level of economic prosperity of the EU states. In that sense, Structural reforms should be pursued in order to ensure efficient management of public finances, continued stabilization and development of the financial sector, increased efforts and expenditure to improve the overall level of education and training as well as to increasingly attract foreign direct investment.

From the geo-political perspective, Turkey is situated at a strategic and problematic area for Europe: the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean; its territory is a transit route for land and air transport with Asia, and for sea transport with Russia and the Ukraine. In economic and demographic terms, Turkey is an important actor in its area. With Turkish accession, the European Union’s borders would extend to the South Caucasus, (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) and to Syria, Iran and Iraq. This will increase the Union’s foreign policy involvement in issues that previously would have been considered as bilateral between Turkey and its neighbors. The management of the European Union’s new external borders would constitute an important policy challenge. Managing migration as well as fighting organized crime, terrorism, trafficking of human beings, drugs and arms smuggling would all be facilitated through closer cooperation between Turkey and the EU. In that sense, Turkey should keep its integration in the western alliance, to persuade the EU that it will contribute to the security of Europe and its neighborhood before and after accession.

From the political perspective, Turkey has made good progress in terms of democracy and human rights in order to fulfill the political criteria of the EU. Therefore, European Council decided to open negotiations with Turkey in 2004. However, the reforms in Turkey have slowed down notably not because of blocking of many negotiation chapters by EU states but also the
perspective of EU membership has become blurred. Moreover this tendency has increased internal resistance for reforms (Chislett, 2011). Considering that the core values of EU integration are quality of democracy, rule of laws, human rights and respect for minority rights, Turkey should further improve its quality of democracy and human rights by fully harmonizing its internal legislation with the international and European conventions. Whether the EU does not give a clear membership perspective to Turkey or not, Turkey’s further democratization would contribute to affect the minds of the European citizens against Turkey’s EU membership. Although the European Commission manages the negotiations, Turkey’s eventual accession depends on the member-states and their domestic politics. Therefore Turkey needs to persuade the European citizens that it can one day be an asset as a member-state.

6.3. Recommendations for the EU

In 1999 the EU formally declared Turkey a candidate for membership and defined the political conditions that Turkey had to meet to start accession talks. These were the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the protection of minorities. Since then, Turkey has made great efforts to fulfill these criteria and the Turkish parliament has passed highly controversial measures bolstering democracy and human rights. It is clear that the EU’s pressure has empowered proponents of EU membership in Turkey. But they would only be able to keep these progress if the EU offers Turkey visible and measurable membership perspective. However, it has never happened after the negotiations with Turkey began.

The opponents of Turkey’s EU membership often use the same argument. Because of its relatively poor economy and quality of democracy, big and growing population as well as geographical borders with Middle East and Central Asia, it was argued that Turkey would
destabilize the European integration project (Grabbe, 2005).

It is true that Turkey’s population is bigger than the ten new members combined which joined to the EU in 2004. And, Turkey’s population is still growing. But in other respects, Turkey is not so different from some of previous candidates. For instance, Poland’s GDP per capita income was at 35 per cent of the EU average in 1994 when the European Council decided to enlarge to Central and Eastern European states. If Turkey joined to the EU, its per capita GDP would be similar to that of the East European members today (Barysch, 2005). Therefore, the economic impact of Turkey’s EU membership cannot be fully assessed considering that Turkey’s growing economy and its potentials are remarkable.

Turkey represents a strategically located large and growing consumer market as well as a dynamic procurement market with increasing investment opportunities in industry, infrastructure and energy. Turkey could reduce the pressure for migration by increased productivity and income, sustained progress by Turkey in areas such as social policy, employment, health and education. On the other hand, with its young and still growing population, Turkey could contribute to the available work force in a situation of overall demographic stagnation or decline elsewhere in Europe. From the point of view of energy supply and transport networks, Turkey is of strategic importance to the European Union. Turkey’s accession would help to secure better energy supply routes for the EU. It would probably necessitate a development of EU policies for the management of water resources and the related infrastructure.

Turkey has always been important for Europe in strategic terms, as it has been seen both as a bridge and a barrier to the Middle East (Güney, 2004). Turkey is a member of international organizations such as the United Nations, OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, and the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, the Economic Cooperation Organization, and the Islamic
Conference Organization. Turkey has also an observer status in the Arab League. In that sense, Turkey would be able contribute the EU to play an important stabilizing role in the area. With its large military expenditure and manpower, Turkey has the material capacity to make a significant contribution to EU security and defense policy.

Therefore, the European Union should recognize Turkey’s membership aspirations as a strategic opportunity for the future of European states. Both the European Union and the European politicians should support this process by pursuing European citizens. Acknowledging that Turkey has been part of Western Alliance, the EU should provide morally and economically support Turkey to help for its improving economic and democratic standards. The EU should also make clear its expectations from Turkey. Turkey should be given a clear membership perspective and treated equally with the current member states including CEECs as well as other candidate states.

With regards to identity issue, Turkey has been considered as an odd candidate. Turkey’s large Muslim population and its historical background are taken to imply that Turkey belongs to a different civilization and cannot be a part of Europe. Turkish identity; its religion, political and societal culture and civilization has also been debated as an obstacle for EU membership. However, the need of multicultural aspect of European identity is not just simply an attempt to overcome the problems of European integration but is also a solution for the further enlargement of the EU. The EU is unavoidably multicultural because growing transnational linkages between member states, increasing the points of contacts between citizens of member states, enables new forms of identifications to develop.

As the former EU’s enlargement Commissioner, Gunter Verheugen, has suggested, Europe should “use the same methodology and benchmarks, the same criteria and same rules” that have
been applied to other new members of the EU, should not have “higher or lower standards for Turkey”, and should not involve “double standards”: “we cannot have double standards. We cannot have 100 percent of implementations. We do not do that even with our own countries” (Setimes, 2004). In other words, Europe should be “fair and objective” in its view of Turkey and its full membership. The EU should treat Turkey not as a special case, but as one of the candidate countries for the full-membership status. For the references to religion and geography, there is nothing that Turkey can do, since it cannot change its cultural identity or its geographical location.

For this reason, if Europe constitutes a democratic political space, then the process of the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria involves not only the candidate countries, but also the existing member states, since by definition no democratic regime can have the process of implementation in its fullest form. This also means that the implementation process continues in a given candidate country during the full accession negotiations, even after receiving the full-membership status. In this sense, it can be suggested that the decision of the EU about Turkey would be fair, if it is founded upon the understanding that Turkey is demonstrating a strong political will and effort to take necessary measures to implement the Copenhagen criteria.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

In this paper, I attempted to analyze Turkey’s accession to the European Union from the perspective of sociological institutionalism and argued that Turkey’s satisfactorily fulfillment of the EU’s official membership criteria is not sole determinant for Turkey to access to the EU. In this process, identity has played significant role in the EU side for the evaluation of Turkey’s EU membership. In other words, Turkey’s accession to the EU has been determined by the perceptions of Turkey’s fit into predetermined EU identity.

In Chapter I, it was explained why the matter of Turkey’s EU membership deserves to be analyzed. First, it was emphasized that Turkey was not able to join the EU although it is the oldest candidate state. Secondly, it was argued that if Turkey with big Muslim dominated population joins to the EU with over 500 million Christian population, it would not only effect political-economical shape and institutional structure of the European Union but also it would change the European identity and European borders.

In Chapter II, concept, process and theories about EU Enlargement including sociological/constructivist institutionalism was explained in order to give clear explanation on the role of identity in enlargement process of the EU towards Turkey and the Central and Eastern European States. Based on the explanations of Schimmelfenning, Sedelmeier and Sjursen, the hypothesis “The organization expands (its institutions) to outside states to the extent that these states share its collective identity, values, and norms” was presented.

Background on Turkey-EU relations, Turkey’s Europeanization (Westernization) efforts and historical evolution process of the EU-Turkey relations were presented in the third Chapter.
The aim was to reveal Turkey’s willingness to be a part of the European family with the reforms ranging from culture to governance.

Where Turkey stands for EU’s economic and political criteria was given in Chapter IV. In order to support the argument, a comparison of Turkey and CEECs in respect of economic and political conditions was made and the likely impact of Turkey on the EU institutions, possible migration from Turkey to the EU countries and unresolved Cyprus issue were discussed in that Chapter. It was put forward that Turkey had been treated differently from CEECs in its membership process because of the fact that neither economic, nor political issues would be obstacles for Turkey’s accession to the EU.

European identity and whether Turkish identity fits into this predominated European identity as well as European public and political opinion about Turkey’s EU Membership were explained in Chapter V. It was underlined that a fixed and unchanging notion of European identity does not exist today; European identity has been amplified through the process of European integration with inclusive aspects and it has always been linked with exclusive aspects. Basically, it was argued that Turkey was not able to join the EU because of the fact that European Identity has evolved by contrasting it to other identities including Turkish identity.

In Chapter VI, policy recommendations for both Turkey and the EU were explained. It was argued that Turkey’s accession to the EU has both challenges and opportunities for EU integration and Turkey’s future. It was explained that the responsibility lies on both sides if the Parties want to turn possible challenges to opportunities.
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